

**JPRS 75215**

**27 February 1980**

# **West Europe Report**

**No. 1547**



**FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE**

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>	1. REPORT NO. JPRS 75215	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle WEST EUROPE REPORT, No. 1547		5. Report Date 27 February 1980	
7. Author(s)		6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address  As above		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
		11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
		13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
15. Supplementary Notes		14.	
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)  This serial report contains political/economic information on West European energy, finance and trade policy matters as well as developments and trends in the doctrine, programs and problems of the major communist parties, including their relations with communist parties outside the West European area. The report also contains information on Theater Nuclear Forces and elections to the European Parliament.			
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors			
Political Science	International Affairs	Iceland	
Sociology	Austria	x Italy	
Propaganda	x Belgium	Luxembourg	
Economics	Canada	x Netherlands	
Energy	x Cyprus	Norway	
Industry	x Denmark	x Portugal	
Trade	x Federal Republic of	Spain	
Finance	Germany	Sweden	
Theater Nuclear Forces	Finland	Switzerland	
	x France	Turkey	
	x Greece	United Kingdom	
b. Identifiers/Open Ended Terms			
c. COSATI Field/Group 5C, 5D, 10			
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 181
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price

27 February 1980

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1547

## CONTENTS

PAGE

## THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

## FRANCE

- Reaction to U.S. Policy Objectives in European Defense,  
SALT  
(Pierre Lellouche; POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, Dec 79)..... 1
- Communist Position on National Defense Policy, NATO  
(Louis Baillot; CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, Jan 80)..... 17
- New Debate on Nuclear Weapons Reported  
(Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 19 Jan 80)..... 25

## NETHERLANDS

- Government Criticized for Antinuclear Weapons Stance  
(A. P. van Walsum; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 7 Dec 79)..... 27

## COUNTRY SECTION

## BELGIUM

- Martens Completes Formation of New Cabinet  
(LE SOIR, 24 Jan 80)..... 33
- Goor, Baudson, Degroove Join Cabinet  
CVP Voices Concern
- Government Survives in Spite of Differences  
(LE SOIR, 12 Jan 80)..... 39
- Francophone Parties Quarrel  
New Political Accord Presented  
Opposition Questions Martens



# CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

## CYPRUS

House Debates U.S. Presence at UK Bases, Monitoring Stations (Various sources, 15 Feb 80).....	47
---	----

EDEK Secretary General's Speech  
AKEL Official: 'Block Americanization'  
Progovernment Member Pleased With Policy

## DENMARK

CP Prepares for Congress; Paper, Leader Back Moscow (Solveig Rodsgaard; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 25 Jan 80)...	53
Radical Liberals' Chairman Petersen Against Defense Increase (INFORMATION, 25 Jan 80).....	56
LO Chairman Nielsen Attacks Government Crisis Plan (Frank Dahlgaard; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 25 Jan 80).....	58
Industry Leader Sees Improved Situation for Shipbuilding (Carsten Steno; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 25 Jan 80).....	62
Next Armed Forces Program Must Simplify Command Structure (P. E. Gustafsson; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 23 Jan 80)....	64
Briefs Oil Consumption Steady	68

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Minister Apel Discusses Crisis Management in NATO (Hans Apel Interview; Deutschlandfunk Network, 17 Feb 80).....	69
SPD Foreign Policy Expert Views U.S., FRG Differences (Peter Corterier Interview; Deutschlandfunk Network, 18 Feb 80).....	76
Schmidt's Number One Aide Interviewed on Foreign Affairs (Gunter Huonker Interview; Suedwestfunk Network, 17 Feb 80).....	79

# CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Inner-German Minister Interviewed on Relations With GDR (Egon Franke Interview; Deutschlandfunk Network, 18 Feb 80).....	83
Industrialist Assesses Economic Boycott Against East (Ernst Pieper Interview; DER SPIEGEL, 18 Feb 80).....	85
Greens Become Important Factor in March Baden-Wuerttemberg Vote (Friedrich Karl Fromme; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 18 Jan 80).....	92

## FRANCE

SDECE Internal Security Service Command Change Noted (Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 9 Jan 80).....	96
UPC's Simeoni Interviewed on Corsica's Future (Edmond Simeoni Interview; LE MONDE, 16 Jan 80).....	100
Rightwing Antiseparatists Fight Corsican Autonomists (LE MONDE, 9 Jan 80).....	104

## GREECE

Measures for Improvement of Bus Transportation Planned (HELLENEWS EXPRESS, 24 Jan 80).....	106
Brief Oil Drilling Plans	107

## ITALY

PCI's Macaluso Urges Government of National Unity (Emanuele Macaluso; RINASCITA, 11 Jan 80).....	108
PCI Youth Federation Secretary Interviewed on Visit to PRC (Massimo D'Alema Interview; L'UNITA, 6 Jan 80).....	112
Present, Future Availability, Costs of Hydroelectricity (FONTI DI ENERGIA ALTERNATIVE, Jul-Aug 79).....	115
Present, Future Availability of Geothermal Energy (E. Pacchiarotti, L. Paris; FONTI DI ENERGIA ALTER- NATIVE, Jul-Aug 79).....	127

# CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

## NETHERLANDS

CDA Calls for Renewed Unity on Nuclear Issue (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 16 Jan 80).....	150
Dutch Offering Mexico Financial Assistance, Know-How (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 16 Jan 80).....	152
Dutch Offering Turkey Economic Help (Editorial; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 16 Jan 80).....	154
Cabinet Considers Raising Natural Gas Price (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 26 Jan 80).....	155
Labor Unions Turn Down Government Wage Offer (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 8 Jan 80).....	157
Den Uyl Comments on Government, Labor Unions Wage Impasse (Joop Den Uyl Interview; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 17 Jan 80).....	160

## PORTUGAL

Cunhal Attacks Government, Calls Program 'Masked Coup' (Alvaro Cunhal; AVANTE, 24 Jan 80).....	164
Socialist Party Leadership Meets, Debates Strategy (Jose Rebello; LE MONDE, 23 Jan 80).....	175

## REACTION TO U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE, SALT

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 3, Dec 79 pp 481-497

[Article by Pierre Lellouche: "France and American Policy on European Security"]

[Text] Pierre Lellouche is currently a research fellow at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales. He was born in 1951. A graduate of the University of Paris-X, with a degree in advanced public law studies, and of the Paris Institute of Political Studies (IEP), he also holds a Doctor of Laws degree from Harvard University. From 1974 to 1978 he was a research fellow in Harvard's Program for Science and International Affairs. He later became a research fellow at the GERPI (Center for Social Sciences) in Paris. He contributes to the review DEFENSE ET DIPLOMATIE. An expert in strategic and arms control matters, he is the author of numerous studies and articles published in France and abroad.

The maintenance of European security has once again become the central issue in East-West relations as well as in European-American relations.

The questions raised by the signing of the SALT II agreement and its ratification process, by the revival of arms control within possible SALT III negotiations and the MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force Reduction] talks, and by the modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces (TNF), have made the continent's future security the issue of a new great debate between Europe and the United States.

What is immediately striking about this new phase in transatlantic relations is the fact that France, which had managed until just recently to stay aloof from this debate, has now in turn been caught up in the wave of concern that has been stirring European capitals since 1977.



If we take Chancellor Schmidt's speech to the London Institute for Strategic Studies in 1977 as the starting point of this debate, we can distinguish two successive phases in the evolution of the French attitude.

During the first phase--from 1977 to the summer of 1979--France displayed a most remarkable degree of discretion contrasting sharply with the intense diplomatic and political activity between Washington, Bonn, London, and Brussels. This contrast was even more pronounced inside France: while the FRG and the United States were aroused by serious internal debate over their respective defense policies, France experienced no such internal turbulence. As a matter of fact, French public opinion and politicians seemed more concerned about developments in the domestic economic situation and changes in the internal political picture following the elections of March 1978 and June 1979, than about problems related to the defense of Europe. This period's only prominent defense-related public concern resulted from the January 1979 Guadeloupe summit meeting which stirred some nervous speculation about possible French participation in SALT III. But political interest in this speculation faded very quickly once the President of the Republic announced several times that France absolutely refused to take part in the SALT III negotiations. This refusal maintained the Fifth Republic's policy on arms control negotiations between the superpowers.

Such a situation marked by France's silence and resolve to stay aloof created a paradox while at the same time raising a question.

It was indeed paradoxical to note that France chose to remain silent at the very moment when General de Gaulle's prophetic analysis of 20 years ago on the ineluctable decline of the American nuclear guarantee appeared to be actually coming true, and thereby creating profound confusion and distress among our neighbors. Furthermore, Germany had now emerged as the main disputer of American foreign policy on European security, a role France had played during the previous great European-American debate.

This paradox prompted the fundamental question of what did this French silence mean. Should it be interpreted as indicating France was perfectly satisfied with the military situation in Europe, and particularly with American policy on the subject? In other words, did this silence signify that the French, unlike the Germans, perceived no change whatever in the credibility of the assurance of protection given Europe by the United States?

This question has been partly answered as a result of the controversy in France these past few months over the issue of France's role in the security of Europe. It is significant, in fact, that the more or less bizarre trial balloons launched by certain persons this summer<sup>1</sup> were able to draw so much attention that the President of the Republic felt obliged to take a definite stand on the subject.<sup>2</sup> It is obvious that France has in turn been caught up, as the FRG and the U.S.A. had been earlier, in a whirl of speculations, misgivings, and perhaps also in the process of questioning the validity of earlier established facts. This second phase has not, however, caused France,

up to now at least, to abandon its policy of remaining aloof from the debate within NATO over European continental security questions, namely the dual problem of TWF modernization and continued arms control negotiations.

We shall refrain from harking back here on the analysis of the more or less sharp change in France's official position on a possible battle in Europe<sup>3</sup> or even on SALT. The important point to keep in mind is that the recent controversy over France's role in the security of Europe is, in fact, less important because of its actual content--see, for example, the Franco-German nuclear force trial balloon--and much more important because of its profound historical significance. This significance stems from the fact that France, 20 years after General De Gaulle's analysis, is now in the process of weighing--and therein lies the whole paradox of French defense policy--the impact of the changing strategic balance between the superpowers upon Europe's security and hence upon France's security.

In this connection, it seems highly suitable at this point to analyze how France perceives American policy in Europe and reacts to it, inasmuch as the questions that have arisen about the future of our own defense policy appear to stem in large measure from the general impression of a decline in the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. In fact, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, in Brussels last September, himself drew the inferences from this decline by asking Europeans not "to keep asking Washington for strategic assurances that cannot possibly be given."<sup>5</sup>

#### French Perceptions and American Policy in Europe

The primary characteristic of all French perceptions of American policy in Europe is their fundamentally political--and even ideological--and doctrinal dimension.

This characteristic, which should be kept constantly in mind, is due in part to the incessant wrangling over defense matters between France and the United States during the last two decades. It is also due to the typically French intellectual approach to the problem of deterrence. More than other Europeans, the French were from the very beginning "the purists of deterrence," and they remain so. Rejecting the temptation of dealing with strategic questions from a purely technical angle, which is the case in Bonn and Washington more often than not, French analysts have traditionally preferred to focus their thinking on the political and doctrinal elements that constitute the real core of the Atlantic Alliance's system, namely the credibility of the American guarantee and the basic problem of "coupling."

In fact, the French nuclear strike force ("force de frappe") is itself the living symbol of this approach.

It will also be noted that this political and doctrinal dimension was considerably reinforced by the fact that France did not take part in internal

NATO nuclear planning discussions and consequently few French analysts really had a line into the permanent strategic debate being conducted in Washington. These analysts are, therefore, much less familiar with the technical elements of that debate than others (the Germans in particular).

In addition to political differences of opinion, there thus developed, over the years, what may be called a communication problem between Frenchmen and Americans. It should be noted, however, that this problem has changed these last few years as a result of the increased interest France has shown in the strategic balance of forces between the superpowers and its consequences in Europe and most particularly in Germany.

Under these conditions, the French approach leads to perceiving and judging the different American policies in Europe on the basis of two essentially political criteria:

First, a purely French criterion: What is the impact of a given American doctrine on the French nuclear strike force?

Secondly, a European criterion: To what extent does such an American policy or doctrine affect the credibility of the nuclear umbrella the United States has given our neighbors?

As we shall see later in this article, this two-pronged approach explains in large measure the attitude taken by France during the present debate over Europe's security.

#### American Policy and the French National Deterrent

Some 20 years ago, the basic issue between Paris and Washington, relative to European security, concerned the very existence of the French nuclear force. Nobody other than France dared at that time to question the credibility of the American guarantee at a time when the United States enjoyed a comfortable strategic superiority over the USSR.

Today, the situation is the exact opposite. The United States has officially recognized the French nuclear force and this independent deterrent capability's contribution to the security of the Alliance.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, the main problem at the present time is the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee given to our European neighbors.

This historic change explains to a very large extent France's present discretion or its aloofness from the new transatlantic debate on the future of Europe's security.

If France is much less clamorous today than 20 years ago, it is precisely because the supreme problem of Franco-American relations,<sup>7</sup> namely the existence of the nuclear force, has ceased to be "the" problem. In fact,

it should be noted that since the signing of the Ottawa Declaration in 1974, President Giscard d'Estaing has emphasized this point on several occasions. Specifically, after President Carter's visit to France in January 1976, the President of the Republic underscored the fact that "for a long time, the feeling had been that there was an (American) desire to see France change the independent character of its defense policy. Not only was no pressure exerted in this area, but President Carter even acknowledged in his statements how advantageous the independent existence of France's defense was for the West."<sup>8</sup>

Despite the efforts made by the Elysee to publicize American recognition of the French nuclear force, there are many who persist in distrusting the attitude of the United States.

A good half of the political community (Gaullists and communists) continues to believe that Washington's ultimate goal remains elimination of the French deterrent, either through its reintegration into NATO--this would deprive the nuclear force of its value as an independent capability--or by the expedient of the process of arms control negotiations with the USSR.

For the Gaullists, SALT III's "meaning to France in plain language is that its strategic nuclear force and its tactical nuclear force would become involved in global American-Soviet haggling.... That is the new fact. It means that our defense's independence could be debated some time or other, and it must be realized after all that this debate would be governed by the 'might is right' rule. It must also be realized that the Americans have never really accepted the French deterrent force, even if they no longer hold it in contempt."<sup>9</sup> Consequently the Gaullists have shown the most hostility to any possibility of France's participation in SALT III. Some officials of that party have even taken pleasure in emphasizing that they had, in fact, forced the President of the Republic to take a stand against SALT I<sup>10</sup> immediately after the Guadeloupe summit meeting.<sup>10</sup>

While the communists, for their part, have also taken a Gaullist-like position on the issue of an independent national deterrent these past few years, they, nevertheless, have reached a diametrically opposed conclusion that consists in stressing France's necessary participation in SALT III. According to the communists, the existence of the Ottawa Declaration would give the United States a sort of blank check to speak in the name of France in the event the latter is absent. Since trusting the United States is out of the question, France must, therefore, refuse to give any other state or organization "the right to speak in its name."<sup>11</sup>

This same mistrust of American intentions appears in the analyses of SALT published by LE MONDE. The SALT process is depicted as actually a sort of understanding between the two superpowers, the ultimate purpose of which is to achieve the long-sought objective of eliminating the nuclear forces of third-party powers, this time by negotiation (SALT III).<sup>12</sup>



In this context, it is significant that the Guadeloupe summit aroused hostile reactions within the French political class. It is equally significant that these reactions were quickly quelled by the positions taken by the President of the Republic against not only French participation in SALT III but also against that negotiation itself.<sup>13</sup>

#### American Guarantee and Security of France's Neighboring Countries

The problem of the nuclear force having been resolved--by the Ottawa Declaration and the French refusal to participate in SALT III--the main question preoccupying France today--as shown by the various trial balloons recently launched in Germany's direction--has to do with maintenance of the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee given our European neighbors within the NATO framework.

It is evident that actual expression of such concern by official circles is an extremely delicate matter.

Having decided to remain out of the Alliance's integrated military organizations, thereby confirming General De Gaulle's 1966 decision, the present government cannot, without contradicting itself, officially take part in the current debate within NATO between Germans and Americans over the problem of European security. Such adoption of a definite position on issues like the neutron bomb or TNF modernization would immediately encounter political obstacles both inside and outside France. The vigilance maintained by Gaullists and communists to detect any such deviation towards NATO, plus the need to maintain the bilateral Franco-Soviet policy of detente--itself based on France's particular posture with respect to NATO--actually preclude taking definite positions of this nature.

Despite these political obstacles blocking the expression of French concerns about the evolution of the European security situation, it is, nevertheless, becoming increasingly clear that France is directly affected by this situation. There is, in fact, noticeable increased awareness of the fact that real problems do now exist, problems resulting not only from the buildup of Soviet nuclear forces these past few years--a buildup that, incidentally, worries government leaders--but also from what is generally perceived as the decreasing credibility of the American commitment to Europe's security.

#### The Problems

Even though France's security is based primarily on the existence of the national deterrent capability, it is obvious that in many respects the country's security is likewise linked to the security of our European neighbors. Their security in turn is based on the American nuclear guarantee given within the NATO framework.

This link between France's security, Europe's security, and the American nuclear guarantee--even though politically difficult for some to acknowledge--is now accepted by most French analysts. It has been most clearly summarized in the following explanation by Jean-Louis Gergorin: "France with its allies signed the Ottawa Declaration affirming the complementarity, from the standpoint of ultimate goals, between the independent deterrent forces of France and NATO. This fact compels us to follow closely any developments in the credibility of the flexible response doctrine even though that doctrine is not ours. While it is, in effect, vital that our deterrent remain always credible, it is desirable that NATO's deterrent not become weaker."<sup>14</sup>

French opinion on the American guarantee's credibility is based on a whole series of perceptions of various aspects of U.S. foreign and defense policies. These perceptions concern the level of American military power, but also the political influence and leadership of the United States in Europe as well as in other areas of the world. This mosaic of impressions forms in turn a picture of the credibility or noncredibility of the famous American nuclear umbrella.

As for ourselves, we shall limit our comments here to an analysis of the viewpoints expressed in France in three main subject areas: the role and leadership of the United States in the world, Washington's policy with regard to the USSR, particularly within the SALT framework, and the place of the United States in Europe on the political and military levels.

#### French Perceptions of U.S. Role and Leadership in the World

In looking at America today, Frenchmen have contradictory feelings that are altogether significant.

If, on the one hand, it is true that post-Watergate and post-Vietnam America has stopped being the "world's policeman," then that in itself is not a totally negative development for France. The more modest America of the late 1970's whose commitments are limited to Europe (and Japan) is no longer the "brusque and insensitive leader" of the past who openly ignored France's national pride,<sup>15</sup> and whose global ambitions risked dragging Europe into dangerous neocolonial expeditions.

To a certain extent, what others--including a large part of U.S. public opinion--may have perceived as a declining America, the French, in contrast, have perceived as a normal and altogether positive movement of that superpower in the direction of a multipolar world. Obviously, such an evolution has certain advantages for France, notably the possibility of a greater margin of maneuver for its own actions in the world.

In fact, upon looking at recent official statements by the two governments, one cannot help noting the striking increasing similarity of views expressed about the future role of France and Europe in a multipolar world.

For example, President Giscard d'Estaing declared on 1 January 1978: "What I found to be of a positive nature in our talks (with President Carter) is that the present American administration realizes that there is in Europe this independent decision-making factor, that this strong national desire to provide for its own security is, all things considered, a positive factor. Accordingly, instead of viewing our differences as being a permanent obstacle to our relations, the fact that these differences exist and are clearly perceived, clearly understood, can be a factor of enrichment in international life and an additional means of achieving our great objectives, namely organization of a multipolar world that would not be limited to the decisions of the two superpowers, but a world in which we would seek to establish the dialog on the basis of something other than ideological structures or military alliances, and thus a world that, little by little, would become multipolar, pluralistic in its political and social choices, and peaceful at the same time."<sup>16</sup>

When asked if he would accept a stronger Europe, Z. Brzezinski's views were akin to those expressed by the French president. Brzezinski replied: "One of the dilemmas of American-European relations is that we do not want a weak and submissive Europe, but at the same time we have to recognize that as Europe becomes stronger and more of a partner, it is bound to disagree with us more. But that is a price we are prepared to pay. Our historical perspective is that of a world of diversity consisting of several important players making a cumulative and collective contribution to security.... If the choice is between a passive and submissive Europe and an active but occasionally dissenting ally, the latter is more in accordance with our picture of a stable international system."<sup>17</sup>

Yet--and this is the other side of that picture--while the French do feel more comfortable today in their bilateral relations with the United States, they are still, nevertheless, disturbed by the change in the global politico-military balance between the two superpowers, a balance that is now perceived as tilting in favor of the Soviets.

In other words, while being satisfied with the now more balanced relations between Paris and Washington, at the same time, Frenchmen vaguely perceive that this new balance is more the result of American weaknesses in Europe and elsewhere than of a deliberate change in attitudes by American decision-makers.

This first problem, namely the perception of a weakened America, has been widely underscored by the French press. In contrast with what is increasingly perceived as continuous expansion of Soviet power in Europe and the Third World,<sup>18</sup> the United States now appears paralyzed in their external military actions, thus leaving this task to others (France in Africa, for example). In some instances, the United States has even looked like a power being openly manhandled: Iran, Afghanistan, Carter's visit to Mexico. When added to the aforementioned considerations, such incidents strengthen the general impression that the Carter administration's foreign policy

performance is truly amateurish. Like many others, Frenchmen are perplexed by the different--and often contradictory--viewpoints expressed at the highest levels of the U.S. government by Z. Brzezinski, C. Vance, and until very recently, A. Young. In addition, glaring blunders--Iran, the neutron bomb--can but further strengthen this impression of confusion which has become synonymous with the present administration.

It is important to note that such impressions contrast sharply with past French reactions to the Nixon-Kissinger administration. As a matter of fact, both of these men are still popular in France. Although Frenchmen were hostile more often than not to the objectives of Kissinger's policy--particularly when these involved Europe--they, nevertheless, understood his Realpolitik philosophy. On the other hand, the present administration's religiosity or moralism remains an enigma to Paris, especially when the global approach championed by Carter results in putting human rights, SALT, or even nonproliferation in the same basket. In this connection, Cyrus Vance's visit to Moscow in March 1977 was perceived in France as the clearest possible proof that Carter ill-understood the USSR and international politics in general. Though France agreed with each one of the objectives pursued on that occasion by the United States--namely disarmament and human rights--it was the mixture of the two as a diplomatic method that appeared most distressing when compared with the French approach in international relations.<sup>19</sup>

We could list many more examples of this nature, ranging from Carter's non-proliferation or arms sales policy to the sudden interest Washington showed in the "Chinese card."

The important point is that, even if France does agree more often than not with the new objectives of American diplomacy, the repeated mistakes in substance and form at one and the same time, the inability to act at the right moment, all ultimately paint a truly disturbing picture when viewed from Paris, especially when these mistakes are made at a time when the USSR is expanding its power and influence in Europe and the Third World.

#### French Perceptions of American-Soviet Relations and SALT

Strictly speaking, Frenchmen have never liked the idea of detente between the two superpowers and its corollary, arms control. In the 1960's--up until the signing of SALT I--it was feared in France that this detente might actually become an agreement permitting the two "greats" to divide government of the world between themselves. Likewise, the SALT process, the supreme symbol of this duopoly, was initially judged to be potentially dangerous, particularly to the security of Europe. These fears were, in fact, clearly voiced by Michel Debre, then minister of defense, in 1971: "These negotiations whose purpose is to limit the arms race and reduce the risk of a large-scale confrontation deserve, in principle, the whole world's support. But in determining the strategic situation according to their vital interests, aren't the two superpowers creating new dangers in theaters they consider merely secondary? In such cases, doesn't their confrontation, perhaps through third



parties, become really less improbable, since this confrontation is kept within limits defined in advance? Consequently can Europeans help from wondering whether their territory is not liable some day to become a secondary theater of war between the superpowers?"<sup>20</sup>

French reactions were less negative following the signing of the SALT I agreement in 1972. Detente had not eliminated competition between the superpowers and the so greatly feared duopoly was far from turning into two-power government of the world. Furthermore, on a more strictly military level, French analysts noted that the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty actually favored France, and that the United States, despite lower numerical ceilings under the Interim Agreement, still retained a wide qualitative lead over the Soviets. As for the "coupling" problem, French analysts concluded--like most of their American counterparts<sup>21</sup>--that SALT I in no way affected either Europe's security or the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.<sup>22</sup> The French Government stated that the SALT I agreement "included no provision likely to limit the freedom of action of third powers in any field of activity whatsoever." The French nuclear force being thus preserved, Paris could, therefore, hail SALT I as "an important contribution to the establishment of a climate of detente and cooperation in the world."<sup>23</sup>

Since the 1974 Vladivostok agreement, and particularly since the beginning of the new transatlantic debate in 1977-1978 over SALT III and the Euro-strategic balance, French perceptions of American policy relative to the USSR and arms control have gradually shifted in a clearly less positive direction. This change is due in a certain measure to the inconsistencies of American policy relative to the USSR. As noted above, Frenchmen were disturbed by the existence of two radically opposing views on the USSR at the Carter administration's highest level--the views of Brzezinski and Vance--views leading to two distinct (and often opposite) policies on American-Soviet detente.

The other series of reasons explaining the change in the French attitude toward SALT lie in the change in the strategic balance since Vladivostok and its effects on Europe.

Even though French experts have not been as hard on the United States as some of their British and German colleagues who accused Washington of having sacrificed "Europe for SALT,"<sup>24</sup> the general view remains that the central balance has changed since 1969 in favor of the USSR and that this development is fraught with consequences for the future of the old continent's security.<sup>25</sup>

It will be noted, in this connection, that despite the French Government's favorable--though highly qualified--assessment of SALT II,<sup>26</sup> almost all analysts and the press took a rather negative view of the treaty. In fact, at least to our knowledge, there has not been to date the slightest comment

clearly favorable to the treaty in the press or specialized literature. Even persons with such different political views in these matters as Raymond Aron and Pierre Gallois have severely criticized the treaty as dangerous to Europe's security.<sup>27</sup>

SALT II is perceived as reflecting a ratio of strategic nuclear forces that is progressively changing in favor of the USSR. Though such a change is not perceived as likely to jeopardize the security of the United States itself--even though there is a problem with the vulnerability of American ICBM's--it is feared, however, that this change may considerably lower the credibility of the nuclear guarantee to Europe.

These French concerns about the evolution in the ratio of forces at the central level takes on special importance because of the fact that, in the opinion of French analysts, it is precisely this central ratio of forces that is the key to "coupling." On the other hand, the so-called Eurostrategic balance is a concept unanimously rejected in France as both erroneous and dangerous to Europeans because it is the very symbol of "decoupling."

Moreover, the connection between SALT II and SALT III also poses a problem from the French standpoint: theater nuclear weapons limitations under SALT III agreements are perceived as liable to endanger the NATO flexible response doctrine on which the security of our neighbors is based, and also as a continuous future source of difficulties between Europe and the United States.

Added to these misgivings is the more widespread impression in France that the United States does not really know what defense policy to adopt or how to restore the ratio of forces in its favor. This point is glaringly illustrated by the B-1 bomber decision and the lengthy shilly-shallying and "fuzziness" surrounding the MX missile program.

#### French Perception of the United States' Place in Europe

Against this background of a declining America seemingly about to be strategically overtaken by the USSR, the French viewpoint on the United States' place in Europe can hardly be optimistic.

As seen from Paris, the main problem has to do with American-German relations, or rather the way the United States is handling the German problem. If the truth must be told, these relations have never been totally pleasing to the French and in the past have been the cause of many of the quarrels between Paris and Washington. Basically, relations between the FRG and the United States place France in a permanent dilemma. Either these relations are very serene, and in that case, Frenchmen have a tendency to denounce a Bonn-Washington axis.<sup>28</sup> Or else Germany, uneasy about American vacillation and blunders, appears to become upset and concerned about its security, and in that case, Frenchmen immediately become worried about a

possible resurgence of the German problem and, therefore, would rather see Washington display more resolute "leadership."<sup>29</sup>

At the present time, French concerns are clearly of this second category. Hence it was no accident that the recent defense controversy in France centered upon the problem of Germany's security which, according to some, ought to be guaranteed by the French deterrent force or by a European deterrent, in default of the American umbrella which is deemed to be full of holes.

The second problem is more general and involves Washington's overall attitude toward the Alliance. The vacillation and confusion of American policy in the neutron bomb case as well as in the TNF modernization problem demonstrate, in the opinion of Frenchmen, a disturbing movement by the United States toward a sort of "nonleadership" that could well signal the beginning of a neoisolationist phase by Americans. Such a move actually changes the Alliance's nature. To speak plainly, NATO is not a democratic assembly of different nations. Only one of the member nations, the United States, has its finger on the nuclear trigger that guarantees the security of the others. This ultimate power of decision, which does not exclude necessary consultation with the integrated allies, implies that Washington makes, at the proper time, the essential decisions when it becomes necessary to increase or modernize the Alliance's deterrent capability. Consequently how are we to interpret Washington's present attitude which consists in publicly asking the other integrated members if they agree to accept this or that nuclear defense system? How can these nations, and especially the FRG, be asked to choose publicly between these weapon systems, when it is known in advance that these nations are in no position to make such decisions for obvious political reasons? Is this one more proof of America's naiveness? Or else is there in this attitude something less naive or harmless that could emerge in the future in the United States to convince the Senate and public opinion that since Europeans refuse to defend themselves, America does not have to take their place?

In fact, it is not by mere chance that in certain American circles we already note the argument being advanced that Europe is showing an astonishing lack of interest in the SALT process.<sup>30</sup> Why then should America spend its taxpayers dollars for the defense of Europe?

Militarily, the policy followed by the United States scarcely furnishes grounds for more optimism. Recent analyses by several French experts have added a technical dimension to French concerns about the impact of the SS-20 missiles on the flexible response doctrine.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, everything gives the impression that the United States is already drawing inferences from strategic parity, inferences that Kissinger, in fact, openly revealed to Europeans quite recently.

In this connection, American insistence upon enhancing NATO conventional forces and increasing budgetary allocations for those forces, the interest shown by Washington in clean and low-yield nuclear weapons as well as in such "gadgets" as the PGM's [Precision Guided Munitions], are all perceived as being an integral part of a master strategy designed to sever the last automatized links between defense of the European theater and employment of the American central systems.<sup>32</sup>

All of this may be summarized in the following concrete terms:

1. The change in the ratio of forces at the central level is perceived as having damaged the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee within the NATO framework.
2. As a result, the United States is in the process of removing every automatic link between the European theater and the employment of central systems by raising the nuclear threshold as high as possible through a policy of expanding conventional forces and preparing nuclear weapons meant for the war in Europe rather than for triggering the American central systems.

What Role for France?

All of the questions raised above now form the central point of the current transatlantic debate over SALT III and TNF modernization. France has decided, rightly or wrongly, not to take any official part in these discussions.

But whether we like it or not, France is directly affected by this debate, as indicated indeed by the growing awareness displayed in the country about the decline in the credibility of the American guarantee and the changing strategic situation between the superpowers.

Though such an increasing awareness is both positive and necessary, it would be dangerous and misleading, however, if the resulting debate in France were to turn into a dialog of the deaf, as has been the case in the past. A new clash between supporters of a selfish and unrealistic "sanctuarization" restricted strictly to French territory, and advocates of an unrealistic and ineffective European deterrent, will only result in maintaining the status quo, the silence and inadequacies of present French policy, at the very time when the present balance of forces situation in Europe demands firm action by France.

France's nuclear trump card must not be the excuse for retiring into one's shell. Such action, added to the American decline, is liable to be fraught with consequences in Europe. Conversely, neither must this nuclear trump card be the instrument of a daydream, that of a European defense organized around the French nuclear umbrella that would suddenly relieve the American umbrella.



There is room between these two extremes for a policy allowing France to preserve its own system of deterrence while at the same time contributing to a strengthening of the Alliance's overall deterrence. To accomplish this, it is urgently necessary for France to make its voice heard on the TNF modernization issue which is of such capital importance for the coming decade. Specifically, the decision already made in Paris to modernize our own forces--particularly the development of mobile medium-range surface-to-surface missiles--must serve as a reference model for all those in Europe who are reluctant to adopt a military policy within NATO. Hence this decision, which for the moment is of a purely internal nature, must become the basis of diplomatic action that will help both our European neighbors and the United States rebuild a truly credible deterrent. Consequently it is not enough to note or denounce the decline of America and the resultant risks of a resurgence of the German problem. Similarly, remaining aloof--by rejecting SALT III and refusing to participate in the [NATO] Special Group--or conversely, proposing that Germany withdraw from NATO in exchange for French protection, are not enough to permit us to reasonably expect Europe's current basic security problems to disappear.

For those problems are also France's problems.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See the interview with General Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 20 August 1979; Senator Chaumont's article "Europe Must Become Independent," LE MONDE, 14 July 1979; and the book by Cagnat, Doly, and Fontaine, "Euroshima, Construire l'Europe de la Defense," Paris, Media, 1979.
2. See Giscard d'Estaing's television interview of 17 September 1979, LE MONDE, 19 September 1979, in which the president "categorically" ruled out "any proposal by France for the constitution of nuclear arms in the Federal Republic of Germany."
3. See Jean Klein's article in this same issue of POLITIQUE ETRANGERE.
4. Pierre Lellouche, "France, SALT, and Europe's Security," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 2, summer 1979.
5. See Henry Kissinger's speech, POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 2, 1979, new series.
6. See paragraph 6 of the Ottawa Declaration of 19 June 1974.
7. John Newhouse, "De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons," New York, Viking Press, 1970, p 58.

8. Press conference of 6 January 1978, LE MONDE, 7 January 1978.
9. LA LETTRE DE LA NATION, 8 January 1979.
10. LE MONDE, 23 January 1979.
11. L'HUMANITE, 23 January 1979.
12. Jacques Isnard, "Europe's Place in the SALT Negotiations," LE MONDE, 4 January 1979.
13. See President of the Republic's press conference of 15 February 1979, LE MONDE, 17 February 1979.
14. Jean-Louis Gergorin, "SALT Negotiations and the Defense of Europe," DEFENSE NATIONALE, June 1978, p 56.
15. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Power: U.S.A.-USSR," New York, Viking Press, 1972, pp 390-396.
16. Press conference of 6 January 1978, LE MONDE, 7 January 1978.
17. "Europa," LE MONDE, 2 May 1979.
18. See, for example, the recent covers of POINT, "Can Europe Still Defend Itself?," 3 September 1979, and L'EXPRESS "Superpower Red Army," 21 April 1979.
19. Jacques Chirac, "France: Illusions, Temptations, Ambitions," FOREIGN POLICY, April 1978, p 498.
20. Michel Debre, "France's Global Strategy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1971, p 403.
21. Andrew Pierre, "SALT Agreement and its Inferences for Europe. An American Viewpoint," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 3, 1972.
22. Jean Klein, "SALT and Security in Europe," REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, August 1973.
23. Council of Ministers [cabinet meeting] communique of 31 May 1972, LE MONDE, 1 June 1972.
24. Lothar Ruehl, "Europe Sacrificed for SALT?," DEFENSE NATIONALE, March 1979, and Laurence Martin's contribution to "The Great SALT Debate," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, winter 1979.
25. Raymond Aron, "The American Resignation," L'EXPRESS, 13-19 January 1979, and "From American Imperialism to Soviet Hegemony," COMMENTAIRES, spring

1979). See also Francois de Rose, "The Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, summer 1979, and Andre Fontaine, "Deterrence At Issue," LE MONDE, 5 September 1979.

26. Council of Ministers of 26 June 1979, LE MONDE, 27 June 1979.
27. Raymond Aron, op.cit., and Pierre Gallois, "SALT: Futile and Dangerous Negotiations," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 1, fall 1979.
28. Pierre Dabiezies, "Europe Hoaxed," LE MONDE, 6-7 November 1977.
29. Raymond Aron, "FRG: Temptation of the East," L'EXPRESS, 21 April 1979.
30. See, for example, Senator H. Jackson's speech to the NATO Assembly in Lisbon on 27 November 1978.
31. Pierre M. Gallois, "Defeat Without Combat," POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, winter 1978-1979, and "New Weapons and Security of West European Countries," seminar of the Academie Diplomatique Internationale, 4 April 1979. See also Francois de Rose, op.cit.
32. Jacques Huntzinger: "Save the Deterrent," LE MONDE, 9 March 1978, and Pierre Gallois "A Weapon About Which We Do Not Know What to Do," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 1, 1977, pp 41-44.

8041

CSO: 3100

## COMMUNIST POSITION ON NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY, NATO

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Jan 80 pp 24-30

[Article by Louis Baillot: "In the Interest of France, Detente and Disarmament"]

[Text] There is nothing national about the Giscardian policy vis-a-vis defense. It does not respond to France's security and independence requirements. By lying within the Euro-Atlantic framework, it turns its back on detente and disarmament.

Since the middle of the summer, strategic and military problems in general and, for France, defense problems, have taken on considerable importance.

A double campaign is being developed. One is aimed at checking detente and starting up the arms race again, especially in Europe. The other, which is its corollary, is aimed at furthering the idea of a European defense. During the European elections campaign all parties except the Communist Party took great care not to mention the question of European defense, and to come out against any extension of the powers of the European Assembly by invoking the Treaty of Rome. But since shortly after 10 June, with the elections over, the partisans of integrated Europe--including militarily integrated--have been going into action. During the first real session of the European Assembly in Strasbourg in September they attempted to open debate on course of supranationality by discussing "a community armament program within the framework of Europe's industrial policy, and in liaison with NATO."

The firm attitude of the communist group exposed the conspiracy hatched against our country with the support of Mme Veil, Messrs Lecanuet, Poniatowski and other Giscardians; the French Socialist deputies leaving the spokesman for the socialist group in Strasbourg to declare that the debate was just ill-timed, which speaks volumes about the social democrats' desire for European integration.

It is obvious that the European integrationists will return to the charge. This is within the logic of the policy desired by NATO, under the iron rule of the United States. More than ever must the vigilance of patriots and French democrats remain on the alert.

## To Prevent the Relaunching of the Arms Race in Europe

Last June in Vienna, after seven years of discussions, Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter signed the SALT II accord. This accord is a very important contribution to detente. It makes it possible to stop the strategic arms race and opens the way to other accords, especially SALT III, aiming at the manufacture of medium-range nuclear weapons, the so-called gray area. Europe is directly interested in concluding such an accord.

Thus far the SALT II accord has never been ratified by the American Senate. The most diverse obstacles--as much international as domestic policy--are being used to prevent ratification. The fact that the United States has entered the presidential election year further complicates the situation. The pressure groups, beginning with the military-industrial complex in the Pentagon, are not remaining inactive. And President Carter's hesitation contributes to slowing down the application of an accord whose qualities he praised when he signed it.

Since early autumn the axis of Western strategic policy has been moved to Europe.

The Americans having decided to install medium-range missiles, Pershing II and cruise, in Western Europe, a violent campaign on the theme of the superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces over those of NATO has been launched by the Atlantic Alliance countries. According to Western propaganda, that superiority would lie both in conventional forces and nuclear forces enriched with new mobile SS 20s "capable of wiping out in a few minutes all the military forces stationed in Europe, and invulnerable by virtue of their mobility," as well as new bombers with the code name "Backfire." However, to many experts, beginning with the Stockholm Institute, specializing in the evaluation of world military forces, that superiority is not at all evident, and on several occasions the Americans themselves and those who support their policy in Europe have made note of a technological or qualitative superiority of the NATO forces over those of the Warsaw Pact. This was again the case at the Western European Union (WEU) in December.

With the signing of the SALT II accords the parity of the strategic forces of the two blocs was brought to the fore, and it is from that parity that it becomes possible to embark on the path to a gradual, balanced disarmament.

Such parity is also valuable on the European side. Also, any implantation of new weapons of the Pershing II or cruise type can only lead to a rupture of the equilibrium, releasing a new arms race. In fact, from the mouths of the most authorized Soviet leaders--particularly Andre Gromyko--it has been learned that if such weapons came to be installed in Europe, the Soviet Union would feel obliged to endow itself with new weapons.

Thus, to prevent the arms race starting up again in Europe is of the greatest interest to the European peoples.



The NATO Political Council has just met in Brussels. After a lively political indoctrination campaign conducted in the European countries that belong to it, it decided to place 600 Pershing II and cruise missiles on European soil. That decision was not taken without difficulty. Although it was relatively easy in the FRG and Italy, despite the opposition of the PCI [Italian Communist Party], on the other hand lively opposition was manifested in Belgium, as well as in Denmark. The idea that it would be necessary to postpone making the decision, until all possibilities of stopping the arms race in Europe through frank discussion with the USSR had been explored, was used by the opponents of implanting the American rockets. The idea continues to make headway. It is profoundly regrettable that the French government has not yet declared itself on such a decision. Its proposal that a European disarmament conference be held cannot replace the absence of a stand against installing American rockets. But, finally, he who says nothing consents. And silence signifies approval of installing the Pershing IIs. The argument that France is not involved in the installation of Pershing IIs because of its withdrawal from NATO does not hold water. Our country's fate is inevitably committed from the moment that new nuclear rockets are implanted in the neighboring countries with which it is linked in the Common Market. Nuclear danger is not divided up. It does not stop at France's borders.

#### Unlike the Positive Attitude of the USSR

It is in this context that the proposals made in East Berlin by Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the FRG acquire all their significance.

The withdrawal from the territory of Democratic Germany of a modern armored division has been accomplished. Twenty thousand soldiers and 1,000 tanks have returned to the Soviet Union. Other soldiers and other heavy weapons could be withdrawn in a new stage. The Soviet proposals also conclude with the unilateral reduction in the number of medium-range missiles in the western zones of the USSR, on condition that NATO not seek to install new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe; with appreciable reinforcement of the military confidence measures agreed upon at Helsinki, in such a way as to reduce the danger of surprise attack; with the guarantee of non-utilization of nuclear weapons to the other countries that are refusing to produce or acquire nuclear weapons and have none in their territory. Leonid Brezhnev's proposals also make it possible to start the SALT III discussion on reducing the number of middle-range weapons, as envisaged by SALT II.

This group of decisions and Soviet proposals constitutes an inarguable political act making it possible to embark on the disarmament path in Europe. The prudent French government--must it not take into account French public opinion and the proposals made by the French Communist Party?--answered through the mouth of Francois-Poncet that the proposals made in Berlin deserved attention. But Valery Giscard d'Estaing, in West Berlin on an inspection tour several weeks later did not make the slightest allusion to them. And at the same time the press, the radio, the television, under orders from the government, began a violent campaign to minimize the scope of the decisions and Soviet proposals, and stressed the crushing superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces. Thus,

timidly, the government recognizes a positive aspect to the Soviet step, without doing any more, but allows the mass media to organize an alarmist anti-Soviet campaign, favorable to the arms race. It will not let a contradiction stop it. Thus, when the updating of the military programming law was being discussed in the National Assembly, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] spokesman for the Finance Committee, Mr Cressard, wrote, in the part devoted to examining opposing military forces: "American power remains largely intact at home and outside its borders. It can find in its own soil, if it manages it parsimoniously, enough to live on. The freedom of the seas it holds under its protection...On a strictly military level, its defense has the benefit of absolute impunity..." And to those who advance the idea that the Americans might "get out of Europe" or that the "American umbrella" might not be as effective as it used to be, as Kissinger recently let it be understood before NATO in order to push the Europeans into accomplishing their own integrated defense, Cyrus Vance replies that the United States "will never abandon the defense of Europe" and is proposing to its European vassals the installation of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles.

In reality, the political forces that are rejecting *detente* and opposing disarmament are making use of quibbling to reject the Soviet proposals. For it is easy to retort that if they consider the USSR measures and proposals to be inadequate, why do they not conduct a campaign for the Western governments, beginning with the United States, to make bolder proposals? But one is obliged to state that since the end of the Second World War imperialism has */never/* [in italics] been the first to make a single concrete, realistic proposal in favor of disarmament. It has always been constrained and forced by the struggle of the peoples with whom it has sat at the negotiating table. This is certainly proof that the world forces that aspire to *detente* and disarmament have a considerable role to play and can bring it to negotiation.

#### France in the Euro-Atlantic Strategy

It is within this political and strategic world situation that the campaign for a European defense is developing in France and in Europe.

In an article in the FIGARO-DIMANCHE of 25 November 1979, entitled "Europe and its Defense," Jean Lecanuet says that "European solidarity is being affirmed in plain language by the government." And to quote the statement made in the National Assembly by Raymond Bourges in the debate on the military budget, "France's destiny cannot be separated from that of the continent. Not only is France in Europe, but it cannot remain neutral; that is why one of our army's missions is to be able to participate in the defense of Europe if the government so decides!"

At the same time, in Brussels, the WEU symposium was being held, aimed at putting forward the idea of a European defense starting with the joint manufacture of armaments. Mr Davignon, resuming the arguments developed in the Strasbourg Assembly a month before, claimed that the manufacture of armaments is now an important element of industrial production in Europe and a considerable factor in preventing unemployment; as a result of this, it would have to be conducted

on a European scale.

Thus, as Georges Marchais demonstrated in Strasbourg in September, it is by means of joint manufacture of armaments that the integrationists want to put forward the European defense idea. This is what Jean Lecanuet is confirming in the above-mentioned article when he says that with regard to European production of armaments "the results are still too limited," that it is advisable to go farther in that area and that "greater unity among the European Community on the subject of defense would in itself have greater power of dissuasion, thus improving the chances for peace." And to conclude: "We would hope that one day soon these questions would at least be the subject of joint research, and that the general problem of the defense of Europe can be mentioned at higher levels, without preliminaries and without a priori..." Although Mr Bourges was not present at the WEU symposium, in Hamburg he contributed to setting up this European defense policy. In fact, with his counterparts from the FRG and Great Britain, did he not make the decision to jointly manufacture an ultra-modern tank and to put under study the joint production of a combat helicopter, a field in which the SNIAS [expansion unknown] possesses an indisputable technological advance which should make our country safe from any competition. The proof being given--once more--that in matters of joint armament production the essential thing is policy and not technology.

As Guy Hermier recalled during the debate in the National Assembly on updating the military programming law, it is really a question of "supporting a defense policy that has nothing national about it, that is not at all responsive to our country's security and independence requirements. This policy is written within the Euro-Atlantic framework. This is a policy that assigns a gendarme's role to the French forces, especially in Africa. For those two fundamental reasons, this is a policy that firmly turns its back on detente and disarmament--conditions that are imperative for real security for our country."

Although France is not officially reintegrated into NATO, for obvious reasons of domestic policy, de facto reintegration exists. By a thousand and one channels France has been linked with NATO surreptitiously, from the participation in the GIEP [Independent European Program Group]--for lack of ability to return to the Euro-group--to France's participation in "combined or parallel maneuvers" with the NATO forces. To take only recent facts, the naval maneuvers took place in the Mediterranean along the French coasts at the same time as those of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the same way, the autumn maneuvers of the Atlantic Pact took place in the FRG simultaneously with those of the French army, christened "Saone-79." This was recently revealed by the Lisbon newspaper L'ESPRESSO, which is close to the Democratic Alliance, which just won the Portuguese elections: "Ramstein's visit was going to offer us a considerable surprise. In fact, while visiting the secret operational control center we were able to establish that he was controlling not only the air forces of the four countries in maneuvers, but also the French strategic command's Mirages, which were carrying out missions of support for the 1st Corps of the French army which, as if by chance, was also on maneuvers...Despite official and unofficial denials," continues the newspaper, "we had a very firm impression that the French forces, though independent of the NATO integrated military

command, are maintaining an extremely significant operational collusion with it."

### Serious Consequences for France and its National Defense

France's defense policy is thus in keeping with the Atlantic strategy, which assigns to the French forces a participation in the defense of Europe and a gendarme's role, especially in Africa.

Recently Harold Brown, American Defense Minister, recommended "a division of labor between Atlantic allies," which means a division of responsibility between, on the one hand, the United States, which would be occupied with "heavy strategic systems and the long-distance naval force" and on the other hand, Washington's partners, who would assume a greater load of "the military effort in their own regions," and who would take charge of making up the difference in matters concerning the naval policy to be conducted to ensure the security of the Western world's provisions.

The plan for an integrated European defense within the Atlantic framework takes on all its significance in the light of these American proposals. To claim that European defense could be conducted independently--indeed, against the Americans--is a misstatement. In fact it involves dividing the tasks with the Americans by common accord. In the Labor government the British Defense Minister stated that no European defense was possible except within NATO. And Hans Appel, FRG Defense Minister, answered "no" to the proposal by Alexandre Sanguinetti for a Franco-German military condominium which would give the FRG the nuclear weapon. "The FRG remains in NATO and asks that it be strengthened," Mr Appel said. That is clear and clean.

Stating before the Institute for Advanced Studies of National Defense, "Our maritime traffic, particularly that which borrows the Cape and North Atlantic routes, will be defended only to the extent that we contribute to the common defense," Admiral Lanuzel, the Navy chief of staff, rejected any idea of national independence in military strategy, such as the idea conceived by the Elysee. And although at the time of the debate on updating the programing law, Mr Bourges thought it necessary, for political reasons, to deny that statement by the Navy chief of staff, it is nonetheless true that the differences, including those concerning military maneuvers, are so obvious that they cannot be accidental.

With regard to the gendarme role that has devolved upon the French forces in Africa, the use of those forces in the Central African affair was considered by the least harsh observers to be a monumental error, and provoked questioning and anger among the career military.

It is true that governmental and presidential position in the matter can only lead to errors and miscalculations prejudicial to the authority and renown of France in the world, not to mention the prejudices caused in the French army itself, as a result of the permanent increase in credits allotted to a "professional army" in gestation, whose name no one dares mention. The discussion



of the 1980 military budget, moreover, gave prominence to the continuing slide toward the professional army. Thus, the number of draftees is being decreased by 4,000; on the other hand, the number of enlisted men is increasing (unemployment, which strikes young people especially hard, is an excellent recruiting sergeant). The proportion of professional military to drafted soldiers is now clearly in favor of the former (53 percent to 47 percent). Likewise, paratrooper regiments and large units are now basically composed of career soldiers. A half-brigade stationed in Frejus, also composed of professionals, has as its mission intervention outside the national territory.

#### To Promote a Vast Movement for Disarmament

The evolution of the international situation and its repercussions in France are stirring up a huge debate in which facts and statements are mingled and intertwined, quite often interpreted and distorted by the mass media.

Once more the Communist Party alone is contributing indispensable clarification, furnishing answers to the questions being asked and defining a policy in conformity both with France's interests and the interests of detente and disarmament.

This is the whole meaning of the statement made in the European Assembly in Strasbourg last September by Georges Marchais: "Taking the floor for the first time in this chamber, I am anxious to repeat firmly and with total clarity the commitment we have made to our people: we will never agree to any attack on the sovereignty and independence of France. We will never agree to have this Assembly, by any means whatsoever, usurp powers that by rights belong to the national institutions. This is especially true where defense problems are concerned."

Defense problems that are being fully integrated into the peace policy that the 23rd Congress recalled forcefully: "Faced with the threat of war which has not disappeared, today it is possible to rally easily for peace and disarmament. The French Communist Party is acting to give full play to the popular movement in this domain and is asking France to intervene to solve these problems on a world scale, /naturally, under conditions making it possible to guarantee the country's security under any circumstances/ [*in italics*] (*italics mine, Louis Baillot*)."

In fact, to Communists, peace and disarmament are not in opposition to the national defense and the military means involved in it. On the contrary, they complement each other in a world in which imperialism is still powerful and aggressive and in which it always tends to use force and violence to protect its egotistic interests and prevent the peoples from gaining independence, democracy and an improved standard of living.

To act for a real national defense, even while fighting to consolidate and expand detente, and for disarmament, constitutes for Communists important moments in their more general battle for the democratic changes to which the people of France profoundly aspire.

\*Report presented by Georges Marchais to the 23rd Congress, pp 35-36 of the June-July 1979 issue of CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME.



This is the whole direction of the 13 December decision of the Politburo, calling for a large-scale unitary counter-attack against the grave decisions by NATO to install Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe: "It is up to the workers, the democrats, the patriots of our country, to firmly and swiftly take the initiative in the fight and thus contribute to the powerful movement that is already developing in various countries in Western Europe in response to the appeal by various international and national organizations."

8946

CSO: 3100

NEW DEBATE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPORTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Jan 80 p 12

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "Government Considers Proposal to Deputies for Debate on New Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] At the urging of the Chief of State, the government will make a proposal at the spring session of the National Assembly for a debate on defense, which should be an opportunity to learn of the options of French leaders for the newest types of nuclear weapons. This debate should take place at the end of May or in early June, independently of the traditional year-end debate on the budget.

In any event, it is one of the President's wishes to see Parliament organize exchanges of ideas on important political issues -- such as defense -- under other circumstances than those of budget sessions where elected public servants are more narrowly concerned.

Already last year, the deputies and later the senators had a chance to express their views on principles of defense policy: this was at the beginning of October, during debates on the 1977-1982 law on military planning, which were followed one month later by specific consideration of the proposed 1980 military budget. During this latter debate, in early November 1979, at the Palais-Bourbon, the minister of defense simply answered specific questions from deputies regarding financial commitments for 1980, since the main aspects of security had been covered during the debate on the military planning law.

For 1980, discussions may take place at the initiative of the government and will probably be of interest because, before next April, the Defense Council meetings presided by the Chief of State will have determined both the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems which are due to replace the present arsenal. By the same token, the current international situation and its consequences are sure to generate comments from elected representatives as they consider the government's recommendations concerning technical guidelines and materiel options.

The files now being finalized by the Chiefs of Staff are primarily concerned with nuclear weapons for the year 2000, which will replace the ballistic missiles of the Albion plateau, in Haute-Provence, and the Pluton tactical missiles, while it remains understood that new versions of nuclear submarine missile launchers will replace the ships now in use.

#### Similarity to SS-20

In the field of strategic weapons, French experts are currently concentrating on specifications for a mobile missile, mounted on a wheeled launching platform, based on what the Soviets have already achieved with their SS-20 battery. The design for this new mobile missile would take advantage of experience gained from current experiments with multiple-head missiles, a full-size prototype of which is scheduled to be tested at the end of 1980, so that the total system can be declared operational around 1985 aboard the submarine Inflexible.

Mobile missiles are one of the options retained, vying with a subsonic cruising missile which does not offer the same advantages.

As far as tactical weapons for the year 2000 are concerned, Pluton will have a successor as soon as the higher performance Super-Pluton missile is perfected through improvements in miniaturization and in the hardening of nuclear charges -- that is, the weapons's resistance to the adverse effect of countermeasures. Future developments in this field should inspire the government to more fully specify the place and role of tactical nuclear weapons in France's deterrent arsenal.

More specifically, opinions differ as to whether it is in the interest of France to acquire neutron nuclear weapons, more commonly known as reinforced-radiation weapons or neutron bombs. Because of its flexibility, this tactical device finds justification as an additional element in the range of possible countermeasures in case of enemy attack with conventional weapons which might overwhelm French defense. At the beginning of the year, Yvon Bourges, minister of defense, when questioned on the eventual place of the neutron bomb in the French arsenal, simply stated that if the French Army now decided to become so equipped, it could have its first operational neutron weapons within two to five years.

11,023

CSO: 3100

GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED FOR ANTINUCLEAR WEAPONS STANCE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 7 Dec 79 p 7

[Article by A. P. van Walsum: "Holland Even More Critical than the Countries Around Us"]

[Text] Decisionmaking over the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in the various European countries demonstrates once more that our country is different. We are quick to add that it is better, or in any case, more responsible, more critical, in short: more aware.

But this is nothing new. Anyone who crosses the border in an auto and notes that in Belgium even the most neglected vehicular roads are bathed in sodium light all night long and that people in Germany can drive as fast as they want, must quickly come to the realization that in our neighboring countries no questions are being asked and no question marks written down. No questions with respect to the modernization of nuclear weapons and also none with respect to economic growth, industrial production index, nuclear energy, company performance or parking garages in the center of the city.

Yet these countries are also experiencing lively political discussions, and in the area of extraparliamentary actions (certainly against the building of nuclear power plants) it may be said that the Germans have nothing to learn from us. How is it then that at every political question it has been previously noted that we tend to come out with a point of view which is many degrees more to the left than that of our neighbors? Are we more ethical perhaps? Or to put it in other words, do ethics play a lesser role in political debates in Belgium or Germany?

Slippery Ice

If anybody wants to volunteer an answer in this respect that person would be stepping on unusually slippery ice. It is a true fact that in Dutch politics one has to cope with political matters more frequently. We simply love that fine dash of ethics in the pronouncements of our national representatives. But it would be a bit presumptive to suppose that a German or Belgian parliamentarian is less inclined to display his deepest moral motives before a television camera than his Dutch colleague and would thereby establish his position on less ethical grounds.

In most countries wanting to delve into the motive for the ethical reasoning of his fellowmen is simply a sign of bad manners these days. Countries such as Belgium and Germany are not as familiar with the phenomenon of the ritual dance in which one whole faction at first has a terrible struggle with an ethical problem, only to finally end up (with a bleeding heart) on a politically advantageous point of departure.

#### Modality

Thus the difference does not really lie so much in the degree of ethics per se, but rather in the extent to which ethics are being made the object of attention. Because the matter of ethics is so prevalent in our country it turns out to be very susceptible to the conforming effect of modality, and so we note that every time a political debate takes an ethical turn it is hardly surprising to see everybody in our country arrive at the same conclusion. In our political aspect, ethics has been monopolized by the left for such a long time that this curious unanimity ought not surprise us in the least.

The opponents invariable start to appeal to conscience and to responsibility toward posterity, especially if this has to do with anything dealing with nuclear fission, be it with respect to tactical nuclear weapons or peaceful nuclear energy; on the other hand, the proponents appear to concern themselves with the position of our country in the world, the role which we could play in the international picture and the competitive position of our trade and industry.

It is clear that the latter position can only help to consolidate the monopolization of ethics by the left. Moreover, clarity in the field of policy is not being promoted; because the citizen wants to approach the matter of policy on an ethical basis, problems are being dished up in terms which are too simplistic. Naturally everybody is sentimentally opposed to nuclear weapons and for that matter nobody deep in his heart is in favor of conventional weapons either.

Pacifism is innate to all of us, but in spite of this it has never been the last word in the ethics of human conflict. We have only to recall those people who in World War II detested their own pacifism of a few years before when they began to realize that allied military intervention at the time when Germany occupied the Rhineland could have caused the downfall of Hitler and prevented the whole mess of World War II and the Jewish persecution. It is really impossible to prove statements such as this, but it does help to illustrate the complexity of the question of ethics.

#### Also Ethic

Yet there are few Dutch politicians who clearly assert that their choice in favor of the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and the development of peaceful nuclear energy is prompted by ethical considerations.



It is as though the proponents of these two things have resigned themselves to the idea that this is simply impossible in our country; that for them making an appeal based on ethical grounds would come down to a kind of blasphemy. In essence it is not altogether impossible to come to some conclusions on ethical grounds which represent an atrocity to the left.

We can do this with two examples. This is not an attempt to induce the opponents to change their minds. They are, therefore, stated in too brief a manner and as far as the case for tactical nuclear weapons is concerned they are apparently too late. Their purpose is limited to the presentation in telegram style of how it can be possible to come to a choice in favor of the modernization of nuclear tactical weapons and the development of nuclear energy from an ethical point of view (more will be said about this subsequently).

#### Example 1 (Modernization of tactical weapons)

The deterrent equilibrium has thus far worked well. Twenty years after the end of World War I, World War II began and since the end of World War II peace has prevailed in Europe for nearly 35 years. The fact that this equilibrium keeps on shifting to increasingly higher levels is a dangerous thing (hence the necessity of efforts for arms control), however, disturbing this equilibrium is even a much more dangerous thing.

The Soviet Union may well have no aggressive intentions; however, its obsession for security can, as Eastern Europe has experienced, translate itself into an expansionistic policy. Moreover the country is heading for so many internal tensions (a steady, but failing economy, nascent nationalism among non-Russian Peoples, Islamic reawakening) that leaders who succeed Brezhnev could end up being tempted to look for a diversion from this by engaging in foreign adventures. This temptation will become greater to the extent that opposition appears weaker. Thus the vote here is: For.

#### Example 2 (Nuclear energy)

Radioactive waste is a problem, but it is manageable. The demand that the problem must first be resolved completely (in the sense that the waste can be processed or stored in such a manner that humans will never again have to look at it) is an unreasonable one, because there are thousands of industrial processes which now lead to problems, that is, they provide situations which require a lot of care.

Those hints to the effect that we can provide other ways for our future energy requirements, or that the energy gap may be bridged by means of energy cutbacks (the usual appeal for a more "sober style of living") are practically so unconvincing that the rejection of nuclear energy will probably cause a serious increase in the risk of an actual energy crisis. Our society with all its institutions and the freedoms guaranteed by these institutions will very likely fail to survive an actual energy crisis. Therefore the vote here is again in favor.

## Honest

So much for the two examples. But once again it is not a matter of whether in this framework of things one is right, but rather whether people morally come to realize whether or not they are being honest. The ethical point of departure that they have in common is the conviction that our society, (doubtlessly capable of improvement) must keep on existing in its present form or approximately so. Faith means believing in the moral value of continuity and gradualness, mistrust of the naive belief of others that after the collapse of our society a better one can be established from its ruins.

This can all be summed up as conservatism. But why is it then that if this separate reasoning is (perhaps not correct, but at least) honest, that conservatism is such a dirty word in our country?

The one explanation must be the fact that in the ethical debate which goes on and on in our country the conservatives have usually failed to show up ever since the night of Schmelzer.

After 1966, conservatism in Holland pulled in its horns, but so much so that the public now is being confronted only by its sickly variant: tight-lipped desperate people who see downgrading and ruin coming upon them from all sides and who feel attracted to the most undemocratic methods as the only means of calling a halt to the threat. And so starts the vicious circle: because this is the only form in which conservatism manifests itself in Holland the average Dutch citizen will think twice before he joins this crowd.

## The Gaping Breach

This is then the situation in Holland: A gaping breach in the political spectrum and the consequence of this is that the sum total of the concepts of the Dutch people, in other words, Holland's policy, is always fraught with difficulties when it comes to fitting it into the policy of the alliance of which we are a part.

The conservatives, who have been silenced by the prevailing morality, are not losing any sleep over this, because they are assuming that the Dutch point of view, which has swung over to the left as a result of their absence on a national level, will surely be corrected again at an international level by the allies.

They fancy themselves on a bed of roses because they do not feel the need to expose themselves to an inimical and intolerant public opinion and the facts of Holland's position in the world are surely sufficient to see to it that in the end everything will turn out all right. Everybody knows the ritual, even the allies, and the result is a foregone conclusion. The government will report that it could not sell the Dutch point of view to the allies and the members of the biggest government parties in the chamber can tell their electors that their point of departure was always a great deal more ethical than the final result.

The bad thing about this manner of operating is just that the pitcher is used to fetch water for so long that it springs a leak. One fine day it will be evident that the unbalanced Dutch point of view is tied down to the past to such an extent that after confrontation with the allies it can no longer be readjusted; or else the allies will retire further from their role in the Dutch ritual, this role being something which is still yielding small thanks for them in Dutch public opinion.

### Lack of Spunk

There are, thus, essential reasons why Dutch conservatives will finally have to venture back into the political fray and a still more important long-range argument is that without a normal conservative input there can be no end to the spunkless cycle which now characterizes Dutch political discussion.

Because the dominating role of leftist ethics has had just as heavy a hand especially in the political spectrum, the right has developed a sort of deep shyness, a nervous need to make it clear that despite a somewhat conservative-sounding point of view they are in no way conservative, but the phenomenon has maladroitly led to a demoralization which cannot be checked.

In the course of the past few years, a whole generation of leftist comrades has come up without having had to face appropriate rebuttals. The left has had it so easy for such a long time that it is no wonder that now it no longer radiates any sparks of vitality or inspiration. Even in the opposition, the leftist comrades cannot fail to note that, at least as far as the spoken word is concerned, all of Holland is dancing to its tune; moreover, it has far easier access to the media than its opponents.

### Demoralizing

What is most demoralizing is not the lack of rebuttals but the fact that it is so amazingly easy to collectively swing the Dutch people to leftist pronouncements.

The Soviet leaders, who decorated their ambassador at The Hague for having so deftly manipulated us into making a pronouncement against the neutron bomb, have once more demonstrated how extremely well they are informed. The fact is that a child can do the wash for others in a country where the opposition leaders make no bones about demonstrating with the communists against the efforts of Western defense against the growing nuclear potential of the Soviet Union.

According to some people, there are signs pointing to a turning back of the tide. We are given to understand that today's student generation may well be much more inclined toward the right than the previous one and certainly not inclined to mince its own words.

But, of course, the rightist vacuum is not to be filled with a generation of reactionary windbags. The spunkless cycle will come to an end only if everybody will begin to see that ethics have nothing to do with modality and that civil courage by definition even runs counter to modality. Moreover, civil courage in our country is, so to speak, found to be rather on the side of the supporters of the neutron bomb than its opponents.

7964

CSO: 3105

## MARTENS COMPLETES FORMATION OF NEW CABINET

Goor, Baudson, Degroeve Join Cabinet

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Jan 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by P.L.]

[Text] Shortly after 1300 on Wednesday the names of the persons called to replace the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] members of the government were learned. The ministerial reshuffle was again discussed at length during the morning in the prime minister's office, by Andre Cools and Paul Vanden Boeynants, the chairmen of the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSC [Christian Social Party]. The negotiation seems to have been more difficult than anticipated, the bureaus of both parties, which had been convened at 1000, having been asked to suspend their session until the results of the discussions were in. It was not until noon that Mr Martens was able to go to the king to propose to him the names of the new members of his council.

The official communique is as follows: "As proposed by the prime minister, the king has relieved Robert Urbain, the minister of PTT [Posts and Telecommunications], and has appointed him minister of Foreign Trade.

"The king has appointed Andre Baudson minister of PTT and Mme Cecile Goor minister of the Brussels Region.

"Georges Grammes, who retains his posts as minister of the Interior and of Institutional Reform and in addition is appointed minister of Scientific Policy.

"Andre Degroeve is appointed secretary of state for the French Community, assistant to the minister of the French Community.

"Philippe Maystadt, secretary of state for the Walloon Region, also has jurisdiction in matters of rehabilitation of industrial sites."

The new members of the government were to be sworn in by the king at 1600 at Laeken chateau.



So the government has three new heads, Mme Cecile Goor, a Brussels Social Christian, Andre Baudson, a Charleroi Socialist, and Andre Degroove, a Brussels Socialist. It was expected that after these appointments the Council of Ministers would meet without delay, either as early as Wednesday evening or Thursday morning. The prime minister must then communicate with Parliament, no doubt after Thursday afternoon.

In other words, the government is getting moving again. The general opinion, however, is that it is doing so in a climate marked by uncertainty. The community contract just signed by the four partners remaining in the coalition appears in fact to be very fragile. The agreement finally given by the CVP [Social Christian Party] on Tuesday evening is in any case accompanied by such restrictions that no new developments can be expected to happen soon.

First, the CVP's "yes" appears to be a forced "yes." "We are faithful to the resolutions of the congress of our Party last 16 December," Mr Tindemans said. "It is in view of the grave situation that the Party agrees to the prime minister's new proposals." It should be said that in responding negatively the CVP was risking political isolation. In fact the BSP [Belgian Socialist Party] in its turn had just responded positively and unconditionally to the latest draft agreement.

The next noteworthy thing is that the Flemish Social Christians hardly seem anxious to realize the guarantees being demanded of the French speaking side, which were written into the new agreement. Thus, the CVP is already contesting the fact that 1984 has been set as the date for the end of the next phase of regionalization. It is also rejecting any "parallelism" between the vote on temporary state reform and the one on the "law program." This parallelism is actually the principal means of pressure available to the PS and the PSC in their efforts to obtain the regionalization.

With regard to the governmental partners' commitment to vote on temporary regionalization before the end of February, Mr Tindemans, questioned by the RTBF [Belgian French-Language Radio and Television Broadcasting], has already said he believed this would be technically difficult. This true, to say the least, if the CVP is again discussing new bills aimed at applying the reform, as it has rediscussed all the preceding bills.

The French-speaking Social Christian press itself is making no mistake. Wednesday morning's LA LIBRE BELGIQUE said, "The CVP's shilly-shallying over the latest (?) compromise proposed by Mr Martens produced a wave of anger in the PS and the PSC, and even in the BSP, which on Tuesday morning 'broke' with the 'Flemish front.' Since then, by conviction or by tactics--they will draw back for a better jump, notably by stirring up their senators on the Institutional Reform Committee--the Flemish Social Christians finally made a positive decision Tuesday evening."

LA CITE is even more skeptical when it says, "Once more we realize that it is fear of a vacuum and an interminable governmental crisis that is driving everyone to show that he is reasonable. Even the CVP."

"In face, we should not delude ourselves. No problem is fundamentally solved. What is truth today will undoubtedly not be truth tomorrow.

"No one would dare wager a penny on the realization of the new agreement. Not even those who signed it!

"In reality, everyone is "pretending" to be in agreement until the next incident. This is the resignation agreement.

"The new offensive will take place in Senate committee, and the new arrangement will be no more resistant than the others to battering by certain senators.

"An appointment, therefore, for the next episode."

### The Three Ministers

Andre Degroeve, the new secretary of state for the French Community, has been Socialist deputy from the Brussels district since 1971. He is 49.

A doctor of laws from ULB [Free University of Brussels], Mr Degroeve has a degree in political science and diplomacy, and in insurance law.

He is a member of several parliamentary committees and is especially interested in consumers, economic problems and the investments of public institutions.

After being first alderman for Public Instruction and Youth in Forest, he became burgomaster of that commune.

Mr de Groeve has also been president of the Brussels Federation of the PS.

Cecile Goor, the new minister of Brussels Affairs, has been PSC senator from the Brussels district since March 1974. Born in Antwerp, she is 57. A graduate in Romance Philology from UCL [Catholic University of Louvain], she entered the Woluwe-Saint-Lambert communal council in 1953, where she became an alderman from 1971 until 1977. She was a member of the Brabant provincial council from 1971 to 1974. She is a member of several parliamentary committees.

Mme Goor is especially interested in the problems of women with families, social questions, education and culture.

Andre Baudson, the new PTT Minister, is 53. A native of Marchienne-au-Pont, he is a doctor of laws, a graduate notary, and has degrees in insurance law and maritime law from the ULB.

Mr Baudson has been an attorney in Charleroi since 1952. He has been a member of the Marchienne-au-Pont communal council since 1958.

Mr Baudson, who has been a Socialist deputy from the Charleroi district since 1968, is vice president of the Chamber. He was called to the chairmanship of the Development Intercommunal for the Charleroi district in May 1973.

## CVP Voices Concern

Brussels LE SOLR in French 24 Jan 80 p 2

All day long on Tuesday the most complete uncertainty reigned concerning the attitude that would be adopted by the CVP. According to sources, all of which are in agreement, it seemed early in the morning that the deliberations of the general council of the Flemish Social Christians, which had met the day before, had been tumultuous and difficult. Mr Martens, defending Saturday's compromise, had received the support of the delegates close to the workers' circles of the ACW (Christian Workers' Movement) and the farmers of the "Boerenbond."

On the other hand, Mr Tindemans had shown a great deal of suspicion, if not hostility, toward the ministerial agreement. His attitude had encouraged the partisans of a tough strategy of refusing the slightest concession to the French-speaking wing of the majority.

Even more obstinate than usual, Mr Martens began his day with a series of meetings. He met first with Mr Tindemans, who is both his predecessor at 16 Rue de la Loi and his successor at the Rue des Deux-Eglises. Next he received Chairmen Andre Cools (PS) and Paul Vanden Boeynants (PSC). He reported to them on the deliberations in progress in the CVP. The response by both French-speaking leaders was short and clear: there is no question of renegotiating anything whatsoever, or of changing one iota of Saturday's agreement.

### Six Points to be Outlined

"The CVP wrote its agreement on the basis of Prime Minister Wilfred Martens' proposals," Leo Tindemans stated on Tuesday evening, after the meeting of his party's executive committee. He immediately added that nevertheless there were six points on which his party asked the prime minister for "further explanation." The first four had to do with the use of the "alarm bell," the role to be played by Parliament in state reform, the new Parliament's task if the reform is not completed by 1982 and the financing of the so-called personalizable matters. On those points Mr Martens' replies were satisfactory.

However, there remain two points which are not urgently needed and on which discussion is still going on. They are: the beginning of the regions' financial responsibility after early 1983, and the guarantees to be found for the Flemish in Brussels before the next communal elections.

"We are clearly saying what our concerns are," continued the CVP chairman. This way there will be no equivocation. Moreover, I hope that everything will also be clear in the statement the prime minister will make to the Parliament. Because it will really be a governmental statement."

Mr Tindemans then commented on the communique that was approved with two against (Jan Verroken and Eric van Rompuy) and three abstaining.

"We are faithful to the resolutions of our party's 16 December congress, dealing with final reform of the state," he said. We still approve the prime

minister's communication of last 10 January. In view of the seriousness of the economic and social situation, however, the party cannot approve a strict parallelism between the law-program and institutional reform. There again, Mr Martens has stated that it is not a parallelism in the strict sense of the word, but that a dual reform would be conducted at the same speed.

"The party also accepts the prime minister's new proposals, realizing that the situation is grave. But it is anxious to emphasize that the system for definite financing of the regions will go into effect gradually after 1 January 1983. Which actually means that the present system, which is based solely on endowments, will be abolished gradually and the solidarity mechanisms are to remain reversible.

"Before the 1982 communal elections, legal guarantees must be found for the Flemish community in Brussels. The CVP will fight for that point."

And he added, "To the CVP, continuing the second phase until the end of 1984 must certainly not be a reason to delay the reform until that date. To the party, new and definite state structures should occur even during that legislature."

The party leadership has asked the prime minister to provide for a guarantee clause to make possible constituent Chambers during the next legislature, if final reform has not yet occurred. This would not be solely to make the next Chambers constituent, but to ensure the suppression of a series of things if solutions for others had not occurred.

To the CVP the approval of a temporary reform which can be extended does not imply the slightest commitment toward forming the next coalition.

The PVV [Party of Freedom and Progress] Chairman: "Starting From Zero"

Three-way regionalization, granting equal jurisdiction to the three regions, will not only be extended until the end of 1984, but, according to Chairman Cools' words, will be permanent. Such is the conclusion the PVV bureau, which met on Tuesday, drew from the latest proposals of the ministerial committee. According to Party Chairman Willy De Clercq, the state reform dossier is not ready. He would much rather, he added, throw the past and present proposals overboard, in order to start from zero.

In any potential debate on a new governmental declaration, the PVV members of Parliament expect to ask how much weight the Francophone pact still carries. They will also ask questions about the financial implications of the mini-regionalization phase and the final phase of the state reform.

The RW [Walloon Rally]: "It is Today That we Have to Say 'Yes or No' to the CVP Plan"

To the RW, taking into account the desire for power that it sees on the part of the CVP, "It is from today, without waiting for the end of 1982 or 1984, that we have to say 'yes or no' to the CVP and Flemish majority plan.

"Any future serious dialog with Flanders requires that it take place between equal and free partners.

"Wallonia and Brussels can only appear as equal and free partners by first of all, affirming as their right their autonomous political existence," the RW said.

To the VU [People's Union], the BSP is the CVP's "Luggage Carrier"

"The CVP must now apply the resolutions of its congress and demand the resignation of the government and the prime minister," declared the chairman of the VU after the meeting of his party's bureau on Tuesday. According to Vic Anciaux, the only possible alternative for the CVP is to repudiate the resolutions of its December congress. As for the BSP, Mr Anciaux calls it "the CVP's luggage carrier."

The latest government proposal on state reform was judged totally unacceptable for the VU by its chairman. He emphasized that state reform is tied in with the country's financial, economic and social difficulties. "The financial crisis," he added, "could be combated much more effectively in Flanders if we had obtained autonomy in a federal sense."

The VU does not yet know exactly whether it will participate in the parliamentary group for state reform, the group nicknamed "the refrigerator" by Mr Anciaux.

8946

CSO: 3100



## GOVERNMENT SURVIVES IN SPITE OF DIFFERENCES

## Francophone Parties Quarrel

Brussels LE SOIR in French 12 Jan 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by P.L.]

[Text] By Friday morning activities had resumed their normal pace at the [government headquarters on] rue de la Loi. The cabinet council met as it does every Friday. Everything even seemed to suggest that government was back on its tracks and that a new lease had been signed between partners of the majority.

The day before, as a matter of fact, the prime minister had announced that a unanimous agreement had been reached by his ministers on a new community platform (contents of which appear elsewhere in this issue) and that the governmental reform was going to be given a new start, along new lines. Thus, officially, the political crisis that had marked the start of this year was coming to an end.

In Mr Mark Eyskens' words, what we had just witnessed was a masterpiece of political technique. Indeed Mr Martens had to stretch to the utmost and perform a masterstroke to save the coalition and, at the same time, to strengthen his position with his own party.

Still, a hitch had occurred in one of the majority factions. Actually, a misunderstanding between the French-speaking parties, the PS [Socialist Party], the PSC [Social Christian Party] and the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] continues to cast a lingering shadow over the outcome of the crisis.

The FDF is apparently making its final agreement concerning the government's new institutional program contingent upon a condition: confirmation by its partners of guarantees of solidarity on the francophone front. Those guarantees had been promised during the negotiations. As long as that confirmation is not forthcoming, FDF sources report, a withdrawal from the coalition remains possible.

Still, Mme Antoinette Spaak displayed some optimism at the close of her executive committee meeting Thursday night. Of course, it would take some obvious political reluctance on the part of one French-speaking partner to go so far as to create a new major incident.

At any rate, by Friday noon or thereabouts, the three party chairmen and the three ministers primarily involved with this case, Messrs Spitaels, Desmarets and Defosset, met to resume these internal negotiations within the French-speaking camp. It should be noted that at that time Mr Desmarets, PSC member and vice-premier, was stating that no "secret agreement" had been made Wednesday evening.

What had happened? On Wednesday, apparently, one time during the evening and while the cabinet, in its limited version, was adding the final touch to Mr Martens' compromise plan, it seems that the most prominent ministers from the PS and the PSC made some promises to their FDF colleagues, Messrs Leon Defosset and Francois Persoons. They reportedly pledged to unite against any possible attempt on the part of the Flemish majority to reconsider a regional ordinance, whether Walloon or from the Brussels area.

Their promises were equally directed towards an agreement between Walloon and Brussels [representatives] on the management of cultural and personal matters in the French community. It seems this is the condition upon which the FDF ministers committed themselves to champion the compromise plan before their party's committee.

Apparently, Thursday at noon, when Mr Defosset was faced with presenting his party's reply to the cabinet council, a first problem arose. Mr Vanden Boeynants, PSC chairman, was reportedly nowhere to be found, so that the agreement between French speakers could not be signed. At that point, Mr Defosset had to tread carefully when giving Mr Martens his affirmative answer. When the three chairmen finally met in the afternoon, there was no longer any agreement on the text that the FDF was submitting for his partners' signature.

There was no objection on the part of Mr Andre Cools, PS chairman.

On the other hand, Mr Vanden Boeynants requested some time to think. This was all it took for mistrust to set in and for the FDF to start wondering whether the PSC might not be planning a reversal by joining with the liberals. As for Mr Vanden Boeynants, he was declaring on Friday morning that the ministers' acceptance of the Martens compromise had never been contingent upon this agreement among French speakers under discussion. In short, the misunderstanding still persisted.

With FDF Leaders, in the Evening

The chief ministers and the chairmen of the three parties are supposed to meet again this Friday afternoon. It is not inconceivable that Mr Vanden

Boeynants may wish to take advantage of a tactical error on the part of a competitor to put that competitor in a delicate position. However, if it is true, as they all contend, that the three parties involved are focusing on their concern for solidarity, then it should be possible to smooth over that misunderstanding. More information should be forthcoming this evening, when a meeting of the FDF executive committee has been called to arrive at some conclusions.

In the prime minister's entourage, in any case, it was pointed out Friday morning that Thursday's cabinet council meeting has made a final decision concerning Mr Martens' latest proposals and that no negotiations are called for on that subject. An agreement among French speakers, then, is all that is needed for the current crisis to become a thing of the past...until the next crisis arises!

#### All in a Day's Work

Let us recall the sequence of events. The PSC and PS had already signified their agreement Wednesday afternoon to the latest proposals in Mr Martens' compromise. Those proposals were still amended slightly Wednesday evening by the limited cabinet. Thursday morning it was the turn of the CVP [Social Christian Party--Flemish], the BSP [Belgian Socialist Party--Flemish] and the FDF to hold a leadership meeting for a statement. The two Flemish parties' affirmative answer was rather prompt in coming.

On the other hand, the FDF seemed to have trouble coming to an agreement. A rare occurrence, polltaking was necessary within the permanent executive committee of the federalist party. The final outcome was what Mme Spaak termed "a reluctant yes." Later, we were to learn that this "yes" was subject to a condition to be fulfilled by the three French-speaking parties. Thus the FDF ministers met with their colleagues of the PS and PSC before going to the cabinet council meeting.

The latter began 45 minutes late. It lasted only 20 minutes, however, and at 1320 hours Mr Martens, with a look of relief, announced that an agreement had been reached within the government, and he spelled out the contents of that agreement. Details given during that press conference will be found elsewhere in this issue. The prime minister then went to meet with the King, no doubt to inform him that his government had been saved.

Meanwhile, however, it was learned that the FDF's permanent executive committee was to meet again early that night and that all three chairmen of the French-speaking parties were to meet in the afternoon. Seemingly, then, everything had not yet been settled.

Beyond the ups and downs of the political scene, some observations are in order after the events of the last few hours. Whether you consider the fragmentation in the French-speaking parties' front, or the jockeying for position within the CVP, those events do indeed shed a new light on the internal political troubles within each community. They also appear as

rather bad omens for further dialog between Flemish and French speakers.

#### A Divided Front for French-Speaking Parties

In the first place, it must be noted that the French-speaking parties' front is in a bad way. It already appeared quite divided Monday night when the PSC accepted Mr Martens' first compromise proposal, while the PS and the FDF were rejecting it. On Tuesday night, the three chairmen, Messrs Cools and Vanden Boeynants and Mme Spaak, put the pieces back together and once again aligned in a common position which, by the way, forced the prime minister to change his tactics and dream up a new compromise plan.

It looks as if the French speakers' unity was lost once again Thursday, as the chairmen failed to confirm a secret agreement that had apparently been concluded the night before between the French-speaking ministers.

This story is not devoid of consequences as we know that one of the bases for the present coalition is this tacit agreement between the PS and the FDF, an agreement stating that each region's dominant political force is a required factor in arriving at a community pact. That principle, by the way, was one of the chief pawns in last winter's long political crisis. As we have seen this week, it is obvious that one of these two parties cannot remain insensitive to the other's attitude.

#### Jockeying for Position Within the CVP

Second observation: the recent events do not seem totally irrelevant to the influence game being played within the CVP. Last 16 December's convention came out--relatively speaking--as a victory for the rightist and nationalist tendency represented by Mr Tindemans. At any rate, Mr Martens, who derives more support from the Flemish Christian Labor Movement (or ACW) gave the impression, Thursday at noon, that he had taken his revenge, so to speak, by gaining the upper hand in a situation which had been jeopardized by that exact same 16 December convention.

That infighting undoubtedly points to further repercussions. If any indications are to be found in Mr Tindemans' profuse comments on Mr Martens' attitude during the meetings of his party, it would seem that relations between the two men are not too cordial. In an unusual occurrence for that great party, Mr Tindemans mentioned Mr Martens' "highly upset frame of mind" to journalists in front of the CVP executive committee.

#### Elbow Room for Parliament Members

Furthermore, while Mr Martens officially requested the parliamentary groups to amend the new texts on institutional reforms as little as possible, Mr Tindemans told the press that "wide operating latitude would be given to

members of parliament while discussing the second phase." He also added that "debates would be entirely open" with respect to the final phase of the reforms. This meant, to say the least, that he was not concealing his intent to continue the guerrilla warfare on the parliamentary level.

#### Confidence Is Shaken

Besides, with or without agreement, the latest events have dealt a serious blow to the confidence the parties have salvaged out of the ruins of the Egmont pact. The compromise effected Thursday within the government is only the product of the unilateral reconsideration of an earlier agreement. The compromise seems to be a new point of equilibrium between that earlier agreement and CVP demands, and a general regression in relation to governmental gains.

The FDF's current reluctance will surprise no one inasmuch as that party had already been within an inch of refraining from entering the coalition, a estimating that the new governmental agreement was already, definitely, a step back from the Egmont pact which it [the FDF] had previously espoused. Some trouble had already arisen from that pact's successive renegotiations at the Stuyvenberg and Lambermont palaces.

#### Attack by the DAVIDSFONDS

Besides, Thursday morning, while an agreement was taking shape, the Flemish movement was already resuming its offensive. The DAVIDSFONDS was casting the blame on Mr Martens in strong terms. Even the day before, it exerted some strong pressure on Mr Tindemans.

Such reactions are only too reminiscent of the reaction that occurs in Flanders after each community agreement is signed: we witness an escalation on the part of cultural movements and the Flemish press, and then the political world. This escalation inevitably results in a reconsideration of the latest agreement signed. A new point of equilibrium must then be sought, each time coming closer, of course, to the demands of the Flemish movement. In this respect, there is great significance in the distance covered between the Egmont pact and this Thursday's compromise.

#### New Political Accord Presented

Brussels LE SOIR in French 12 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by P.L.]

[Text] The plan prepared by the prime minister and approved Thursday around 1300 hours by the cabinet council to get the government coalition out of its impasse may be summed up in a few major points:

The first point would consist in a prompt and official start of negotiations



on the final phase. The government would, in fact, invite all representative parties to start discussions immediately on the final governmental reform, a reform, the text of the agreement points out, that is to pave the way for an in-depth revision of the Constitution during this legislative session.

Beyond that, the plan essentially consists in modifying, or more precisely, in reducing bills 260 and 261, intended to make the second phase of reforms come into being. That reduction would, roughly, consist in turning this "transitory and irreversible" phase into a simple "transitory" phase. The operation includes five essential elements, listed here as Mr Martens himself details them:

1. The Constitution will not be modified for the second phase of reforms. This essentially means, as Mr Martens explained, that there will be no transfer of the legislative power with respect to "personifiable" matters. In other words, plans have been dropped to entrust cultural councils with policy concerning such matters. Community executive groups will, however, retain competency in executing such policies.

2. The resolutive clause that pairs bills 260 and 261 is being modified. That clause, as our readers know, provides that, should the final governmental reform not go into effect on 1 January 1983, the entire institutional structure would crumble. That penalty would be moderated by the new agreement. Instead of leading to a legal vacuum, the lack of a final reform on 1 January 1983 would automatically bring the nation back to the present situation, that is, to the immediate phase of the reforms (limited regionalization of the executive power and absence of regional assemblies.

3. Contrary to the provisions of bills 260 and 261, a distinction is being instituted between the competencies of the Walloon and Flemish regions, on one hand, and the Brussels region, on the other hand. The latter will not have the competencies which "by their nature have no actual application in the Brussels region."

4. The instrument designed to exercise those regional competencies remains the ordinance, that is, a sort of regional law. However, contrary to the provisions of government agreements concerning the second phase, the national legislative power will have the right to abrogate those regional ordinances, whether in toto or in part, at least if a proposition or bill to that effect is introduced within the 6 months following the publication of the regional ordinance being contested.

5. There is a provision that appropriations by the central government will remain the only method of financing the regions and communities during that transitory phase. As provided earlier, their growth rate, in proportion to the State budget, will be maintained during the 2 years that the transitory phase is theoretically going to last.

## Before the End of February

In answer to reporters' questions, the prime minister again emphasized that the government will ask for a vote on those priority arrangements before the end of February. The government will also ask for a vote on the "program-law." Those two votes will not be linked, Mr Martens added, but government will request that the same urgency be attached to them.

Mr Martens again clarified that the procedure consisting of calling on all parties, even those of the opposition, to discuss the final phase, is a procedure prescribed by the governmental declaration. That declaration did in fact provide that the government should prepare the tests of the second phase, and that the final phase would be dealt with in an in-depth discussion with all representative parties.

In another clarification, the new regionalized and community phase of the administration (which is still a de facto part of the first phase of the reform) will be approved in 2 weeks.

Finally Mr Martens stated that this proposal is the climax of so many discussions, within the government as well as with the majority parties, that it would be healthy for the essential points not to undergo any more changes. By the way, the prime minister added that the government would ask the various parliamentary groups to refrain from making any more amendments to the test.

## Opposition Questions Martens

Brussels LE SOIR in French 12 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Dv.]

[Text] Next Wednesday the Chamber of Deputies will hear interpellations by liberal and communist [members of the] opposition regarding what they consider to be an essential modification of the governmental declaration. As one might suspect, the topic has been the new proposals on community matters, decided Thursday at noon.

Setting that rather simple agenda required a long and rather insubstantial discussion, with Prime Minister Wilfried Martens affirming on three occasions that he was willing to respond to the requests of parliament members and that the "modifications" to the government agreement would be translated into amendments to the text introduced in the Senate. [He said that] "Mr Leo Tindemans, chairman of the CVP, would hear about those amendments at the same time as other members of parliament."

Originally the Chamber had not intended to meet next week. Indeed no budget is ready for discussion in open session, and several [budgets] have not yet been submitted by the government.

Mr Herman De Croo had, through a motion to the order of the day, asked a series of questions in the name of the liberal opposition. "After a marathon held Sunday through Monday," he remarked, "you are submitting two proposals to your majority. Two parties, the PS and FDF, fail to accept them. This Thursday at noon, you produced another agreement, no doubt a different one from the original proposals, since the reluctant parties appear to accept them. One conclusion must emerge: not so long ago, you defended a governmental agreement and obtained the confidence of Parliament on the subject. Now you have come to a new agreement. Don't you then deem it necessary to ask for another vote of confidence?"

Mr Martens vigorously retorts: "But I am quite willing to answer those interpellations. The government is implementing the governmental pact. Within 2 weeks it will effect the administrative restructuration. Next, all representative parties will be invited to seek a wide "consensus" on the final governmental reform. I will shortly extend an invitation to party chairmen and to the heads of parliamentary groups to meet with me to determine the best procedure in this case."

Mr Martens then conceded that some portions of the original proposals for the second phase would be postponed until the third [phase.] "Our views," he concluded, "will materialize through a series of amendments to the bills introduced in the Senate, bills currently under debate."

Mr De Croo insisted: "Rather than legal issues, our argument would be based on political issues," he said, "but you are denying us such a discussion." That assertion was vigorously denied by the prime minister.

Mr Jean Defraigne, head of the PRL [expansion unknown], supported that opinion, as did the VU [Flemish National Party] chairman, Mr V. Anciaux, who declared that it might be possible to fool public opinion, but not Parliament! The reaction of Mr Paul-Henry Gendebien R.W. Thuin [as published] is more violent still: he does not understand the limitations brought to the government agreement and declares that not one member of Parliament in 10 understands what it is all about.

As for the former VU chairman, Mr Hugo Schiltz, he feels that this is an essential modification of the agreement and that Parliament should express its opinion on that subject. Finally, Mr Defraigne remarks that it is ridiculous to ask for a vote on the budget and on some bills without knowing if the government in power still enjoys the confidence of its majority.

While the session, the assembly voted on matters on the agenda introduced at the conclusion of the interpellations on the two previous days, and on a series of bills and proposals chiefly concerned with approval of international agreements.

HOUSE DEBATES U.S. PRESENCE AT UK BASES, MONITORING STATIONS

EDEK Secretary General's Speech

NC150810 Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 15 Feb 80 p 2 NC

["Highlights" of 14 February address in the House of Representatives by EDEK Secretary General Khatzidimitriou on the "American presence in the British bases and monitoring stations" which he put on the House agenda]

[Excerpts] The question that we are debating today is a familiar one. Some of its aspects were discussed last year. EDEK Chairman Vasos Lissaridis raised for discussion the question of American spy stations during a House session in the past and asked that they should be closed down.

Unfortunately the previous House voted against this motion, thus allowing the continuation of an unacceptable situation that internationally exposes Cyprus as being untrustworthy in its nonaligned orientation; at the same time this undermines Cyprus in the case of crucial matters of internal security. This is so because--as stated at that time--the spy stations spy not only on third countries which are friendly to us but also on ourselves.

There is no message from the Republic of Cyprus that is not intercepted by these stations, and thus all forces are mobilized in order to neutralize our policy.

The question that could be raised by some is the following: Why is an issue that has been debated in the past being raised again? The answer is simple.

The question of the bases and of the American military presence will always be open for us and we will raise it at every opportunity until Cyprus is freed from this cancer. We must not forget that the British bases and American strategic and economic interests in the area have been the cause for the Cyprus tragedy, occupation, the creation of refugees, for the missing persons and the mourning.

We must not forget that the treaty of establishment on which the presence and operation of British bases is based is one of the most humiliating documents for our people.

And it has become ever more humiliating because of the way in which the bases have been utilized by the British themselves, the Americans, the Israelis, the West Germans--the press has reported this and it has never been denied--and by all the warlike leading members of the NATOite alliance.

Cyprus does not have common interests with either the United States or NATO. On the contrary, developments have proved that a NATO ally--the most favorite--Turkey, has carried out an invasion and is holding 40 percent of our land.

If we keep silent about the American presence and the bases this would mean accepting without protest the Turkish occupation.

The stationing of American planes at the British bases is connected with the cease-fire agreement following the 1973 Middle East war. Following an agreement between the interested parties, the Americans were designated to supervise the confrontation line in Sinai.

Cyprus was then asked to allow the presence of American planes at the British bases. The Cyprus Government consented. After the Camp David agreement, the cease-fire agreement ended and yet the planes have remained at the bases. These planes take off from Akrotiri daily for an unknown destination and many times they stay away for more hours than they can fly. We do not know where they stop during their flights or on whom they spy, but we can imagine.

Today the bases are no longer British, but American-British and this is absolutely illegal.

To start with, the government should never have allowed the presence of American planes at the bases, but this presence should have been terminated along with the Sinai agreement. On the contrary, we see and we denounce the improvement of installations and of the landing strip in order to allow the landing of the most modern American planes.

The telecommunications at Dekelia, Akrotiri and the Troodos radar station, in particular, have been supplied with American material. The American circles of NATO consider Cyprus as the outpost for the protection of their interests, particularly in the Arab oil fields and the Suez Canal.

Their plans for military operations in the region from neighboring Lebanon and Syria to Iran include Cyprus as a basic bridgehead.



We must occupy ourselves with the problem of the American espionage and military presence in Cyprus at a time when the situation in the Middle East is hardening and at a time when there is the revolution in Iran and the developments in Afghanistan.

Western and American activities in Cyprus and the region represent greater chains for Cyprus.

The question of the presence of American spy stations has been inherited by the Cyprus Republic from the colonial administration.

There is no provision for these stations in the agreements [for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus]. For this reason the Cyprus Government has no commitment toward the Americans. Nor is it possible for contractual obligations of the colonial administration to be binding on the Republic of Cyprus.

In other words, there is no legal impediment to the dissolution of these radio stations.

The United States set foot on Cyprus after World War II. The British Government leased to it—free of charge—Cyprus land in order to build three spy stations to monitor wireless and radio messages from the Arab and the socialist countries.

The three stations began operations at Mia Milea, Gerolakkos and Karavas during a most gloomy period of the cold war.

[NC150840] These stations were improved and expanded irrespective of developments on the island. They watched surrounding region and the Cyprus Government, and they had the potential to bring the telecommunications of the Cyprus Republic to a standstill.

After 1964 some restrictions were imposed on the economic immunity of the employees who, until then, were treated as diplomatic employees. Since 1967 it was agreed that the amount of \$1 million was to be paid to the government for the operations of the stations. This money came from the CIA because these stations come under its jurisdiction. This event has served to defame Cyprus when its name was included in the list of those who were financed by the CIA.

These three stations are now in the occupied areas. And because nothing coincidental happens, particularly in the case of military operations—such as the Turkish military operation which led to concrete occupation plans—we must conclude that one day the Americans decided to put these three stations under the protection of trusted pro-Western NATOite troops instead of leaving them exposed to the dangers and the threats of a non-aligned Cyprus Republic.

According to reports, despite Denktas' references the radio stations are operating and have also been improved following the occupation and their old equipment has been replaced with modern equipment.

With the grant of billions of dollars to Turkey and the signing of a new military agreement, things are much easier now for the Americans. Such an agreement will definitely improve the conditions for the use of the radio stations in the occupied areas.

If what we have said in connection with the bases and the monitoring stations falls within the framework of the consequences of colonialism, there is one question for which the Cyprus Government is responsible.

We wonder what made the government agree to the American request for a new station in Nicosia, of course the free Nicosia.

We do not believe the government was under any obligation to do this. Could it be that the government believed this concession could lead to political recompense in the Cyprus problem?

If this were the idea, the government should have known from the beginning that American policy has always favored Turkey and that nothing would have been enough to make the United States abandon Turkey for the sake of Cyprus. Thus, we have no room for maneuvering or concessions toward the United States for a change in its policy.

When we accept the American spy station then we accept certain other states of affair that confuse the Cyprus issue.

We accept the present consumer society with its economic gaps. We accept the present form of defense instead of a popular defense with the mobilization of the people and the resources. We accept Clifford and the other American pressure and blackmail.

We have bowed to American pressure and accepted that the designing of refugee houses should not aim at comfort under temporary conditions but at providing a new roof to replace the old one.

The visits of the American ambassador to refugee settlements and the handing over of keys by the American ambassador to refugees at Anthoupolis constitute a stigma and a disgrace.

That is, with this retreating policy toward the United States we have encouraged those who are hostile to Cyprus. We assist in the spying on the Cyprus Government and we contribute to the outflanking of our struggle.

While the government appears to be making so many political concessions to the United States, American policy has been continuously strengthening Turkey.

The fact that the United States pays \$300,000--that is 70,000 pounds--for its spy station in Nicosia, creates for us a moral and political problem that does not even give us economic benefit.

We again appear to be receiving money from the CIA and this gives the impression that we have an inconsistent policy. It strikes at the non-aligned character of the Cyprus Republic and makes us the accomplices of those who have destroyed us.

If the amount of 70,000 pounds is considered a benefit, our people are willing to contribute this money so that the station may close down.

Moreover this situation gives Denktas arguments in order to slander us internationally, saying we are being paid by the Americans and being opposed to our neighboring countries and in general to the Islamic world.

Is the amount of \$300,000 worth such moral and political damage?

We must denounce the American presence in Cyprus and we must denounce the aid to Turkey as hostile to Cyprus and the region.

Our passive stand toward these questions confuses the Cyprus issue, leads our problem into a stalemate, encourages Turkish occupation and opens the door for the complete enslavement of Cyprus.

We will listen to the views of our colleagues, who we hope will agree on the basic points, and in the end we will submit a motion for a resolution hoping that this will express the views of all sides in the House.

AKEL Official: 'Block Americanization'

NC150904 Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 15 Feb 80 pp 1, 7 NC

[Excerpts] The U.S. presence at the British bases in Cyprus, which is continuously being escalated, really constitutes one of the greatest dangers not only for the independence and sovereignty of the republic but also for Cyprus' very existence.

This serious warning was made in the House of Representatives yesterday by leftwing House member and AKEL Deputy Secretary General A. Fandis when he spoke on the "U.S. presence at the British bases and the monitoring stations."

A. Fandis said: "Americanization of the British bases means in practice their activation and inclusion in the Pentagon's general strategic plans for the hot Middle East area--plans that, according to a most recent statement by Carter, are being reworked so as to be adjusted to the climate of tension and cold war that Washington is cultivating."

The speaker referred to the various AKEL charges about the U.S. use of the British bases, the operation of the spy stations and the imperative need for their dissolution, and the U.S. imperialists' increased interest in Cyprus following the loss of their bases in Iran and the charting of a new strategy by the Pentagon.

A. Fandis also stressed: "Certain fundamental conclusions originate from all this, the main one being that our island's involvement in U.S. plans, which constitute a moral danger, must be absolutely averted. The House, the government and the people must unanimously block the Americanization of the bases. The president has already stated that the bases will not be allowed to be used for purposes other than those envisaged by the agreements. This statement must become even clearer, more categorical and more concrete. We already know that the Americans are using the bases. It must be declared that this is totally impermissible. The British are violating the treaty of establishment that they themselves imposed on Cyprus. This gives us the right to denounce them for violating the treaty and to denounce the treaty as well. At the same time, it must be declared that it is necessary to put an end to the operation of the U.S. spy stations because under the conditions of escalating tension they politically expose us in the eyes of our friends who have been unsparingly supporting us.

"The need to abolish the British bases, which are a cancer on Cyprus, must be repeated. The time is ripe to view this question as one of supreme importance."

#### Progovernment Member Pleased With Policy

NC150907 Nicosia ELEVTHERI KYPROS in Greek 15 Feb 80 p 8 NC

[Text] During yesterday's House debate on the question of the U.S. presence at the British bases and the operation of U.S. monitoring stations raised by EDEK House member Khatzidimitriou, Pelekanos, Democratic Party House member, stated on behalf of his party's parliamentary group that, as it has been repeatedly clarified by the government, the bases were being used solely in accordance with the treaty of establishment. He said: "We are satisfied that the government has been closely watching the situation and has been taking the necessary pertinent measures."

CSO: 4908

## CP PREPARES FOR CONGRESS; PAPER, LEADER BACK MOSCOW

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 80 pt 2, p 2

[Article by Solveig Rødsgaard]

[Text] The chairman of the Communist Party of Denmark, Jørgen Jensen, will today be returning from a 5 days' visit to Moscow. To the fierce public debate on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan--which the Danish CP has approved of. To the debate on the boycott, if at all, of the Olympics in Moscow--which the Danish CP, of course, is against. And to the debate on the internal exile and degradation of Andrei Sakharov, the critic of the Soviet system--which the party organ LAND OG FOLK, in an editorial yesterday, quite surprisingly criticized mildly. An editorial which was neither approved beforehand by Jørgen Jensen, nor by the chief ideologist Ib Nørlund.

Jørgen Jensen's trip to Moscow was planned a long time ago. It had nothing to do with the current foreign political situation, it was pointed out at the party headquarters on Dronningens Tværgade. It was not a so-called official trip, and, on account of the political situation, the Soviet top leaders will hardly have had time to receive Jørgen Jensen in audience. But there is no doubt that, regardless of the original program for the trip, he has also been discussing with his party comrades in Moscow the attitudes taken by Western communist parties to the situation in Afghanistan and to the Sakharov case.

The chairman of the Danish CP has been able to state that there have been only four withdrawals from the Danish CP as a result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. That, in the letters to the editor, the reaction to the intervention has been very controlled. That the Danish CP, in a few weeks, will receive public approval from the Ministry of the Interior to nominate candidates for the coming Folketing election, and that the party is 100 percent certain that it will get back into the Folketing.

However, when going through the heap of newspapers which have been accumulating during the week, Jørgen Jensen will also be reading in LAND OG FOLK of last Thursday:



"During the last few years, Sakharov has repeatedly broken Soviet law. In the foreign press, he has had his fling, attacking the Soviet people and the Soviet state. He has often been warned by the Soviet authorities about the consequences which such a behavior might have. Nevertheless, Sakharov persisted."

"The authorities now struck. Sakharov will be deprived of his international honors but will continue receiving his pension, and an apartment will be made available to him in Gorky. The reason for the intervention against him was an interview with an American TV company, backed by President Carter's approval for a boycott of the Olympics in Moscow."

"There is no doubt that the Soviet law permits such intervention. Nevertheless, it may seem incomprehensible and illogical to resort to administrative means in an ideological and political struggle."

#### Official Visit

Party chairman Jørgen Jensen, who last Friday was warmly celebrated on the occasion of his 60th birthday, has never before paid an official visit to Moscow in his capacity of party chairman. But he has, of course, been to Moscow and to other places in the Soviet Union on many visits and trips. When he became party chairman in December of 1977, after Knud Jespersen's death, he paid some kind of inaugural visit to the Eastern European capitals.

#### Shy

The last time that the Danish CP sent a delegation on an official visit to Moscow was 5 years ago. However, about 12 months ago, a delegation from SUCP visited their colleagues on Dronningens Tværgade.

Among the official visits is automatically included a talk with the top people of the Politburo, primarily with the party secretary and president, Leonid Brezhnev. Also in the case of unofficial visits, the heads of Western communist parties are usually received in audience, if time allows it. But, in the case of both kinds of visit, the foreign communists are staying in guest houses, not at Moscow hotels.

Jørgen Jensen does not feel at home at big receptions. He is somewhat shy. Unlike Knud Jespersen, who, on account of his long time as party chairman, was in high favor among the leaders of foreign communist parties, and who, actually, liked a bit of pomp and circumstance, with driver, car, and nice receptions on his arrival.

#### Viewpoints

At the official visits, the delegation from the Danish CP will negotiate with members of the SUCP who have been appointed by the Politburo. In the case of all visits, there are negotiations with the international department of the SUCP under the leadership of Boris Ponomarev.

"Viewpoints on the international political situation and developments within the world communist movement are exchanged," all of it, of course, mostly seen in relation to the part of the world from which the communist delegation in question comes.

The members of the delegation from the Danish CP change from time to time, depending on the items on the agenda to be discussed, which have been agreed upon beforehand.

It was said at the headquarters at Dronningens Tvergade that the reason why it was Jørgen Jensen who went to Moscow this week was that he was the one who had the best possibilities at the moment.

#### Congress

In a short time, the party secretariat of the Danish CP will start making arrangements for the party's 26th congress which will be held at Easter, and Jørgen Jensen will then be busy. It will be the first time that he, as party chairman, will be meeting the congress of the Danish CP, which is the party's top leadership.

7262

CSO: 3106

## RADICAL LIBERALS' CHAIRMAN PETERSEN AGAINST DEFENSE INCREASE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 25 Jan 80 p 14

[Text] The Radical Liberals are participating in the negotiations concerning a new defense program because this gives the best possibilities of pinning the Social Democrats to their move toward a 'zero-solution.'

The chairman of the Radical Liberal Party, Niels Helveg Petersen, tells INFORMATION that it is too "dangerous letting the Social Democrats sit alone and negotiate a defense program with all the hawks."

We are willing to accept a move in the negotiations which is based on a zero-solution, i.e. a solution which means that the defense expenditure will not be increased. But we can, under no circumstances, accept an increase in the expenditure. There is no other area within the public sector which has been ensured a fixed index-tied amount for a certain number of years. On the contrary, all the other areas have to economize."

## Foreign Troops

The other reason that Niels Helveg Petersen gives for the Radical Liberals' participation in the negotiations in connection with the defense program is the fear that the government's move will throw the country open to the presence of foreign troops in Denmark in times of no war.

"The government's move in connection with the new defense program puts greater emphasis on warning services and less on land defense. That may mean that foreign troops may become deployed at an earlier point.

The Radical Liberals can, under no circumstances, accept the presence of foreign troops in our country in times of peace. That is the reason why we participate, among other things, in the negotiations in connection with the armed forces program, so that we shall be able to find out if that is what they are now contemplating."

F-16

"The reason why we are at all in the situation that the army, the navy and the air force have to be reduced, even if the defense budget is being

maintained at an unchanged level is the 'cuckoo-in-the-nest' effect of the F-16 aircraft.

The cost of the F-16 aircraft exceeds by far the amount initially estimated. That is why we are forced to schedule cutbacks to fulfill the obligations caused by the F-16 aircraft," Niels Helveg Petersen says.

#### On Own Account

The Folketing group of the Radical Liberal Party has just discussed its position on the negotiations concerning the defense program at a group meeting. As far as INFORMATION has learnt, the group has had its discussion against the background of a certain amount of annoyance within the party at a statement made by the spokesman on defense policy matters of the Radical Liberal Party, Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen.

Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen has requested the formation of a government composed of the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Conservative People's Party and the Radical Liberal Party. In that connection, Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen said that all the parties will have to bow to one another, and that the Radical Liberal Party must accept an armed forces program "of a different content and extent than desired."

Niels Helveg Petersen says that Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen has made his statement on his own account. "There has been no adoption by the group of that statement."

"Does this mean that you dissociate yourself from Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen's statement?"

"This is an academic question. It is a question of conditions which do not exist at all. Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen will also admit that it is a hypothetical question."

Niels Helveg Petersen says that the Radical Liberals will continuously evaluate the course of the negotiations concerning the new defense program, and whether they will continue to take part in the negotiations. The next meeting between the government and the other parties will take place next Tuesday.

7262  
CSO: 3106

## LO CHAIRMAN NIELSEN ATTACKS GOVERNMENT CRISIS PLAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 80 pt 2, pp 1, 2

[Article by Frank Dahlggaard]

[Text] An embittered LO chairman speaks his mind after a month of silence: "We are now struggling on with new debts, a higher rate of inflation and more indirect taxes--The crisis plan is not a matter for the government or the Folketing to decide upon--There is no reason to discuss industrial democracy, either with the Radical Liberal Party or with the Socialist People's Party."

Denmark is steadily continuing its hitherto course, which involves a higher rate of inflation and more borrowing. The government will not be able to avoid presenting the population with new increases in indirect taxes.

It is a disappointed and embittered LO chairman who says these things. During the last month, Thomas Nielsen has been keeping quiet--one of the reasons being his illness--but now he is again back in the public debate:

"The package solution we had originally agreed upon with the government before Christmas would have rendered superfluous further increases in direct as well as indirect taxes. For it would definitely have helped restore Denmark's competitive power. The Socialist People's Party and the Radical Liberal Party, however, got cold feet because of some religious ideas on profit-sharing, and, consequently, the alternative to a tightening of the incomes policy will have to be employed: higher direct and indirect taxes. The wage drift which has now become possible will communicate itself to the public sector where the costs will keep increasing. In such a situation, more tax money will have to be collected."

Thomas Nielsen adds that new indirect taxes mean a further decline in real wages, and that experience shows that this causes a renewed pressure for higher wages.



Thomas Nielsen does not conceal the fact that he is embittered at the way the government acted in the hectic days prior to Christmas:

"This time, we really were ready to make an important contribution toward improving the competitive power of the country. We gave up three installments of the cost-of-living increment for good, we accepted that oil be removed from the cost-of-living index, and that the first installment of the cost-of-living increment resulting from the new cost-of-living index be reduced by 30 øre. We were ready to give all these things up which hitherto have been like 'sacred cows' to us. In return, we felt that it would be reasonable for us to have a share in the profits of the enterprises. But, here, the non-Socialist parties said no. For they do not want to slaughter any of their 'sacred cows'; this agreement applies only to us."

The LO chairman points out that the Social Democratic government had promised the LO that it would force the 'package solution' agreed upon through the Folketing, but the government ran away from these promises on Sunday, 16 December.

"There has not--as has been maintained--been a rupture between the government and the trade unions, but it is clear, of course, that our confidence in agreements entered into with the Social Democratic government has been shaken. If the government approaches us anew, we shall have to think more carefully."

#### Agreement on Election

What, in the opinion of the LO, should the government then have done? For Anker Jørgensen was not able to provide the necessary majority in the Folketing.

"They should have done what we had agreed on with the government on Saturday, 15 December, viz. continue the negotiations. They should have extended the temporary controls fixed by law, so that there would have been more time to discuss things. This might very well have given a result, but if, nevertheless, there would have been a collapse, a general election ought to have taken place. There was agreement on this on Saturday, 15 December, when we last talked with the government, but, the next day, they, nevertheless, did something else."

Thomas Nielsen states that, thanks to the government, the trade unions have lost well-earned rights without getting anything in return, and without getting the needed improvement in the competitive power toward foreign countries, for which the stage had originally been set:

"They have now released the sliding wage system and regulation of the rate of increase, and a considerable portion of the improvement aimed at is thus gone. Under the original plan, the wage increases in the second year of the collective agreement would have amounted to approximately 5 percent. Now they will not be below 10 percent."

The LO chairman states that the top leaders of the trade unions have not had any contact with the government on questions regarding the economic policy since the said Saturday in December. There simply has been nothing to discuss. However, in a special employment committee, they discuss with the government the employment plan which will take effect in 1981.

Hoffmeyer too Clumsy

The central bank director has recently described what the present economic course may lead to. Does this not make an impression on the top leadership of the trade unions?

"Erik Hoffmeyer has described the situation a bit too clumsily. Nobody, of course, has any doubt that we are in a difficult economic situation, but all this talk about abyss distorts the proportions. If only we will take some effective steps to improve our competitive power, we shall gradually be able to improve the situation. It is not worse than that."

Thomas Nielsen is angry that the trade unions are being blamed for fighting for industrial democracy. "The goal of our entire work is to create equality and justice. We shall stick to the demand for profit-sharing, for we shall not have complete democracy in Denmark until it has been introduced in the economic area as well."

The wisacre has recently asked the politicians to consider big, general state subsidies to the trades and industries. Does LO agree on this idea?

"Lots of subsidies have already been given directly or indirectly by the state to the trades and industries, but one should remember that these subsidies are being paid via taxes, 80 percent of them by wage earners. If, therefore, we are to contribute to such a form of policy to improve our competitive power, we shall also want to have a say on the way the money is being spent, thus profit-sharing. We do not want just to pay subsidies which are pulled out of the country and deposited on Swiss bank accounts."

What will be the result of the discussion with the Radical Liberal Party on profit-sharing?

Crisis Plan

"The executive committee of the LO has not made any decision on the question of meeting with the Radical Liberal Party. It probably would not serve any purpose either. Niels Helveg Petersen simply must not make any concessions for his party, and the same thing, incidentally, also applies to the leadership of the Socialist People's Party. They talk in quite exaggerated terms about our central industrial democracy fund, in spite of the fact that our proposal implies that the funds of the enterprises become the essential element."

What is LO's reaction to the heralded crisis plan?

"In the trade unions we have been working for a long time on this question which the politicians now suddenly are taking up. However, it is abundantly clear that this is not a question which lends itself to legislation because the employment conditions are so widely different in the various parts of the labor market. The crisis plan is something which must be created through a network of agreements between the parties in the labor market."

Thomas Nielsen says that, according to an agreement with the government, it has, all the time, been the idea that the question of the crisis plan is something which the parties in the labor market must arrange themselves through negotiations. "A lot of viewpoints, for which there is no basis, have been put on to Svend Auken by the non-Socialist parties. I do not believe at all that any crisis plan will be coming from the government. On the other hand, I believe that many trade unions will put great emphasis on the question of a crisis plan in the coming collective bargaining."

What will Denmark be coming to after the Christmas agreement?

"We shall just continue in the same way as before. We in the LO are still ready to contribute to a proper solution, but I suppose that it will now be natural for the government to come to us. The LO has not broken any agreements or created the present situation."

7262

CS0: 3106

## INDUSTRY LEADER SEES IMPROVED SITUATION FOR SHIPBUILDING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 80 p 9

[Article by Carsten Steno]

[Text] The pessimism of the last few years within the Danish shipbuilding industry has turned to optimism and a renewed belief that Danish shipyards have a future.

It appears from a survey issued by the Danish Shipbuilders' Association that the volume of orders of Danish shipyards at the end of 1979 has become considerably improved compared with the same point of time in 1978, and the volume of orders, moreover, is now bigger than that of competing shipyards in the rest of Europe.

At the end of 1979, the volume of orders of Danish shipyards comprised a total of 64 ships of a total tonnage of 609,000 gross register tons, as against 50 ships of a total tonnage of 515,000 gross register tons at the end of 1978. This corresponds in tons to an increase in the total volume of orders by 18 percent.

Hardly any of the major shipyards are now in immediate need of new tasks. Especially not after the Nakskov Shipyard yesterday secured orders which will keep its workers employed for another year.

The level of employment at Danish shipyards has been reduced since 1975 by 7,000 men, or by just under 35 percent. The present volume of orders makes it possible to keep the present number of workers of approximately 14,000 men employed until mid-1981.

## Wage Increases

The director of the Danish Shipbuilders' Association, K. Engell-Jensen, however, points out that the present level of employment can only be maintained if the wage increases given to the workers are based on increased productivity.

With the present level of production, Danish shipyards contribute to an improvement in the balance of payments by a net amount of approximately 2 billion kroner annually. A wage drift of a few percent, however, may rapidly change this figure, and the Danish Shipbuilders' Association, therefore, urges its members to enter into long-term wage agreements with their employees.

In connection with the increased influx of orders which has been particularly stimulated via improved ships credits to Danish owners, it has, at the same time, become possible to increase the share of export orders from 10 percent in 1978 to 27 percent in 1979. However, there still is quite some distance to the level of the early seventies, when approximately 50 percent of the production went to foreign countries.

Another reason for the increased order intake is, moreover, the greatly improved freight market, which has also contributed to an increase in the prices of the ships ordered. An indication of this is that the gross tonnage ordered in the second quarter of 1979 for the first time in 5 years exceeded the completed tonnage.

#### Trend

The trend in the freight market may, however, change rapidly. This has been demonstrated, among other things, by the U.S. embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union. However, it is still too early to evaluate the long-term effects of this step.

Finally, it is worth noting that Danish shipyards have been able to pull through the crisis without extensive state subsidies, which have been the rule in nearly all other European countries. Danish shipyards have been forced to make their production more efficient in order to get out of the crisis, and this benefits them today.

7262  
CSO: 3106



## NEXT ARMED FORCES PROGRAM MUST SIMPLIFY COMMAND STRUCTURE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Jan 80 p 8

[Article by P. E. Gustafsson, Major]

[Text] The debate on the coming defense program had slowly got under way in the fall of 1979. This might have given rise to confidence and expectations that, this time, we would get a profound debate in the political constituency organizations, among the defense personnel, and among the population.

However, things did not go as expected, for the debate stopped the very moment that writs were issued for the election to the Folketing. Contrary to what is the case in other Western countries, the armed forces in this country are kept out of the election campaign. Indeed, it has almost become a tradition that one does not discuss defense during an election campaign. This is, of course, a very sensitive subject, on which one could burn one's fingers.

After the election came the debate on the NATO missiles, and not even in this most vehement debate did they venture to touch on the subject of the future armed forces program. The fact that it was now the government's 'overall solution' which took up all the time of the Folketing is quite understandable. That the last debates and the voting in the Folketing had hardly been completed when a number of politicians started a vehement discussion of the old problem of Danish TV's program 2, is less understandable.

Many of us will remember how the 1977 armed forces program was pulled through on a Sunday morning at 4.30 a.m. after uninterrupted negotiations from 2 p.m. on the previous Saturday afternoon.

It is absolutely irresponsible if we shall, once more, experience such a course of negotiations. One thing is that it is a question of negotiations involving inflation-proof billions of kroner with a term of 4 to 8 years. Another thing is that it is also a question of the place of work for approximately 30,000 people, who, for a certain period of time every 4 years, are put in the situation that they do not know if they will be able to remain in their jobs--to many of them a lifelong vocation.

The politicians owe it to us that we, this time, get a thorough and factual debate on the defense reform, for it will, hopefully, be a reform and not, as in 1977, an extension of a previous program, against the background of a few hundred million kroner's adjustment, for it is not only a question of the number of jobs, it is the defense of the country that the negotiations are about, it is decades of security policy on the national level and in the NATO context which will here be laid down.

In the negotiations in connection with the extension of the 1973 program, there were, as we shall experience it once again, parties that wanted very big retrenchments or rather a liquidation of the armed forces. But there were also parties that wanted to go far beyond what the defense chief had asked for. It has, unfortunately, become the rule that they concentrate on a certain amount of billions of kroner instead of examining the budget itself or the armed forces program. The will to defend the country of the political parties is measured in billions of kroner. How much and what kind of defense they get for the money, they are less interested in.

The background to the coming debate has hitherto been the Defense Command's 'Draft proposal for the armed forces program after 1 April 1981--Alternatives to the 1973 program.' The draft program has been prepared against the background of the Defense Ministry's directive and was published in October of 1979.

It follows the traditional pattern. The alternatives are difficult to find, it is a question of reductions of the operative units of all services. The army suffers the most. Here, the number of brigades, battalions and companies is reduced to such an extent that it is simply unwarrantable. It is thus not a question of a draft program for a defense reform, but it is an enumeration of the cutbacks which will become necessary on the basis of the budget which may be expected to become available.

Three economic levels are mentioned, each of which indicating how many units (combat troops) can be maintained within the limits of the budget. Level 1 is based on an unchanged defense budget, which, in 1980, is estimated at 7.5 billion index-regulated 1972 kroner. This model involves big reductions, primarily on Zealand. It is remarkable that they are, more or less, giving up this area where they used to put a very high priority on the control of the Great Belt and the Little Belt (the passages). It may be putting it too strongly to say that they are giving up Zealand, but we are approaching the stage to a dangerous degree where the defense of Zealand will be based on the home guard.

Level 2 is based on an increase in the present budget by 1.5 percent. Also this model involves a very big reduction in the combat troops; there are no reorganizations or changes in organization.

Level 3 is based on an increase in the present budget by 3 percent. This model involves largely a continuation of the present organization and strength targets.

It applies to all three models that it is the units (the combat forces) which are being cut away; all staffs, command units and schools can be maintained in their present structure. There are no concrete proposals to carry through the radical structural change which was presupposed already in the 1973 program. Where is the alternative?

We now have seen the draft program prepared by the defense command--we are now waiting for the alternative solutions announced by the minister of defense. In newspaper articles as well as in lectures, the minister has stated that the present heavy defense organization cannot be continued without changes in a new program.

As late as late in the summer of 1979, the minister said: "The good-will of the armed forces may, to the best of my knowledge, be jeopardized if the armed forces and the home guard do not themselves demonstrate the ability and the will to come up with new ideas, to think in terms of alternatives. That the armed forces only lack funds and personnel to continue the existing program can hardly be the only constructive idea than can be produced and furthered."

#### Remove the Heavy Organization

I quite agree with the minister's statement that the present program cannot be carried on without changes, and that we must get away from the heavy defense organization. But I still have not understood how the alternative solutions are to appear. It is possible that the wording: "the new thinking should come from the armed forces themselves" means from the chiefs responsible. In that case, we have seen the proposal, but if the minister means that it must come from the personnel of the armed forces, there is a lack of initiative to further such alternative solutions. A directive is also missing which ensures that the personnel participating with factual and constructive proposals will get unhurt out of the debate. It is true that civil servants are secured against dismissals on such a basis, but they must also feel secure against the so-called disguised sanctions. There is no danger for those who agree to the universally accepted ideas, they will get their rewards, but the others have good reason to be aware of the problem.

Since 1974 successive ministers of defense have been telling us in feature articles, in articles and lectures that the ministry in 1974 approved a new structure for the army on the basis of the results of a rationalization study carried out in 1973. The new structure divides the activities of the army into an operative function, an educational function, and an establishment and administrative function. In spite of the fact that they have now had 7 years to carry through the structural change, no essential steps have been taken in this area. One may, in this connection, then wonder what the so-called 8-strong committee has been doing in this respect.

## Each Man His Own Anti-Tank Defense Missile

It is imperative to get started on the reorganization and simplification. We cannot, in the long run, keep the double organizations, the overlappings, and the other superfluous units. That will have the effect that one keeps reducing the combat units, they become so undermined, as far as materiel and personnel is concerned, that it will be quite misleading to call them companies, battalions and brigades. In actual fact, it is a question of cadres. Only a few officers or non-commissioned officers have seen what a company or a battalion looks like when organized for combat.

The defense of Zealand is now to be left to our Allies. It is probably optimistic to believe that other NATO-countries, which themselves are greatly in need of their forces, will put down units in an area which does not even have forces to secure receiving facilities. It would probably be more realistic to put an emphasis on the land forces which, after all, are in the area when the combat starts, and then hope to secure support from the air and the sea.

We have also learnt from the draft program that "It is characteristic of the local defense forces that the requirements as to the quality of the materiel are generally less stringent than when it comes to the quality of the materiel of the field army." It probably is not our task to evaluate this. The local defense force is one of the very areas which needs improvements, we have to have a modern local defense force. What we have are largely a number of depots.

There is enough to tackle, we must get started on the new thinking and the alternative solutions.

The politicians must be made to understand that we now need a defense reform. We cannot continue the 1973 program even with a 3-percent increase. It will be possible to maintain the combat forces if we get the head adjusted to the body and get the balance of the services adjusted to goals and means. The tendency there toward each man his own desk must be changed to each man his own anti-tank defense missile.

It is my hope that also the very pro-defense politicians will understand that money alone does not do it. One cannot with money create efficiency if one does not have the necessary modern and flexible guidance system.

The defense minister's article in *HÆRENS ÅRSSKRIFT* 1978 points in the right direction. One can read in the annual what the intentions of the minister were in 1978. Whether they will be translated into action, we shall learn in the coming months.

## BRIEFS

OIL CONSUMPTION STEADY--Despite increasing oil prices, massive economy drives and approaches from the International Energy Agency to save on oil, it does not look as if the Danish consumer intends to do so. For the preliminary calculations by the Energy Board of last year's oil consumption show that the oil consumption is largely on a level with that of the previous year. It is primarily the switch of power stations to coal-firing and a modest decline of 4 percent in gasoline sales which have given us the small amount of saving. The modest drop in the total oil consumption is far from sufficient to have a noticeable effect on the balance of payments. The only positive aspect of the report by the oil importers is that the savings were biggest in the latter part of 1979, and this development seems to continue into this year. [Text]  
[Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Jan 80 p 2] 7262

CSO: 3106



## MINISTER APEL DISCUSSES CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN NATO

DW200845 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany  
1000 GMT 17 Feb 80 DW

["Interview of the Week" with Federal Defense Minister Hans Apel by correspondent Woerdehoff, apparently recorded in Bonn]

[Text] [Question] Ever since the Soviets have invaded Afghanistan nothing has been right and proper anymore between the superpowers, Mr Minister, and what is even worse, there is some friction between the United States and Western Europe. The reactions to the events in Afghanistan neither have a coordinating effect nor are they part of a concept for crisis management. Must the reasons for this state of affairs be seen in a lack of institutions and instruments for crisis management or are the Americans and Europeans drifting apart in the political assessment of the situation?

[Answer] No doubt we cannot deny that many a hasty report on this side and beyond the Atlantic has caused a sensation in the initial periods of these events. But the very past few weeks have made it plain that Europeans and Americans are more strongly moving toward each other and that the necessities are equally seen; especially understanding is being created for the need of sort of division of labor within the Alliance. In this connection I think it is remarkable that not only the German defense minister quite expressly rejects the presence of German troops on the Gulf and an extension of the NATO area but that my American colleague says the same. It is obvious, on the other hand, that we also discuss the question whether enough is being done reciprocally, for the United States as well as the Federal Republic needs encouragement.

[Question] Nevertheless, I would like to take a look under the nice label of the solidarity between the United States and Europe and quote two voices: the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE wrote the other day that it is the mistake of Europe to pay more attention to Washington, Carter, and the presidential election campaign than to the Soviet Union. And there seem to be some misunderstandings also in Europe where NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, for example, which is a highly respected newspaper, after the German-French consultations sees in the neighborhood of the decision-making centers of Bonn and Paris the

temptation to pursue a policy of emancipation between the blocs. Are such voices entirely unfounded or is this attributable to the fact that the consultations, the discussions, are not intensive enough?

[Answer] As far as our orientation is concerned, to begin with the first part of your question, it is, of course, primarily toward the United States as our Western superpower. But we are also firmly envisaging, and are in fact also maintaining, dialog contacts with the Soviet Union. The chancellor wrote Mr Brezhnev a letter to restore in this manner the communications between East and West. Nothing is worse than desisting from talking with each other in times of crisis. Actually there is no such thing as emancipation here in Western Europe. Though there are indeed the European prospects and European needs....

[Question] ...And also interests....

[Answer] ...Also European interests which must, of course, be incorporated in the process of solidarity. At no time can solidarity be a one-track affair.

[Question] Occasionally, Mr Minister, the impression arises as though there is a difference of opinion on this side and beyond the Atlantic over the assessment of the motives for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There are two controversial versions, properly speaking, one of them, having just been restated by French Premier Barre, says that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a sign of weakness, meaning, on the whole, a defensive action. A similar opinion has come forth from George F. Kennan who, after all, is an expert of standing. Another explanation primarily cultivated in the United States has it that this invasion is part of the Soviet urge to reach the Indian ocean and the region where the oil is flowing. How do you assess what began on 27 December?

[Answer] I am very much against our trying to shed light on, or even debate, the motives of people whom we know, to be sure, yet whose motives and debates with others in the Politburo are unknown to us. But I think that the following may be said with certainty: The Soviet Union had been facing a difficult question, namely, the question whether [to look on idly as] in its forefield, in Afghanistan, a nonaligned country, developments spread which would change the political characteristics of that country--after all, the development in Iran took all of us by surprise, also with respect to its dynamics, its speed, and its intensity, and sparks of that nature may well jump over--or to intervene. The Soviet Union decided to take the latter course of action and, in so doing, committed a fundamental political mistake. It will take the Soviet Union a long time until it will have digested that mistake. This is why we uphold our demand: the Soviet Union must withdraw from Afghanistan.

At the same time, however, the Soviet Union thus has improved its strategic position. We know from our sources of information, also from satellite

reconnaissance, that the Soviet Union has relocated modern combat planes to airfields which it has constructed beforehand. Thereby it has enhanced its range of action, at least with respect to military options. By the way, the relocation of these airplanes has nothing to do with Afghanistan and the problems in Afghanistan. So we can derive intentions from this. Personally I prefer to stick to facts, however, and what I mean by facts is that it is now important for the West to safeguard the region against any further options of expansion of the Soviet Union through a concerted action.

[Question] I do understand you, you consider what the Russians have been doing in Afghanistan as a strategic option.

[Answer] No, I regard it as a military action which might be linked with military-strategic options.

[Question] You just said that something must be done against it. In all probability there will be some U.S. military bases in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman, and reportedly several thousand leathernecks will be dispatched to the Indian Ocean. Do you see these measures as a sensible containment or are they a mere instrument for current crisis management?

[Answer] What matters essentially is to see that short-term measures alone will be of no help, necessary as they might be. It is important indeed to develop a long-term plan and to solve the problems of the region on a long-term basis. After all, the West has been painfully taken by surprise once before. So actually it should not have been taken by surprise by the development in a country which was highly armed militarily and which seemed to be so stable. I believe that all of us need to learn this lesson.

From this follows that the social and economic stabilization of this region, but not exclusively of this region, deserves a high order of priority. The report which Willy Brandt has submitted on behalf of the North-South Commission is an important contribution to this end in that it draws our attention to the fact that nothing will be attained by military actions, though military presence is, of course, part of a long-term action. This is not NATO's responsibility. There will not be any German troops on the Gulf. These are tasks of the Americans. It is not up to me to discuss in public the extent to which the Americans will have to live up to these responsibilities, this is, besides, far outside my own sphere of competence and power of decision.

[Question] But you have acknowledged, have you not, that this option of a military-strategic stabilization through new military bases might also cause new difficulties? Last week Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi made it quite clear in Bonn that the Arab states are not particularly happy about a U.S. base in Oman.

[Answer] What essentially matters probably is that the interests of the region be taken very seriously. After all, we cannot wish to take the place of governments of these countries. For this reason I am a declared opponent

to any enlargement of the zone of interest and influence of NATO. Our help toward the independent course of the countries and toward their own power of resistance, our economic assistance, primarily also via cooperation with the European Community, is the contribution we can make toward the development of this region and also toward the development of our own interests which we are bound to have in this area since our energy supply is largely insured there.

[Question] Another question, Mr Apel, concerning the instruments of crisis management. General Schmueckle has suggested that NATO set up a crisis management group for itself analogously to its nuclear planning group. What do you think of it, if anything, and could it be useful in the light of the experiences of the past several months?

[Answer] I am against permanently overtasking NATO politically. NATO is a military alliance. Gathered in NATO are states of the same philosophy of life and of identical political basic structure. There are quite a few tasks with which NATO cannot cope at all. The questions concerning economic cooperation do not belong in NATO but in the EC for the West Europeans, in the OECD for all industrial nations, and in the UN organizations for the countries of the world. This alone makes it plain that we would be making a serious mistake were we burdening NATO with matters that are at odds with NATO's mission. NATO is not the center of the world. The problems pressing us today are problems which must be solved at an entirely different place.

[Question] But where should they be settled? There have been difficulties already to assemble four foreign ministers in Bonn. I would like to ask you concretely: Would it not have made sense to assemble the circle that has become known as the world economic summit at an earlier date, it is supposed to meet in June in Venice?

[Answer] I do not consider that as urgently necessary. The actual measures have been debated and will be implemented. The world economic summit will have to view the long-term perspectives of the problems. Just an example I would like to introduce here in the debate: Afghanistan and developments in Iran have taught us something painfully, namely how precarious the energy supply of Western industrial states is, how unstable all that is what we consider as natural now. The problems probably are much more important for the future of industrial nations and the world as a whole than military-strategical problems, although they are also important. I consider it necessary to discuss them at the economic summit in Venice and I think that this will most likely be the case. Particularly the nuclear energy issue--the peaceful use of nuclear energy--belongs to that context.

[Question] You mentioned actual measures tht have been taken without such an institutionalization. One actual measure still is making the headlines, namely the participation of Western states in the Olympic games. You have been most outspoken in this respect. I would like to ask you: Should a German Olympic team not start in Moscow even if the National Olympic Committee decided clearly that the German sportsmen ought to go to Moscow?



[Answer] I believe we ought to touch on the proper sequence of that issue. First: Some months will pass until the teams of individual nations will report to the Moscow games the date is in mid-May or late May. Second: The Soviet Union must make it possible with its policy that the Olympic games will run smoothly and that all nations will be able to take part. Third: Sports and politics certainly belong together. I do not think that these are completely separate spheres of life. There exists no sphere that is completely free of politics. And yet I fully agree with you: In the end those must make the decision and be responsible for it who are the elected sports representatives. The impression must not be created that we want to tutor or torment those who are bearing a basic responsibility here, a responsibility, however, that is also political.

[Question] Let me touch on the measures again, Mr Minister. U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown, his predecessor Schlesinger and other American politicians complained--the last time at the Munich meeting of military experts--that the Federal Republic has too low defense expenditures. You and other Bonn politicians maintain, however, that there is also the help for Turkey, where Bonn plays a leading role, increasing development aid expenditures and the new relations of the European Community with Yugoslavia. My question is: Has the term "division of labor" not been properly defined on this and the other side of the Atlantic, so that such complaints have been voiced?

[Answer] I consider the entire debate not merely as unfortunate but also as rather dangerous. If I also started making public complaints about shortcomings of other NATO states in the past, that a number of NATO armies have become professional armies, that this caused problems with regard to reservists and problems with regard to a good quality of soldiers....

[Question] You have in mind the Americans and the British?

[Answer] I have in mind a number of NATO states. They are certainly not the only ones and we would have a rather senseless debate. One could carry the debate on, one could discuss what the Germans have done in the last decade and what others have not. That would really not get you anywhere. This is just an attempt of making mutual reproaches. And therefore I do not participate in the debate.

As regards expenditures in 1980. We will be spending almost DM10 billion for arms and equipment. That is 30 percent of our budget. That ought to be initiated first. Second, we are just in the very beginning of the fiscal year. The help for Turkey has not yet been introduced in the budget. But according to NATO criteria it will be added to our defense budget. We have not yet a supplementary budget for increased fuel costs. Other projects also have not been fully debated.

In short: We are doing everything that is necessary also with regard to the key word division of labor. But: Reproaches do not get you anywhere. We must debate the matter together. I can tell you that I have very intense



telephone contacts with my American colleague so that the necessary measures will have a proper structure and that we will quit the catalog of senseless reproaches that has been handed over the Atlantic.

[Question] So far we have only discussed crisis management in the West, in the Western Alliance, in view of the Afghanistan invasion. It is of course more important to bring under control the East-West crisis, the crisis between the two superpowers. You mentioned that Federal Chancellor has written to General Secretary Brezhnev. That was probably meant to get the paralyzed tongues going again?

[Answer] The main thing was to point out German positions. But beyond that letter there are important matters also. I consider it rather important and even significant that President Carter has said: The SALT II treaty will not be presently ratified by the Senate, but we will adhere to it, we will adhere to our signature and carry out arms limitation. If the Soviet Union for example, would make a similar statement, it would be a good thing. It would demonstrate that agreed arms control policy will be adhered to also in times of tension. Gierek has made a suggestion I cannot yet definitely probe, but it certainly offers interesting points also. In all this we must pay attention to one point, namely that there cannot be and may not be any actions that could separate Western Europe from its solidarity with the United States. But the Soviet Union is certainly very much aware of that.

[Question] What chances do the Europeans have in their negotiations as long as the Americans and the Russians do not speak to each other? I mean MBFR in Vienna, the CSCE followup conference slated for Madrid this year and the European disarmament conference suggested by Giscard, Brezhnev and now also by Gierek?

[Answer] There will be certainly some standstill situations. But the fact alone that talks will continue in Vienna, for example, although the East is presently most polemic there in an unnecessary way, demonstrates that chances have not been disrupted. It is therefore most important that the West will develop a general strategy, looking for things it has in common with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in order to exploit them together. Also after Afghanistan the basic prerequisites for peace in the world have not basically changed.

[Question] Moscow's line vis-a-vis Bonn, at least Moscow's agitation, seems to be the following: You cannot have both--detente in Europe and solidarity with the Americans. And some Washington voices actually sound similar. How do you react to that?

[Answer] The decade behind us is characterized by solidarity with the West, by the strengthening of NATO, strengthened Western integration in the European Community and by a simultaneously successful treaty policy with Eastern Europe. There exists no reason at all to doubt that basic model of a treaty policy here in Europe. A treaty policy can be continued only if all will

understand that we cannot be separated from Western solidarity and that we want to make our contribution to safeguarding peace in Europe and the world. But one must tell the Soviet Union one thing clearly: Peace in the world is indivisible indeed. Actions such as in Afghanistan have the effect of a cancerous ulcer. They curtail the opportunity to continue the successful policy of the past decade in an undisturbed way.

[Question] A last question, Minister Apel. The crisis in international relations takes place in an election year--there will be elections in America and in our country. How do you assess the action of the opposition that even wants to sacrifice the tax package on the altar of security? Are you content with it?

[Answer] Well, the opposition is not that outspoken. It wants to keep the egg to make scrambled eggs in the end. In other words: It offers something to everybody. The position of the opposition is therefore more than unclear. That has become most clear with regard to Mr Strauss who said a week ago that the German-French communique is almost ridiculous. Thereafter he himself praises the French policy when he was in Paris, saying that it was very close to his policy. There are many unclear things in this respect but also some insight, namely that the words and the actions of the Federal Government are the only perspective for German politics this year.

CSO: 3103

SPD FOREIGN POLICY EXPERT VIEWS U.S., FRG DIFFERENCES

DW190943 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0515 GMT 18 Feb 80 DW

[Excerpts from reporter Lenz telephone interview with SPD foreign policy expert Dr Peter Corterier in Washington--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Is it your task to make it clear to the Americans that the federal chancellor had no bad intentions when he mentioned in the SPD parliamentary group the political unpredictability of the Americans?

[Answer] I would see the task in a broader framework, namely as a task to explain our policy in the present situation to as many discussion partners here as possible, particularly in the Senate. However, I would like to say that I agree with some of the chancellor's critical statements. The improvement of consultations between the alliance partners is a problem, and I hope that it will be solved as soon as possible.

[Question] The CDU/CSU Bundestag faction's disarmament expert Alois Mertes in his talks with American politicians noted self-criticism by the United States with regard to lack of consultations with the alliance partners. Does that contain some hope that the "senseless catalog of reproaches" as Defense Minister Apel called it yesterday, which has been handed over the Atlantic to Bonn will be discontinued?

[Answer] I have just started my talks, but my first contacts have actually indicated the same. I can confirm that impression. The Americans themselves and the press confirm that several things have not worked in this connection, that the solidarity they like to mention should not be a one-way street, and that ways and means must be found to include the allies more. I hope that in the coming days and weeks some progress will be achieved in this matter, particularly since most high-ranking contacts will take place in the next days and weeks.

[Question] CDU parliamentarian Mertes maintains that the United States is very much in favor of a broad parliamentary consensus for strong German security and foreign policies. Mertes said that the Americans do

not want to interfere in the Federal Republic's election campaign but they still believe that a CDU/CSU government could act with more cohesion in matters of security and foreign policy and thus with regard to solidarity. You as a social democrat must reject that, but is there not something to it? Has such American opinion been mentioned confidentially?

[Answer] Well, naturally that depends on the people you talk to here. I believe that some people who have come here intend to see agreement between their own ideas and those of the American discussion partners. I really do not know how Mr Mertes could have the idea that the CDU/CSU shows more cohesion than we do. Last week Kohl tried to maintain that the CDU/CSU has some sort of a monopoly on solidarity with the Americans, while Strauss, after his visit to Paris, launched strong attacks against the U.S. administration. I must really ask where the agreement is.

[Question] Well, one could say that this agreement with the Americans could be indicated by statements of Deputy CDU Chairman Biedenkopf who pleaded--very much in line with the ideas of the Americans--that the Federal Republic ought to use its economic strength more for foreign policy necessities, such as say curtail trade relations and credit agreements with the Soviet Union. That would be speaking very much for the United States, would it not?

[Answer] Well, the things that are in question there will be discussed individually in the next weeks. But I believe that we must not forget one thing: Many things that are taking place between us and the Soviet Union in the field of trade are based on treaties. I very much hope that Mr Biedenkopf wants to adhere to these treaties as much as we do.

[Question] But future agreements are involved.

[Answer] Well, that must be discussed individually.

[Question] You are viewing the Bonn-Washington situation rather optimistically with regard to understanding. But Federal Minister of the Interior Baum said yesterday that no ultimatum exists for the federal government on 20 February to decide on a boycott of the Olympics. Won't that have the effect of an affront for the Americans who have committed themselves unconditionally to that boycott?

[Answer] Well, I believe that no affront can take place in connection with this problem because it is an outstanding example of a lack of consultation. I would like to recall once more how this happened. The deputy secretary of state was in Bonn telling the federal government and also the federal chancellor that the Olympic boycott issue was not a current topic, and 3 days later it was announced by Carter. So I believe that an affront can hardly be involved in this matter. I believe that the Americans must be content that several members of the federal government have said that it is hard to imagine that American athletes would be absent in Moscow while the Germans would go marching in.

[Question] But lamenting over a lack of consultation in the past is like crying over spilled milk. One must adapt to the Americans despite the lack of consultation, whether one likes it or not.

[Answer] I would like to agree to that in general. We cannot abandon our most important ally in important matters. It would be bad if the alliance were to show cracks as an aftereffect of the Afghanistan invasion. But I believe that we ought to learn from the mistakes made in the past and do everything so that they will not be repeated.

CSO: 3103



SCHMIDT'S NUMBER ONE AIDE INTERVIEWED ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DW190834 Baden-Baden Suedwestfunk Network in German 1145 GMT 17 Feb 80 DW

[Excerpts from interview with Gunter Huonker, minister of state in the chancellor's office, by Guenther Lotze, apparently recorded in Bonn]

[Text] [Question] Do you, as the minister of state in Helmut Schmidt's chancellor's office, have enough leeway left to develop and implement political ideas or are you rather what might be considered an assistant to the chancellor?

[Answer] The chancellor has something in the chancellor's office which I would like to refer to as cooperative leadership style; that is to say, any matter is discussed first before a decision is made. This offers a chance to advance ideas and suggestions. It is absolutely clear that the chancellor makes the decisions, and then it is the duty of his minister of state to put into practice what the chancellor has decided.

[Question] You joined the chancellor's office in a very interesting period. The political climate between East and West has considerably cooled, and we cannot but wonder whether detente policy stands any chance of survival.

[Answer] I might say yes, it does. Only this is not a foregone conclusion. It is necessary to work for this aim, and a lot needs to be done to this end. The efforts of the federal government made jointly with its allies are aimed at developing an overall concept to prevent tensions from aggravating again, at achieving that tensions will be mitigated again so that, as a result, the successes attained by detente policy may be retained for the purpose of clearing the road for scoring further headway in detente policy. Considering the currently difficult world situation I need not particularly emphasize that this will not be easy.

[Question] It almost looks as though the Soviets wanted to say: Detente policy with the Germans, with the Federal Republic, and with Europe indeed, but not with the Americans. Would this be an option to save detente policy?

[Answer] This would not be an option to save detente policy. Detente policy had been initiated, and can be pursued, only in full solidarity with the United States. I do not believe that there are any forces in Moscow which believe that the Federal Republic could be separated from its friends in the Western alliance and that they might try to achieve this by pursuing a sort of separate detente policy here, within Europe, at the seam between East and West.

[Question] It seems as though the communication lines between the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in all of the past 10 years have never been as disturbed as they have been in the past several weeks. Can the federal government do anything to eliminate this disturbance in the communication between the superpowers?

[Answer] I believe it can. This is, of course, a highly difficult matter and must not be misinterpreted to mean that the federal government might assume a sort of mediator role between the two superpowers. All it can do is to help, by means of suggestions and advice within the alliance, improve the preconditions for a resumption of the dialog, of the contacts, between East and West.

[Question] But was the chancellor's letter to General Secretary Brezhnev not a sort of mediation attempt?

[Answer] No, it was not an attempt at mediating but part of what I have just tried to outline.

[Question] The position of the federal government toward the participation of the German Olympic team in the Moscow summer games is well known. We behave like the Americans; this is what the federal foreign minister has said and this is what the defense minister has said. Has this position of the federal government not been influenced by the vote of the International Olympic Committee?

[Answer] The federal government has not made any decision as yet with regard to the matter of an Olympic participation. To preclude any misunderstanding: this decision could only be a recommendation to the sports institutions which ultimately have to decide whether athletes of the Federal Republic will participate in the Moscow games. We expect--and this is the policy of the federal government--that the Soviet Union will create the prerequisites for the participation of all countries, all states, in the Moscow games. We will have to wait and see in the next few days and weeks what developments will be like.

[Question] How long does the federal government intend to wait until it makes a definite decision on the Olympic Games?

[Answer] Considering the background which I have just outlined you will understand that it is impossible today to say what the proper timing

might be for such a decision. It will be necessary to make this decision with the proper sobriety and calm at the appropriate time, pondering all prerequisites.

[Question] Time and again we are hearing accusations from the United States--not so much from the government but from public opinion--that the Federal Republic does not display adequate solidarity. Is the federal government really doing so little beyond declamatory protestations?

[Answer] As far as I know there has not been any criticism from the U.S. administration to the effect that we are doing too little. You know that it was an initiative on our part to launch a program for the aid to Turkey whereupon Federal Finance Minister Matthoefer has been instructed to coordinate this internationally devised program. And we are prepared to make a very substantial financial contribution to this end, which has been stated in public. As far as the matter of development aid to Pakistan is concerned we will make some extra efforts as well. So I think if what we are doing is scrutinized minutely and probed point by point, some of the voices heard in the media of the United States indeed are unjustified. It is true, though, that we cannot say at this point in marks and pennings what we are doing additionally in the present situation. It is not possible to tell because this involves programs, measures requiring coordination with our allies in NATO as well as within the European Community. It is absolutely clear that such consultations take time.

[DW190842] [Question] Yet the engagement you referred to, meaning Turkey and Pakistan, requires considerable financial contributions. Does this mean that the federal government will have to cut down on some of the tax alleviations in the amount of DM17 billion which it has promised? The CDU/CSU chancellor candidate already has said that he would waive tax alleviations.

[Answer] On 20 February the federal government will adopt the tax package in the cabinet just as the coalition has defined it in orientation figures. As far as the remark by Mr Strauss is concerned I am not sure I know what he is really after. I assume, and many indications support me in this assumption, that this is rather part of the dual strategy under his election tactics. It looks very much as though Strauss wanted to represent himself as the statesman who is prepared to make sacrifices. He is aware that he is suffering from considerable deficits in the field of statesmanship when it comes to the election chances, and that the CDU/CSU simultaneously is waging a tax-cutting campaign which again must be viewed exclusively as an action for the sake of election day. In this tax-cut campaign they are promising the citizen tax reductions of which anybody knows that they would be irresponsible if implemented. We have no reason at all to assume that the CDU/CSU will desist from its well-known game of lamenting the high

state indebtedness on the one hand and demanding extra spending in many fields on the other. The third side to its game is to lie shamelessly with respect to the options for tax cuts.

[Question] Must we expect for the post-Tito period in Yugoslavia that this multinational state on the Balkan peninsula will be facing domestic problems and that this might tend to support a Soviet invasion in the form of an aid action, Afghanistan style?

[Answer] In the talks with important Yugoslav politicians last week we heard with great interest that there are no indications whatsoever for any panic in Yugoslavia. That is to say, much of what has been heard on the media in the past few weeks and days seems to be unfounded, to go by what we have been told. As to your question, we derived from these talks that the Yugoslavs are quite optimistic in that respect.

[Question] You mean to say that they, too, do not fear any invasion by the Soviet Union?

[Answer] No, we were not told about any such anxiety. On the contrary, it was amazing to see with what sureness and calm the government business in Yugoslavia is currently handled.

CSO: 3103

## INNER-GERMAN MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON RELATIONS WITH GDR

DW191420 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany  
0617 GMT 18 Feb 80 DW

[Excerpts from interview with Federal Minister for Inner-German Affairs  
Egon Franke by reporter Lenz, place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Federal Chancellor Schmidt said that two large projects the GDR wanted to include in a current inner-German negotiation package are not ripe for being decided on. The electrification and modernization of railroad lines to West Berlin and the construction of a soft coal power-plant in the GDR that was also supposed to supply energy to West Berlin and the Federal Republic were involved. In order to forestall misunderstandings, government spokesman Boelling remarked with a view to the GDR yesterday that this is not at all the beginning of a new ice age in German-German relations. That may be so, but is such a "no" not tantamount to missing a chance to strengthen German-German relations just now?

[Answer] No, no chance is being missed there at all. On the contrary. A state of negotiations on the projects that were discussed in 1978 exists. In this connection it was known that the GDR is interested in achieving some long-term agreement on larger projects. That has been noted with interest, but not in such a way that some basic agreement has been achieved with regard to what has been indicated. Preparedness has been expressed to think about this most intensely and to clarify detailed problems in order to take them up again if need be. In other words the things that were agreed on in 1978 have been discussed in more detail, in a certain way they are ripe for a conclusion, but farther reaching interests must still be examined.

[Question] Two theories exist. One says that East Berlin wants to conclude some German-German agreements before the tense international situation makes many things impossible. This may be due to the GDR's own interests but good treaties serve the interests of both sides. So East Berlin is pressed for time. The other theory says that East Berlin has made such an offer in close agreement with Moscow, because such large projects are also of interest to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. What interpretation would you prefer?



[Answer] I tend toward the interpretation that it could be true that one might be interested in setting a signal indicating that our efforts aimed at normalization and detente ought to be continued in practice.

[Question] If you state the hope that the volume of cooperation with the GDR ought to be developed in the future, is that just wishful thinking or does something indicate that this hope can be substantiated?

[Answer] I have indications that there are possibilities as before for achieving agreements in all the other fields we are trying to handle with agreements. Just a few days ago I published a report about all results that have been achieved in the past 10 years. That is quite a voluminous work. It shows in detail all the things that have been agreed on in that period with the GDR. I have reason to say that progress is being achieved in all these fields. There will be continuous meetings of all the existing commissions and authorities--bilaterally manned--that discuss and settle current affairs. No interference has taken place.

[Question] Observers believe that a certain hardening of the GDR stance can be registered by viewing some Honecker speeches, for example, after Afghanistan. Do the impressions of the Federal Government confirm these observations?

[Answer] No, not in this way. The speeches and other GDR statements indicate that the other side continues to be interested in continuous talks and efforts to normalize matters.

[Question] I just mentioned domestic political hardening.

[Answer] Well, naturally we are imbedded in world political developments. That pertains also to the GDR. Certain statements must naturally be viewed in this connection but this does not indicate signals that everything has come to an end now, or, as some other people maintain, that the current policy has failed.

CSO: 3103

INDUSTRIALIST ASSESSES ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AGAINST EAST

DW200946 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 18 Feb 80 pp 52-57 DW

[Interview with the director of the Federal-Government owned Salzgitter Corporation, Ernst Pieper by Rudolf Wallraf and Wolfgang Kaden, date and place of interview not stated]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Are you doing good business with the East Bloc, Mr Pieper?

Pieper: We have had a remarkable business with the East for the past 25 years. This business is good not only by its volume but also by the profits we made.

SPIEGEL: How many of your orders do you contract from the East?

Pieper: Last year business with Eastern Europe accounted for 25 percent of the orders we received from foreign countries.

SPIEGEL: Have any setbacks occurred in this business since the Afghan crisis, setbacks that are discernible to you?

Pieper: There are no discernible setbacks. But then, we did not have any orders for large installations incoming since then. We have a well running business in steel.

SPIEGEL: Are any new orders forthcoming?

Pieper: We are conducting negotiations on steel deliveries with Moscow this week. The prices and quantities are newly negotiated each quarter of a year.

SPIEGEL: You just were in Moscow yourself to introduce the Sheremetyevo 2 airport which the Salzgitter Corporation had constructed. What was your impression? Has the climate worsened?

Pieper: The climate was just as fine as it had been in the preceding months and years.

SPIEGEL: Hence: "Business as usual"--the transactions are proceeding normally?

Pieper: Perhaps a certain anxiety is discernible on both sides. But it did not exert any influence on our talks. In the effective business the word indeed is: "Business as usual."

SPIEGEL: And where do you go from here? Can you, as a manager, maintain economic contacts in the long run if the politicians are not talking?

Pieper: If the politicians cease to talk with each other, as it is the case now, then this really is more their problem and their mistake. After all, the telephones once had been installed for the politicians to talk with each other in times of crises.

SPIEGEL: And suppose they fail to do so? Will this not entail consequences for the economy as well?

Pieper: If we were to get involved in the frequent climatic changes in politics we could no longer cultivate nearly any business contacts with the entire world. Our business must develop on a long-term basis, and it must be cultivated on a long-term basis.

SPIEGEL: The American entrepreneurs obviously take a different look at this. They immediately submitted to Carter's boycott demand without offering any resistance.

Pieper: Surely this comes easier to the Americans. Their business in large installations is minimal. What is significant is their wheat deliveries, and even in that field they did not want to hurt themselves so much. To begin with they abided by existing delivery contracts. This means that the bulk of the wheat which the Americans wanted to deliver this season will be delivered.

SPIEGEL: Would you, on principle, consider an economic embargo a suitable political instrument?

Pieper: It is my view that political conflicts must also be solved politically. And to me it is indicative of some lack of imagination to shift to the fields of sports, economy, cultural affairs, or other spheres. The politicians are overrating the effects of such measures. Ultimately these are mere needle pricks to the ones that are affected.

SPIEGEL: The Americans do not allow this separation of politics and economy. Former Kissinger adviser Helmut Sonnenfeldt said over German television: "Anyone disturbing world peace excludes himself from world trade." It seems to us that this is a well-gripping formula. Is it also an appropriate acceptable formula?

Pieper: I do not think it is a good thing that the economy should take the rap for political mistakes. U.S. foreign policy in the past several years has caused a considerable vacuum to emerge as a result of its excessive restraint. The Soviets have filled up this vacuum in power-policy respect.

SPIEGEL: With respect to the Olympic issue the opinion is prevailing that if the United States will not go we, the Germans of the Federal Republic, cannot go to Moscow, either. Does this attitude make any impression on you, does it challenge you to emulate?

Pieper: If the National Olympic Committee decides not to participate in the games in Moscow, then surely all sportsmen must abide by that decision. For our sector it means this: If trade is to be cut off, then the government must act in keeping with the options of the foreign-trade law. What is valid to us is this principle: As long as transactions with the East are permissible under our foreign-trade act we shall do business with the East.

SPIEGEL: How hard could a discontinuation of the Western deliveries really hit the Soviets? Is it true that Moscow is dependent on Western know-how?

Pieper: I definitely believe that the current technology transfer is yielding advantages to both sides.

SPIEGEL: Does the West also profit from the other side technologically?

Pieper: We keep further developing our know-how through the construction of large-scale installations. This is also true of installations which we sell to Eastern Europe. Sheremetyevo 2 airport, for instance, which we built in Moscow, has a model in Hanover. But if you compare these two airports you will find that the airport in Moscow is essentially further developed. Experts say nowadays that the check-in and check-out building in Moscow is between 3 to 5 years ahead of its time.

SPIEGEL: Do the Soviets also have technologies of their own which are of interest to us?

Pieper: You can say that again. Let me cite an example from our sector: a few years ago Salzgitter purchased from the Soviet Union a certain process scheme for the construction of chemical installations. We are jointly offering for sale in third countries high-pressure polyethylene installations after a Soviet process. Hence, the technology transfer is not a one-way street.

SPIEGEL: And yet, are there not some sensitive fields in which the Soviets do depend on Western technology?

Pieper: There are some fields. This applies particularly to the computer sector where great dependencies on the West exist. But there are loopholes even there.

SPIEGEL: What loopholes?

Pieper: The Russians can procure substitute deliveries from some East European countries. And they can also have computers operate for themselves in neutral countries.

SPIEGEL: The Americans have expressly put on their embargo lists such highly sophisticated technical products as computers. Does this also impede the West German exporters to the East?

Pieper: We are affected in our large-scale installation business.

SPIEGEL: Because you are also installing computers in these large installations?

Pieper: Yes.

SPIEGEL: Can these not be supplied by Germans as well, say, by the Siemens Company?

Pieper: The Germans might step in.

SPIEGEL: What does the U.S. embargo look like in practice to date? Is it practicable at all?

Pieper: Stipulations for the implementation of the American embargo are not known so far. They will be published this month. So we do not know whether it will be practicable.

SPIEGEL: It means that the American industry cannot follow it either.

Pieper: That is it.

SPIEGEL: The advocates of a boycott, most of all in America, always mention also strategic considerations. The argument is that highly technical products will help the Soviets in matters of arms.

Pieper: Naturally one must differentiate in the supply of industrial goods whether these goods are of considerable strategic importance. Entrepreneurs also must give some thought to the security of their country. Economy must subordinate itself to that priority. But the state must settle that by legal stipulation.

SPIEGEL: Several commentators in Europe as well as in the United States suggested to stop at least the supply of spare parts to the Soviet Union.

Pieper: If one has contracts, they are also valid with regard to the supply of spare parts. These contracts must be adhered to. We, on the other hand, are equally interested in the Russians' adhering to their contracts.



SPIEGEL: Such as with regard to the supply of raw materials. Could Moscow hit the Federal Republic with a raw material embargo?

Pieper: The market shares the Soviet Union holds in our country are not dangerously high; but they are an important factor of our raw material supply.

SPIEGEL: After all, the Federal Republic obtains 16 percent of its natural gas from the Soviet Union.

Pieper: Exactly. If we abandoned the principle that existing supply contracts must be adhered to, we would get tears in our eyes.

SPIEGEL: You yourself, Mr Pieper, stick to concluded contracts and you want to obtain new orders from the East. But if the Bonn government officially ordered a trade embargo, would you then break your contracts?

Pieper: I see no danger at all that Bonn could issue such embargo stipulations. If it issued them, we would have to adhere to them as every other enterprise also.

SPIEGEL: Historical models exist for such official export bans. In 1962 the Federal Government banned the export of big-size pipes to the Soviet Union. How successful was that pipe embargo?

Pieper: The pipe embargo is being considered today as a complete failure. Nothing has become known about bottlenecks in the Soviet Union with regard to pipes. The pipes the Germans discontinued to supply, have been supplied by British, Swedish and Italian plants. It was particularly problematic that one has been interfering in valid and legal private contracts. That has considerably curtailed legal security in economic relations between the East and the West.

SPIEGEL: You consider a trade embargo vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as not called for at the moment. Let us forget the current situation and the Soviets, do you basically rule out an embargo as a political weapons? Cannot there be situations where trade with a country is not acceptable any more? A state such as national socialist Germany that has set up concentration camps and killed millions of people, is not acceptable as a trade partner, after all.

Pieper: I fully recognize that.

SPIEGEL: So there is a moral threshold, a point where one must say: that is the limit.

Pieper: That point must be determined by the politicians by the government. In a functioning democracy where also moral elements of politics play a role, this line must be marked by the politicians.

SPIEGEL: But personally you would not rule out that such situations could exist?

Pieper: I see in the present context that the Federal Government must show concern for our main ally, the United States.

SPIEGEL: Rhodesia and South Africa are examples from the other political direction. A boycott decision existed with regard to Rhodesia, a decision that never has been adhered to by German enterprises.

Pieper: The enterprise managed by me has adhered to that embargo, but on the other hand one must also state that Rhodesia has overcome it quite well.

SPIEGEL: Would it be simpler for you personally to join a boycott against South Africa or Chile than follow an appeal to boycott the Soviet Union?

Pieper: Basically--and I said that before--I do not think embargo are any good. The governments must set the data because of their better overall view. The knowledge of individual entrepreneurs is not sufficient.

SPIEGEL: Many people have said that during Nazi times also.

Pieper: That was an organized mass murder of 6 million Jews. It was something that was widely known in the West, this knowledge was uncontested.

SPIEGEL: Let me say it differently: managers like you could be accused of hiding behind politicians.

Pieper: I can only repeat: in a functioning state the framework conditions must be set for our action. Take South Africa. There exists a code of conduct of the European Community.

SPIEGEL: You adhere to that?

Pieper: We adhere to it. I believe that a Federal Government-owned enterprise such as Salzgitter is particularly committed not to violate such a code of conduct.

SPIEGEL: And as long as it does not exist, higher politics do not matter for your business policy?

Pieper: We do not pursue high politics. How does it work? Our salesmen swarm out in the whole world trying to obtain orders. We have no department in our house for morally viewing every business or for giving marks to individual countries. It was permissible 2 years ago, for example, to conclude a treaty with Iran on the supply of 6 submarines. We did that. Today the approach is completely different. If we will begin to introduce moral categories next to the framework conditions set by the state for our foreign trade relations, business will become very difficult for us. An enterprise does not consist of one person but of many persons.

SPIEGEL: So it means that you as an enterprise and as an entrepreneur adhere to total political abstinence?

Pieper: Last but not least the political will of the people enters the politics of our country and also the measures of the Federal Government. We follow the rules that are established by the state. Otherwise we would have to introduce moral categories in viewing every country and every deal.

SPIEGEL: And that would be asking too much?

Pieper: That would be asking too much of us.

SPIEGEL: Mr Pieper, we thank you for this talk.

CSO: 3103

## GREENS BECOME IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MARCH BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG VOTE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Jan 80 p 10

[Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "A Rock Drops Into Sluggish Waters"]

[Text] Much is demanded of a minister president of Baden-Wuerttemberg. He must satisfy a federal Land, the two component parts of which are gradually growing together. But there is a multiplicity of existing differences that goes beyond the Swabian-Badensian one. There are the Swabians of the pietistic school of thought, the world-oriented, anticlerical Remstal Swabians, and the superclericals of Upper Swabia. In the Baden area, there are worlds of differences between the industrially-minded Mannheimers, who actually are more central German in nature, the Black Forest people, or the Kaiserstuehlens. Should the minister president possess something of all these traits and should he present the right appearance at whatever happens to be the appropriate place? The very attempt to do anything like that would cause him to appear suspicious to a population which punctiliously watches to see if a person is "genuinely" one of their own.

The three men who have until now been minister presidents of this state have been exactly like that, each in his own way--unchangeable, unassimilated, and unmistakably themselves. There was Gebhard Mueller, whom his party appears to be neglecting a little these days, although he is one of the last remaining witnesses of its beginning years, i.e. of the heroic times of the Union. He is steadfast, upright, and clever. There was Kiesinger: Dignified and radiating his polish and gift of the gab, which many people ridiculed because they would have liked to possess a little of the same themselves. And there was Filbinger, who was at first assessed as being somewhat of a dull minister of the interior but who subsequently, when he became the "father of his state," was recognized as being a man who displayed abilities which approached those of Kiesinger and who, in the process, probably turned out to be the more skilled politician of the two.

Things are not easy for the new man, Minister President Spaeth, who in 8 weeks must hold his own in the Landtag elections. Having been minister president for only 1-1/2 years, he has not as yet been able to establish

himself in the eyes of the public as a man who looks exactly the way a man holding this office is supposed to appear. In contrast to his predecessors, he did not come into office as a man with solidly developed characteristics. The composure which permits one to be tolerant, the self-assurance which enables one to be modest--none of these attributes constitute Spaeth's strong points, at least not as yet. It is possible that his adroitness and flexibility, which constituted great advantages in the performance of his official duties as party whip prior to his service as minister of the interior, have made it even more difficult for him to give the public time to visualize him as being their minister president. To be sure, Spaeth is a man who can justly call himself a liberal--whatever the precise meaning of this word may be today. Certainly, he can listen and give consideration to the concerns of the people. But it may happen now and then that precisely his quick and practical mind, together with his somewhat managerial efforts to get quickly "down to brass tacks," will cause him to close the book on some cases a little too quickly. Such procedures give him greater satisfaction than they do his partners. And the omnipresent Spaeth, an image the young minister president seemed to be striving to attain for a certain time, is rather apt to cause mistrust among these sober-minded people who are also introspectively searching for things spiritual (to be indulged in only as a leisure-time pursuit).

Having a "president you can touch" was not an entirely fortunate situation. The people of this Land want to see at the helm a man of a type such as they themselves could be but, on the other hand, one would like to have him be somewhat different from one's actual self. And what about politics based on material performance? As a rule, presidents of federal Laender are not judged on the basis of the latter. A place in a museum for civic curiosities should be reserved for a voter who, when filling in his ballot slip, would let his hand be guided by what he thinks he knows about the level of police recruitment in his state or about the number of newly constructed bicycle paths along the state highways. Baden-Wuerttemberg is flourishing but, as everywhere else, this is considered to be only natural.

But is there really any reason for Spaeth to worry? Did he not receive an inheritance of almost 57 percent from the 1976 Landtag elections? Is not Baden-Wuerttemberg a "safe CDU Land?" These are all half-truths and, before elections, all prophets become unsure of themselves.

Baden-Wuerttemberg is not a "safe CDU Land." Strictly speaking, there simply is no such thing. It is an invention of hasty day-to-day observers who at any chosen point draw a line across the middle of the FRG and say that anything situated under the line belongs to the Union and anything above it belongs to the SPD. Even in Bavaria there existed as late as in 1970 for the first time a majority of CSU [Christian Social Union] votes. Before that, there were two occasions when a majority of seats came about by way of a present from splinter groups which failed to rise above the 5-percent level. It was only in 1964 that the CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg attained a position in the middle of the 40-percent scale and it attained for the first time an absolute majority in 1972.



Filbinger's 57-percent figure of 1976 was connected with a low voter participation rate. It is understandable that the CDU has never made much use of this fact. On the basis of the absolute number of votes cast the 1972 results (52.9 percent) and the 1976 results were close. It is possible that the 1976 elections were influenced by the fact that voters of the SPD/FDP coalition parties, who had become unsure of themselves, did not want any Minister President Eppler, not even under the premise of "Help For Schmidt," but did not voice any particularly passionate demands for any Minister President Filbinger. It is possible that such voters stayed at home feeling that Filbinger would get elected anyway and that this would not be so bad either. Today things look different. It is possible that there has been an increase of respect for Eppler of the SPD who (aside from Korntal and the surrounding area) is certainly not taking the southwestern German voters by storm. Nobody questions that he has a head of his own, and in the southwest they are not exactly averse to pigheadedness. Therefore Eppler's precarious position vis-a-vis the federal chancellor does not necessarily have to cause him any harm. Additionally, there is the fact that there is somewhat of a rebellious element in many Swabians along the lines of "let's vote for Eppler in order to show the CDU a thing or two (if one can be sure that nothing is going to happen)". This explains why polls carried out by the SPD in 1976 ended up at 33.3 percent but this time predict up to 37 percent. The statements made by Land CDU leaders to the effect that one is glad that the SPD has Eppler, suggest a certain measure of embarrassment.

The absolute majorities held by the CDU in the Land since 1972 are explained by the fact that through the Bonn move of the FDP to the SPD, the customary middle-class alliance between the CDU and the FDP (which here steadfastly bears the abbreviated name of DVP, meaning Democratic People's Party) was deprived of its substance. This made it possible for the Land FDP to carry out its far-extending turns to the left. They were a consequence, not a cause. The traditional FDP voters who had previously preferred to carry along the bourgeois governments led by the CDU, but at the same time to add correctional provisions to be applied against real or supposed challenges by the extreme coal, iron, and steel interests, now voted for the CDU. However, not all of them felt good about doing this and not all of them did so under the seal of irrevocability.

The FDP has on this occasion drawn its own conclusions by holding itself with cunning frankness available for those who would like to believe that possibly their beloved old FDP will once more be on the right track. One should also consider the fact that these old-time liberals who wanted to be governed along bourgeois lines but do not wish to be in the "black" category have meanwhile become rather old liberals. Young ones have come up behind them, and they are different. And one must also consider the fact that for such other people there is yet another party: the Greens. The FDP is in utter fear lest this new grouping, which in Baden-Wuerttemberg makes its appearance under the leadership of high school teacher Hasenclever of Tuebingen, who is not at all peevish and who does not at all remind one of a fanatic (such people are not liked there) may tear off the thinning strip of insulation

material around the deadly 5-percent cable. Last time the FDP, which formerly had about 20 percent, had a bare 7.8 percent, and it is being prophesied that the Greens will be hovering in the vicinity of the saving 5-percent level. But the CDU could also be harmed via returness to the FDP who come to a halt at the Greens.

Eppler's SPD has the least cause to fear the Greens. Even if, judged by the results, Eppler were to be the loser, he could turn out to be the winner in a complicated sort of way such as, for instance, through people who had not voted last time, who in their hearts actually were pro-FDP, who this time wanted to go along with the Greens, and who then ultimately end up with Eppler's ascetic SPD after all (with a prosperity guarantee). If Eppler's SPD were to make substantial gains, would a Landtag election, which quite clearly is an election for the Landtag, incidentally also throw a big rock into the federal policy waters which at the present time are sluggish and characterized by a wait-and-see atmosphere, and what consequences would this have especially for Schmidt in Bonn?

8272

CSO: 3103

## SDECE INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE COMMAND CHANGE NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Jan 80 pp 1, 19

[Article by Jacques Isnard]

[Text] A high-ranking officer of the national gendarmery will become head of the internal security division of the Foreign Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Service (SDECE) after the departure of Guy Laugere, a former member of the French secret service, who has been asked by the general directorate to step down after more than 30 years of service.

The new head, Jean-Michel Verniere, 48 years old, is a squadron commander, equivalent to the rank of major in the ground forces. He worked for the intelligence desk at the national gendarmery and military justice directorate before being assigned to the SDECE at the end of 1978.

Other gendarmery officers already work for the French secret services, notably Michel Roussin, former gendarmery captain, reserve officer and presently head of the cabinet of Alexandre de Marenches, director general of the SDECE. Nonetheless, these new functions of Major Verniere are very important. Actually, this initiative means control of the internal security service by an authority traditionally trained to impose a more rigorous, more regulated and less arbitrary discipline, and make it respected.

The internal security service of the SDECE employs a small number of officers and high level civilian employees and a large number of minor agents and deputy officers.

Controlled by the general directorate of the SDECE, the internal security service has a multi-purpose mission:

--protection and safeguarding of facilities

--investigation of SDECE employees, their families and private affairs

--surveillance of personnel, if necessary by means of wire-tapping of their offices or domiciles

--and, on an administrative level, the reduction of professional mistakes.

Under the administration of Laugere, who entered the SDECE after the Liberation when the service was given its present name and who succeeded Colonel Lionnet, the internal security service was accused by certain agents of aligning itself too freely with the counterintelligence service which, along with the intelligence sector, is one of the largest and most important sectors, intelligence being the other, of the SDECE, and of conducting a witch hunt against personnel thought to be too unorthodox.

In searching for these unorthodox agents, or those thought to be because of their far-too-liberal thinking, the counterintelligence service--whose recently departed chief, Colonel Bernard Schenk, had copied his predecessor, General Yves de Janvry--cooperates with the Directorate of territorial surveillance (DST) and military security (SM). At the time, General de Janvry had boasted of having convicted more than 50 military or civilian personnel of treason or complicity to treason. The departure of these people from the SDECE over the last 7 years has remained unexplained.

The generally suspicious climate that prevailed and the activism of the internal security service and the counterintelligence service are probably the reason for all the mistakes that a number of agents, whether they be right or wrong, attribute to the men and management under Laugere. The year 1976 was full of serious incidents at the heart of the SDECE, as these few examples from the recent past demonstrate.

#### Witch Hunt

In June of 1976, a Resistance decorated civil servant, Maurice Clement, 54 years old at the time and head of studies at SDECE's training class, which puts him in category A of public service, was--without proof--suspected of working for the Soviets.

Illegally sequestered in an apartment in Paris' 16th district, he was subjected to a series of more than 200 questions and a lie-detector test in the presence of a doctor from SDECE's psycho-technical service. Mr Clement, handcuffed and wearing opaque glasses, was led by three masked security agents, one of whom carried a machine gun with a silencer, to the underground garage of a building of the 19th arrondissement (where the Service has a secret apartment), then to the cellar of a pavillion in the Paris suburbs.

Tied to a central heating radiator pipe, Clement was forced--in order to avoid the worst--to make a confession, which was immediately retracted in writing after a medical certificate was delivered which confirmed the

contusions, hemorrhages and bruises he suffered. He was, however, discharged, "in the interest of the service."\*

In order to obtain reinstatement and damages once the case was reopened, it was necessary to threaten a public hearing, to use discreet pressure from people both outside and inside the SDECE and to undergo long negotiations through various lawyers--one a lawyer with the Paris Court and a member of the Bar Council, and another a lawyer with the Council of State and a member of the Supreme Court.

In August 1976, Georges Blanc, an employee with the radio-electric control group (GCR), whose mission it is to listen to foreign government broadcasts for the French government, was found hanged from the bolt of his French window in the SDECE area in Berlin.

According to his colleagues Blanc was a calm and well-balanced individual who had preferred to keep his public function rather than be integrated into the SDECE when the GCR was attached to the secret services in January of 1975.\*\* Moved from Berlin to Paris during the summer of 1976, this employee, a militant of the CGT, filed a grievance on 19 August with the Paris administrative tribunal about his forced transfer. The next day, in a rather incomprehensible move, he put in a request for retirement, just before being authorized to receive his wife and 16 year old son, who normally live in Brittany, in Berlin for the holidays.

Sometime during the night of the 24th to 25th August, Blanc hanged himself in the French sector of the former German capital. A glass containing barbiturate residue was found in his room and empty envelopes that had contained the same substance were found in the trash can. There was neither an autopsy nor an investigation. The death certificate bears only the remark: unnatural death.

---

\* Article 86 of the 27 November 1967 decree, not published in the "Official journal" which fixes the status of agents, stipulates that besides those cases of dismissal identical to those in the public sector, the employees of the SDECE can be dismissed "in the interest of the service." Pay may not exceed 1/2 of what is received during normal duty. Within a maximum time period of 5 years, agents put on half pay under these conditions can retire and collect regular retirement payments immediately.

\*\* Formerly dependent on the prime minister, the GCR, attached to the SDECE, is now under the direct authority of the Defense Ministry. As a part of the SDECE, the civilian employees of GCR (approximately 280) had to accept the loss of certain rights they had previously enjoyed: (union, strike) and further restrictions were placed upon them (advance authorization for foreign travel was necessary, an account of any trip taken outside France had to be given, etc).



In Domme (Dordogne), where the SDECE operates another listening station, two other GCR agents disappeared in equally murky circumstances: Mlle Claudine Sokolowski, given the same choice as Blanc, fatally shot herself with a revolver, and Edmond Dessille, on sick leave, swallowed barbiturates in a hotel room in Sariat, the day before Christmas, 1977.

Certain agents do not hesitate to blame the inquisitory methods of the security service and one must believe that the general directorate of the SDECE--even though it may be acting a little late--has become aware of this internal strife because it has sought out some sort of pacifying solutions.

At the GCR, for example, a new set of personnel guidelines was drawn up around the middle of last year with the administrative office and public service, so that these employees, who complain about the physically exhausting conditions of the detailed aspects of their work, could receive special indemnities to offset the restrictions (the absence of union rights and the right to strike) that their new subordination to SDECE has imposed upon them. From now on, the personnel guidelines of the GCR equate them, with the exception of a few details, to the agents of the STI [Ministry of interior communications]. In the internal security service, one first tried to raise the quality of the lower level workers, and Verniere, who had been head of the director's office in 1978 and who was head of the national gendarmery squadron, was placed in a position next to his chief, Laugere, who received a temporary promotion last summer in order to better prepare his departure. This domination can thus be considered an attempt on the part of the SDECE general directorate to control the activities of the internal security service more closely than in the past and thereby assure more legal practices.

Born 6 December 1931, Jean-Michel Verniere is a former deputy officer of marine forces who entered the service in 1951. Following courses taken in Strasbourg and at Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan, he became an officer in 1959 and entered the gendarmery in 1961. He is a licensed parachutist and airplane pilot. As a captain, he served in the departmental gendarmery in Carpentras (Vaucluse) and in the mobile gendarmery in the Paris region. He has a law degree and received a technical diploma from the advanced gendarmery school before assuming his post as head of his corps. Squadron commander in 1976, he should be promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1980. [as published]

9572

CSO: 3100

## UPC'S SIMEONI INTERVIEWED ON CORSICA'S FUTURE

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Jan 80 p 12

[Interview with UPC's spokesman Edmond Simeoni by correspondent Guy Porte: "We Will Not Be Forced to Follow the Path of Timid Regionalism," declares Mr Edmond Simeoni"--date of interview not given]

[Text] Whereas the funeral of CRS [State Mobile Police] officer Hubert Massol took place on Monday 14 January in Montauban, in the evening another CRS officer, Philippe Delsol, 28, was taken seriously wounded to a hospital in Marseille. He is, apparently, in stable condition. Another person, Mrs Berthe Valli, wounded in the night of the 9th to the 10th in Ajaccio and hospitalized in Marseille, is said, according to a medical source, to have regained consciousness on Monday 14 January.

Besides, on Monday 13 January [as published], before the FDSEA [Departmental Federation of Unions of Farmers] and the CNJA [National Young Farmers Center] summoned their members to erect road blocks on Tuesday 15 January in the two Corsican departments, the prefect of Haute Corse department met with these farmer organizations to urge them to moderation.

Finally our special correspondent Guy Porte tells us that persons are now being kept under close watch by the judicial police in Bastia. This is being done at the demand of the State Security Court after the kidnapping in Bravone of Jean-Robert Dumont, a 69-year old repatriated farmer. (See LE MONDE, 15 January.)

In the following interview, Edmond Simeoni, spokesman for the Union of Corsican People (UPC), confirms his willingness to "engage in dialog with the authorities," but refuses to "follow the path of timid regionalism."

[Question] What conclusions do you draw from the latest incidents?

[Answer] This tragedy could have been prevented, but the authorities, by resorting again and again to erroneous methods, did not want to do so. If, indeed, we compare the incidents in Aleria and in Bastelica, we find that they were both bred by situations of unbearable injustice: the wine scandal in Aleria, the operations of the semi-clandestine police in Bastelica. These situations degenerated because the authorities do not tolerate being the butt of accusations, and succumb at once to their repressive reflexes.

As a result, unity exists nowadays between practically all Corsican democratic movements. Two or 3 years ago, the PCF [Communist Party], the PS [Socialist Party], the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and the FEN [National Education Federation] would under no circumstances have associated themselves with a movement whose representatives committed illegal acts. Furthermore, the will to keep on fighting together exists. I think that this united move--imposed, in my opinion, by the rank and file --, is perhaps the most important political phenomenon of these past 5 years.

[Questions] Hasn't the autonomist movement again placed itself in the same situation as in Aleria?

[Answer] We had denounced for a long time the existence of the semi-clandestine police. The reply given us was the unproven statement that they were Corsican patriots deeply attached to France and embittered by our behavior, accusing us of being separatists. We are sure, however, that these so-called patriots have all along been controlled from a distance by the authorities under whose cover they operate.

One must remember too that we, the autonomists who have fought within the law, have been the victims of 60 criminal attacks. Some of these were particularly serious, and even involved attempted murder, such as the attack on my mother. Knowing our generous and action-prone temper, the authorities wanted us to answer in the same manner. We have always avoided falling in this trap.

In the Bastelica case, the initiative was taken by militants from Bastia and Ajaccio. They had received precise and concurring information showing that Mr Bertolini and two other persons were going to kill one of us, Marcel Lorenzoni. I had not been previously informed. I immediately went there. There was no way that Bertolini and his men could be defended, so I thought that we would come to a peaceful solution. But we all know what happened ....

During the same night, waves of police forces arrived. I realized it was a deadly trap. As I left, I urged the Nationalist Collective Front in Bastelica to fix an earlier time for the scheduled press conference and

to turn these men over to the authorities. In Ajaccio, my proposals for mediation met with a veto issued by the prefecture ... where I was received the following day.

Implore? Threaten?

[Question] Does not the Bastelica operation mean that UPC's methods, and even its positions, have become more radical?

[Answer] Bastelica was, indeed, in its form an operation conducted outside of legality. But how could we avoid this extreme action? For 2 years, our public proclamations were useless. When one finds out that people caught red-handed during anti-autonomist criminal attacks are released without being tried, following the intervention of high-ranking police officials or politicians, what is to be done? Cry? Implore? Threaten?

Bastelica is, however, an isolated operation. I challenge anyone to point out, in the past 3 years, an autonomist action that was done outside the law. Our basic position has not changed. We were and we remain in favor of granting Corsica internal autonomy. As for separatism, its political options and methods are absolutely different from ours.

We do not assume responsibility for the kidnapping of Mr Dumont\*, nor for the confinement of Commandant Bertolini after the Bastelica operation. We never made any pretense of setting ourselves up as a people's court. All we wanted was to force the courts to do their job. Moreover, I read that Mr Leonelli, picked up in Bastelica together with Commandant Bertolini and Mr Olliel, was a PUC undercover member. I do not know this person.

The French ...

[Question] Do you believe that you have convinced public opinion of the validity of your accusations?

[Answer] It is true that the turn of events has temporarily concealed the problem of semi-clandestine police. But let us take a look at Olliel's case. It is a case of "common law." He spent 2 years in Les Baumettes prison in Marseille for stealing arms from the military base at Aspretto, in southern Corsica. However, he was rehabilitated by a Corsican court

---

\* According to the State prosecutor in Ajaccio, Mr Xavier Pompeani, Mr Olliel asked, some 7 to 8 years after his release from jail, that his sentence be struck from report No 2 on his police record. Every citizen is entitled to make such a request, which is then studied by the court assembled in full council and deliberating behind closed doors. Under the circumstances, the court in Ajaccio ruled to grant Mr Olliel his request.

and, in spite of his past police record, granted a gunsmith's license. Isn't this disturbing? On what criterion was based the rehabilitation of this man? And when he is picked up, what does one find on him? Membership cards in the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the SAC [Civic Action Service].

As for Commandant Bertolini, he did not carry such cards, but large caliber arms. During an 8-hour-long conversation I had with him in the presence of numerous witnesses, he admitted that he was the boss of FRANCIA [New Action Front Against Independence and Autonomy]. But who is still unaware of that? The whole of Corsica knows it; the prefect, the elected officials, everyone knows it. A high police official himself cautioned us against the spirit of revenge stirring within Mr Bertolini. He wrongly holds the Autonomists responsible for the criminal attack he sustained [in December 1978].

We truly would like to open dialogue with the authorities. But if anyone thinks he can force us to follow a path of timid regionalism, he is making a big mistake. The present generations have grown to respect France and cultural values. They have known De Gaulle, the Resistance, and they have never really questioned their belonging to the French nation.

The very young Corsicans, however, who today see France through the distorting prism of an authoritarian administration and an insular political life that has run dry, since it is not democratic, will ineluctably be led to changing the status quo. Tomorrow, the young Corsicans who more and more frequently refer to the people on the continent as "the French," will completely reject France.

9507

CSO: 3100



## RIGHTWING ANTISEPARATISTS FIGHT CORSICAN AUTONOMISTS

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Jan 80 p 14

[Article by L. G. (Louis Gravier?): "Barbouzes, Go Home!"]

[Text] In Corsica, they are called "i barbouzi": the barbouzes [spies]. Diametrically opposed to the autonomists of the Union of the Corsican People (UPC) of Mr Edmond Simeoni, and to the clandestine separatists of the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), these men are gathered in the Francia movement.

By taking hostage on Sunday 6 January three persons whom they accuse of being "barbouzes of Francia" the autonomists are attracting attention to a clandestine movement born in the first months of 1977. Actually, little is known of the ideas which inspire this group. For a little, its acronym, which means "New Action Front Against Independence and Autonomy" sums up its very simple political stance. Earnest antiseparatists and antiautonomists, the militants of Francia affirm simply: "To every autonomist bombing we will respond with a bombing." Extremists on one side, they intend to oppose by force the extremists on the other side, sometimes claiming that they speak in the name of the Corsican silent majority, which can't do anything about it.

Francia appeared on the Corsican scene following two tiny groups: Jhuistizia Morandina and Jhuistizia Liberta. It is believed that from their union--when the tragedy of Aleria was not far off--the movement was born.

A certain number of elements also permit it to be said that these militants share, for the most part, Gaullist convictions and that they are often members of the Service of Civic Action (SAC) of the same political origin. Mr Alain Olliel, a gunsmith in Ajaccio, one of the three hostages of the autonomists, has admitted his membership in SAC.

If it is impossible to figure the number of militants in Francia, it is on the other hand easier to evaluate the volume of their action. Although the organization renounced claiming responsibility for its bombing attacks since 1978, the official statistics attribute to it six attacks in 1977,

39 in 1978 and almost 30 in 1979. At the trial of the Corsican nationalists before the National Security Court, in June and July 1979, Mr Simeoni, heard as a witness, indicated that the members of his organization, the UPC, had, for their part, suffered 43 attempts.

#### A Jealousy That Fosters Hatred

The autonomists and the separatists, when they talk about the "barbouzes," say at first that they are only a handful. During a clandestine press conference held in Paris by the FLNC last June 13, a militant spoke of "paid and manipulated hoodlums," concluding that "the secret police can only disappear when colonialism does." On this occasion the FLNC strongly reaffirmed that it was indeed involved in the 8 December 1978 attack aimed at Commander Pierre Bertolini, one of the "prisoners" of Bastelica, an inspector of the fire department of southern Corsica. Bertolini's left leg had to be amputated. In fact, autonomists and separatists, not counting a large number of other Corsicans, remark especially that, unlike the UPC and FLNC militants, the antiseparatists are never incarcerated and do not appear before the courts for their activities. This "jealousy" fosters a particularly bitter hatred in their direction. Some village walls are covered with the slogan "I barbouzi fora" (spies go home). Going further, the UPC has printed and diffused several times in Ajaccio and Bastia tracts denouncing by name several persons for their presumed activity in Francia.

The problem is not solved by that. In a deposition before the National Security Court, Commissioner Gilbert Thil pointed out that all inquiries proved "difficult at the local level," the victims limiting themselves to giving names, without furnishing other information. A high police official, presenting things differently, confided to us one day that he knows all the militants in Francia, but has no proof of their participation in this or that attack. And he regrets that the autonomists have never filed a complaint against these individuals....

Certain lawyers of the Corsican nationalists explain that some Francia militants picked up for questioning when transporting explosives were released immediately. The offense is supposed to have miraculously become an infringement of fishing regulations! It is to attract attention to these differences between the treatment of nationalists and antiseparatists by the law that the Bastelica operation was organized.

9508

CSO: 3100

## MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT OF BUS TRANSPORTATION PLANNED

Athens HELLENES EXPRESS in English 24 Jan 80 p 4

[Text] The E.A.S. (Urban Communications Company--State-owned) which ran up a Drs 1,800,000,000 year's deficit in 1979 and expects it to grow to Drs 2,200,000,000 this year, is nevertheless planning to build its own large maintenance and repair workshops for its fleet of diesel-powered buses in the greater Athens area. How much this new venture may add to the annual operational deficit has not yet been calculated but the taxpayer is sure to find out in due course. Meanwhile, within the E.A.S. Board of Administration itself there has been disagreement with the manner in which its affairs are being managed and five members resigned last week asking for removal of the Chairman. If the plan goes ahead, the new workshops will be ready towards the end of 1981. One hundred and fifty 20-year old SKODA buses, laid up in an open-air depot near Athens for the last three years are to be repaired and renovated so that they can be recommissioned, at least temporarily, until enough of the newly purchased engine-chassis can have their bodywork built in Greece in readiness to take up service (200 Mercedes, 200 Mogirus-Deutz and 150 Volvo). The Skoda units, all of which belonged to the E.A.S. predecessor "A.S.P.A." were laid up, after years of service, as there was difficulty in obtaining spare parts. Whether such spares have now become available or whether there is to be an attempt to replace worn out Skoda engines with power units of some other make which could be made to fit is not quite clear. According to other reports, it is intended to "cannibalise" so that out of the 150 derelict units at the moment some 100 or so could be put back into service. Whichever way it is, the underlying effort is to get as many buses into service as possible to provide an incentive to the thousands of people who commute by private car to use public transport. This they cannot do at the moment because there simply is not the requisite number of buses available in rush-hour times.

CSO: 4920

## BRIEFS

OIL DRILLING PLANS--The Public Petroleum Corporation is to engage in on extensive programme of geological and geophysical research during 1980. Drilling operations are to be undertaken by the Corporation's own means in Northern Greece, Central Greece and the Peloponnese. There will be further cooperation with Rumanian experts and, for the first time, contracts for technical cooperation are being signed with Russian and Yugoslav organizations. Drilling at Myrtia on the West Peloponnese shore is to continue because, although no oil in quantity has yet been located there, indications remained positive and were considered to warrant further drilling in the area. The Public Petroleum Corporation also intends to direct its attention this year to exploitation of the natural petroleum gas located near Thassos island at the Prinos offshore oilfield. The most probable use to which this gas may be put is thought to be raw material for the proposed ammonia plant near Kavalla. The Public Petroleum Corporation is expecting to take delivery of a second onshore oil drilling rig in the next few weeks. [Text] [Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 24 Jan 80 p 4]

CSO: 4920

## PCI'S MACALUSO URGES GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 11 Jan 80 p 5

[Article by Emanuele Macaluso: "National Unity Is the Choice To Be Made"]

[Text] The alarming developments in the international situation, the state of public order marked by the Milan massacre and the terrible assassination of the president of the Sicilian Region, the increasing difficulties in the financial market and in the oil market, the gloomy forecasts for our economy, already scourged by a spiraling inflation: all these elements make increasingly more obvious and urgent the need to give the country an authoritative and strong leadership, capable of expressing and carrying out a policy adapted to the period we are going through. We must ask ourselves whether a country like Italy can continue not to have--as has been the case for a decade--a government based on a majority in the parliament and in the country, which supports its policy and its actions. And yet, if one thinks about it, the situation is precisely the same as when the center-left, at the end of the 1960's, entered into an irreversible crisis and the DC [Christian Democratic Party] did not know how to and did not want to act by making new choices capable of assuring government stability. And we say the DC, on one hand, because in our parliament there have not emerged lately any majorities which could split--even from the numerical point of view--from the DC and on the other hand, because, taking into consideration indeed this reality, communists and socialists have made instead choices which, starting precisely from the need to ensure the country a sure leadership, have recognized the need to reconsider the reciprocal relations and those of the entire left with Christian Democracy. This party, after having attempted at the beginning of the 1970's a move to the right with the Andreotti-Malagodi government, finding itself at once in contradiction with the reality of the country, attempted obstinately to avoid the problem posed by the crisis of the center-left and emphasized at that time by the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] leaders themselves, of carrying out a program of reforms and of renewal adapted to the new problems which already then were posed, with the presence in the government of the two parties of the left.

The attempt made by Moro to make his party emerge from this impasse was thwarted, on one hand, by his assassination and, on the other, by the inability of the ruling DC to carry out Moro's plan. Today, the same problem has arisen, but in sharper and more dramatic terms.



The confirmation is in the fact that in a situation which everyone recognizes as exceptionally serious, Italy finds itself with a government lacking a majority and without the necessary authority, both on the domestic and the international level. This weakness leaves room for the same blind radical obstructionism which has become obvious violence against the institutions. The argument put forward by some DC spokesmen, according to which the current government should remain at its post for lack of an alternative is, at the same time, a pretext and a danger. In the first place, because it is not true that there exist no alternatives, since socialists and communists, by proposing a government of national unity, have proposed a definite alternative. The DC, until today, has rejected it without indicating other solutions, if not the postponement, pure and simple, of any decision. The latest device is to let this government continue until the regional and administrative elections, as if it were a question of avoiding a confrontation with the voters on the choices to be made even for the national government.

But the argument put forward by the DC is also dangerous because a weak government, without a majority in the parliament and in the country, can be tempted, in order to survive, to seek or not to reject support which may be offered it by extremist and adventuristic forces, both national and international. And this, especially at a time when international and internal tensions are acute.

It is not a mystery that because of the worsening of the international situation some forces would like to find a pretext to return to divisions, ruptures and to the cold war climate which characterized the 1950's. Our social democrats are the worst example of this effort. But in Europe itself, there are today socialist, social democrat, Catholic forces which instead are moving with great concern and sense of responsibility and with the intention of working to take up again the thread of detente which seems to be breaking.

In Italy, conditions exist today which can unite the democratic forces around a foreign policy which, within the Atlantic Alliance, would promote, along with all the other European forces, an initiative directed toward decreasing the current tensions. We think that the resolution adopted by the PCI [Italian Communist Party] leadership offers a basis for a meeting and, frankly, we do not understand how the editor of *POPOLO* could define our positions as "well below the threshold of political utilization." And what is this threshold? There are in Europe other socialist and even Catholic forces above the threshold we indicated. The truth is that even the editor of *POPOLO* seems to seize this occasion to defer the political choices to which the DC is called and, not by chance, in the same article published in *POPOLO*, Belci lashed out against the unions, because they placed in their recent resolution the problem of the government, emphasizing the need to have a valid spokesman able to respond to the problems posed by them: how to cope with the energy crisis; how to defend incomes reduced by inflation; how to intervene in the points of crisis where employment is threatened.

Therefore the unions have not made, as Belci says, "political prejudgments," If it is true that even Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry] has had to agree, with the united federation, to a document strongly critical of the absence of a plan to meet the energy crisis. The workers warn of the absence of any sign of a program to confront a crisis which has shaken economies which are considerably stronger than ours. But these absences and these lacks are not casual, since a policy adapted to the times and to the facts of today is not imaginable or possible without the help of the working class and without the operating and governing solidarity of all the democratic forces.

But the most dramatic cry at this point in the current Italian situation still comes to us from the terrorist front, with the Milan ambush and from Palermo, with the assassination of the president of the region, Piersanti Mattarella. This is not the place for a more complete examination of the conditions and of the reasons which have led to the murder of the Sicilian leader. One thing, however, must be said: it is a political crime, willed and organized by forces which see their positions of power consolidated over the years being threatened by a possible democratic solution to the crisis. And Piersanti Mattarella, even if it was with prudence and contradictions, had demonstrated within his party the will to follow a new path of which the meeting with the PCI was an unavoidable point.

In reality--and this is what the DC leaders must think about--it is precisely, as we have said, the absence of a firm political direction, the long and unsolved crisis, the uncertainty of the solutions which the DC wants to reach, which incite subversive forces of all kinds to step forward and to strike, in an attempt to push back the situation, creating a climate of terror, of intimidation and of fear. The core of the problem, therefore, is the government: to attempt to underestimate it, as some DC leaders are attempting to do, is a serious mistake. And it is a mistake to leave to the DC the possibility of deferring choices which need urgently to be made.

From this point of view, of great importance are the discussions and debates within the PSI and they are of great importance precisely because they tend to put an end to this tormented, dramatic period marked by the instability, precariousness and uncertainty of the country's direction

The attempt to reduce the events which the PSI is going through to a personalistic dispute is silly. The problem is political: it is a question of giving an outlet to the intuition of the socialists themselves and that is that the phase Italy is going through requires a solution of the crisis which would see both the parties of the left in the government within the orbit of national solidarity, without any prejudice to the prospects which each of them have outlined for the country's future. In the past, not having held this intuition firmly has allowed the DC to expect to put together again a more or less refurbished government which, using the support of the PSI, would maintain the so-called centrality of the DC and its system of power.

The development of the political situation and the worsening of the crisis itself have pushed the PSI to propose again, with renewed vigor, this problem but, with the current situation, we think that the DC itself cannot subsequently avoid the problem if it does not want the ungovernability of the country to assume an increasingly dramatic character.

8956

CSO: 3104

## PCI YOUTH FEDERATION SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON VISIT TO PRC

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 6 Jan 80 pp 1, 15

[Interview with Massimo D'Alema, secretary of the PCI Youth Federation, in Rome, With Giulietto Chiesa, date not given]

[Text] Massimo D'Alema is carrying a big notebook full of notes and reflections on his trip. He is back from China, where he visited for 12 days with the FGCI [PCI Youth Federation] delegation, which had been invited there by the League of Chinese Communist Young People. It was a very interesting trip, and indeed it could not have been otherwise after a lapse of so many years in the relations between the two organizations and the two parties--years which were lost years from the point of view of knowledge of each other, the exchanging of information concerning their experiences and political dialog.

"Our trip," said D'Alema, "essentially amounted to a resumption of relations between our two organizations, but, as Comrade Ji Peng Fei, the deputy prime minister and the man who is responsible for the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, stated, it was explicitly considered by them to be a further step forward in the process of normalizing relations between two parties. The Chinese press and television gave great prominence to the meetings, thus attributing unequivocal political significance to the visit of our delegation."

[Question] But what has changed, in your opinion, in the Chinese Communist Party's attitude toward us? And, above all, what are the reasons for that change?

[Answer] In the first place, I should like to say that, as far as we are concerned, we once again affirmed the fact that our acceptance of the invitation extended to us by the Central Committee of the League of Chinese Communist Young People was the logical result of a position which had been characteristic of us and which we had maintained continuously through all

those years. We never accepted the logic of the condemnations and excommunications, and we did not condemn and excommunicate anyone ourselves. In the meetings we had with them, the Chinese comrades told us that they had appreciated that fact. For their part, their respect for our autonomy and their recognition that our positions, although differing from theirs, are the result of an original thought process and set of experiences, could not be more explicit and more clearly stated. The fact that the condemnations of us and the epithet of "revisionists" with which we were described have been dropped completely is not without significance. "The disagreements of the past belong to the past," they said, and I gained the impression from them that, rather than simply considering them to be closed chapters, they believe that they should be reexamined calmly in the light of their new domestic requirements and the new international picture which is being created, a picture in which China today is of great importance and has enormous responsibilities. The fact is that labels are no longer of any use, and, as Ji Peng Fei also told us, "it is necessary to clear away the fairy tales and to have reference to that unique criterion of truth which practical experience constitutes." Their repeated appreciation of the role our party plays on behalf of peace and detente also seemed to me to be of great significance.

[Question] But isn't that point precisely one of the most delicate ones among those where the differences between our positions and theirs are the most noticeable?

[Answer] Yes, that is true. The Chinese comrades, although they are at present shifting the accent to the need to work for peace and to the need China has for peace in order to carry out its process of "modernization," they firmly maintain their belief in the "inevitability of war"--in the unavoidability of a conflict between the two big powers. Therefore, in their view, the struggle for peace must be carried on by the people and the nations against the "super-powers," and, above all, they say, against the USSR, which they describe as the most aggressive and dangerous power. That is the point on which we differ most profoundly from our Chinese comrades. We have several times stressed the need to overcome the logic of the inevitability of conflict and retaliation and the need to help a process of detente--between the United States and the USSR, above all--to gain ground, and we reminded them that the hostility between China and the Soviet Union is not just a dramatic problem for the workers' movement and for communists but also an element which endangers peace and the policy of coexistence. The existence of disagreement on these points was noted, and indeed it could not have been otherwise. At the same time, however, the Chinese comrades wanted to emphasize, repeatedly, their appreciation for the fact that the Italian communists consistently reject any rationale of prevarication and the use of force and defend every country's and every population's right to independence.

[Question] So it is not possible to perceive anything new in regard to the attitudes and positions of the Chinese comrades, which are already known where most questions are concerned?



[Answer] I do not think you can say that. Instead, it seems to me that one can say that a number of indications show, in what apparently is a continuous procedure, that a process of serious, although very cautious, critical reexamination of a whole series of judgments made in the past is going on. In regard to the Soviet Union, they told us that they "are discussing" the social nature of that country, and on a nonofficial occasion they informed us that a debate on that very subject had recently taken place at the Academy of Sciences in Beijing, and that obviously is an indication that the question is considered anything but a closed one.

[Question] What developments is it reasonable to expect from your visit to China?

[Answer] We invited a delegation from their central committee to Italy and the invitation was accepted in general terms. All that remains to be done is to set a date. We anticipate that we will soon be able to resume, in all possible ways, a dialog which was interrupted for too long a period, with damage to both parties. It is clear that closer relations with the Chinese Communist Party, not only on our part but also on the part of other democratic forces, can be very important in helping China to break, once and for all, out of the isolation in which she has remained for too long a period. The effects in all directions of such a break could not help but be beneficial.

9258

CSO: 3104

## PRESENT, FUTURE AVAILABILITY, COSTS OF HYDROELECTRICITY

Rome FONTI DI ENERGIA ALTERNATIVE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 9-15

[Article: "Hydroelectric Resources: Present State and Future Possibilities"]

[Text] 1. Hydroelectric Potential

1.1. The average annual precipitation on Italian territory is estimated at about 1,000 mm, which corresponds to a meteoric inflow of 300 billion m<sup>3</sup>.

Of this inflow, only 52 percent--that is, about 155 billion m<sup>3</sup>--flows to the sea through the surface hydrographic system. The remaining 48 percent returns to the atmosphere through evapotranspiration of the soil and the vegetation, becomes a component of biological processes, or is absorbed by the earth through deep infiltration and goes back to the sea through subterranean channels.

The quantity of precipitation and the altitude of our territory mean that our country has high hydro-energy potentials available, even by comparison with other European countries.

However, various factors connected with the pluviometric regimes, the morphology and the fragmentation of the hydrographic system severely limit the possibilities for transformation of this potential into useful energy.

1.2. A fundamental investigation to evaluate the resources capable of hydroelectric utilization was carried out by the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Public Works, which published its results from 1928 to 1932. The evaluation was carried out on broad principles, in relation to the hydrological and topographic characteristics of the individual basins and the needs of the time for other priority uses of the water.

The investigation was extended to all possibilities with mean nominal power of more than 220 kW.

The energy obtainable was established in function of the value assumed for the maximum flow taken off in relation to the mean flow available. With a

maximum takeoff flow corresponding to that with a duration of 6 months (which was the value by which the installations were sized until around 1940), the total hydroelectric production potential was estimated at 51 billion kWh per year; with a maximum flow corresponding to that with a duration of 3 months (which is the value taken for the most modern plants), the hydroelectric production potential was estimated at 69 billion kWh. Taking into account the characteristics of the plants already built, it can be considered that a figure of about 62 billion kWh per year represents the limit of the hydroelectric potential today, in accordance with the aforesaid study, and without reference to any further limitations deriving from the advent of greater water needs for other priority uses, from more extensive civic and industrial installations, or from more detailed knowledge of the geological aspects.

A study carried out for the CNR [National Research Council] and published in 1973 by the Water Research Institute estimates the hydroelectric potential at 64.6 billion kWh per year, without specifying the size limits of the structures, and thus substantially confirms the results of the study by the Hydrographic Department.

1.3. In the international framework (ECE [United Nations Economic Commission for Europe]), for purposes of statistical comparison of the situations of various countries, other parameters of estimation of hydro-energy resources, not directly referable to the technical possibilities for utilization, have been taken into consideration: they include the so-called surface-area gross potential energy--which is the total energy possessed, in relation to the level of the sea, by the volumes of water flowing on the territory--and the contour-line gross potential energy, calculation of which relates to the volumes flowing in the successive sections of the hydrographic system, starting with the first sections determinable from cartography on the 1:100,000 scale.

For Italy, the total values for these potentials are, respectively, 340 billion and 227 billion kWh per year--that is, several times higher than the energy technically recoverable per the studies first cited. This results from the fact that many important factors limit the possibility of conversion of the potential into hydroelectric production: the unfeasibility of installations in the first sections of the hydrographic system; non-use of the flows in excess of what plant sizing permits, or flows earmarked for priority uses, or of the water flowing between the plant's intake and return sections; losses of head by friction along the canalizations; losses of energy because of the efficiencies of the transformation machinery and from auxiliary uses in the power plant, etc; and finally, the impossibility of utilizing the entire head of a watercourse because of factors connected with the morphology, flood protection, environmental obstacles, or geological-geotechnical situations.

1.4. Table 1 presents a summary of the production potential technically realizable according to the investigations carried out by the Hydrographic Department, the production potential of the plants built and under construction as of 31 December 1978, and of the plants that are the subject of the study carried out by ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] to identify the nation's residual hydroelectric uses. This involves, as will be illustrated below, 31 plants with unit production potential higher than 100 million kWh per year (Table 2), for a total of 5.5 billion kWh; 31 plants with unit production potential less than 100 million kWh per year (Table 3), for a total of 1.5 billion kWh; and other plants, which are indifiduated in a general way and the design of which is not yet sufficiently advanced, should have a mean annual production potential of another 1.3 billion kWh.

Table 1. Italian Hydroelectric Potential

(8)	Energia in miliardi di kWh/yr	(7) Ripartizione per Compartimenti idrografici.										
		Regione Veneta (9)	Bacino del Po (10)	Romagna Marche	Liguria Toscana	Umbria Lazio	Molise Puglia	Campania	Basilicata Calabria	Sicilia	Sardegna	
1	Potenziale tecnicamente realizzabile (1)	62	17.3	27.3	2.2	2.7	3.3	2.2	2.4	3.2	0.8	0.8
2	Produttività degli impianti realizzati e in corso di costruzione	46.14 <sup>(2)</sup>	13.21	22.13	0.75	0.89	3.44	2.45	0.88	1.88	0.33	0.50
3	Produttività dei nuovi impianti studiati	7.08	2.49	2.75	0.63	0.73	0.10	0.30	0.07	0.48	0.18	0.04
4	Produttività totale accertata	53.22	15.70	24.88	0.78	1.72	3.54	2.65	0.75	2.15	0.51	0.54
5	Produttività totale accertata (in valore percentuale rispetto al totale realizzabile)	83%	91%	91%	35%	64%	- 100	- 100	31%	67%	64%	80%
6	Altri impianti in corso di studio	2.09 <sup>(3)</sup> (86%)										

- (1) From data of the 1928-1932 study by the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Public Works.
- (2) Present mean annual production potential (44.84 TWh) + net production potential of the plants under construction (1.30 TWh).
- (3) Including new small power plants, restorations, and modernizations.

Key:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Production potential technically realizable (1)             | potential (as percentage value in relation to total realizable) |
| 2. Production potential of plants built and under construction | 6. Other plants under study                                     |
| 3. Production potential of new plants designed                 | 7. Distribution by Hydrographic Sectors                         |
| 4. Total ascertained production potential                      | 8. Energy in billions of kWh/year                               |
| 5. Total ascertained production                                | 9. Veneto Region  |
|  | 10. Po Basin  |

With few exceptions, these tabulations do not include power uses of less than 5,000 kVA. In any case, an estimate of the energy obtainable in total from these small power plants through reactivations, modernizations and new construction would be of about 700 million kWh per year.

Table 1 gives, for each hydrographic sector, the total of the resources already being utilized or ascertained, and the percentage as related to the value determined in the study by the Hydrographic Department (lines 4 and 5). Finally, the production potential relating to plants still in the initial design phase and to the contributions by the small power plants is indicated (line 6).

## 2. Residual Italian Hydroelectric Resources

2.1. In recent years, ENEL has developed a study, far-reaching and sufficiently detailed in its technical aspects, of the hydroelectric resources that appear still usable, prescinding from their economic suitability, and has also estimated the possible increases in production potential achievable by the recovery of small power plants that are out of service today, by new small power plants, and by the modernization of other small plants that are in service.

Obviously, the schemes of greatest magnitude have been considered from the start, and the study has then gone on to the plants that are smaller but still of sufficient size for useful inclusion in the national electric-power grid.

2.2. In the first category, plants with annual production potential greater than 100 GWh are considered. A total of 31 have been studied so far: of these, 16 are grouped in 7 hydrographic systems, each consisting of the plants positioned along the same river axis, while the remaining 15 constitute single uses, inserted, in some cases, into already existing systems.

The locations of the plants are: 23 in the Alpine arc, 6 along the Appennine ridge as far as Sila, and 2 in Sicily.

Those projects are listed which--subject to some further detailed study and critical reexamination, especially as regards certain geological and geotechnical aspects--have appeared realizable on the technical level; they constitute a census, now very advanced, of the hydroelectric utilizations still possible in Italy that could make significant energy contributions.

Among these plants are projects already studied in the past but not carried out because of difficulties of various kinds, especially of an environmental nature. These projects have been reworked by ENEL to make them compatible with, on the one hand, the changed economic situations of the various energy sources and the progress in construction technology, and on the other hand, with new land-use situations and closer environmental protection.



The 31 plants are listed in Table 2. Their total net production potential is 5.5 billion kWh per year, and their cost, estimated as of 31 December 1978, is 3,230 billion lire.

Some of the proposed projects are for mixed uses, intended for irrigation or water-supply systems as well as for hydroelectric purposes. Specifically, these include the Isola-Ponti plant and those on the lower Dora Baltea in the Alpine arc, Cabanne and the plants on the Lima in the north-central Apennines, and the plants of the Caronie Orientali in Sicily. In such plants, electric-power production, which is conditioned by the other priority uses, can contribute only partly to the expenses of construction of the system, which must therefore find its economic balance in a suitable distribution of the costs in relation to the benefits obtainable in the various sectors of use of the waters. This has proved to be true with, for example, the plants of the Sila (now nearing completion, and the subject of an agreement with the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno [Fund for the South]), and for those of the lower Cellina; as for these latter, it has been possible to include them in ENEL's last operational program, after the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region arranged the financing of the Ravedis reservoir.

2.3. The possible new plants with production potential less than 100 GWh per year are the subject of a detailed study analogous to the preceding one, in an advanced phase of elaboration.

It has emerged from an initial general investigation that a number of these plants are technically realizable, with total annual production on the order of 2.8 billion kWh. For 31 of them, which have a net production potential of 1.5 billion kWh, the preliminary studies have been completed, and their principal characteristics are presented in Table 3. The total cost of these 31 plants is estimated at 1,070 billion lire as of 31 December 1978.

2.4. The plants listed have been grouped into classes according to the cost of the energy produced by them:

--the first group includes the plants with production costs comparable to those for thermoelectric production using coal or nuclear power; this group includes 16 plants with production potential of 3.5 billion kWh per year and cost of about 1,580 billion lire;

--the second group consists of plants with higher unit costs, up to about double the present limit of competitiveness, and thus capable of being taken into consideration in a longer-term outlook. This group comprises 26 plants, with production potential of 2.5 billion kWh per year and cost of 1,620 billion lire;

--the third group includes plants with costs more than double the aforesaid limit; there are 20 of them, with production potential of 1.1 billion kWh per year and cost of 1,100 billion lire.

The new contributions stated above can increase by another 1.3 billion kWh per year--as mentioned earlier, in section 2.3--by means of the plants with production potential of less than 100 million kWh per year that are still in the study phase. Moreover, it will be possible to define their position in the cost ranges indicated above only upon conclusion of the study, even though, on the basis of very general estimations, it appears that they will almost all fall into the second and third groups.

2.5. ENEL has also started a systematic study to redevelop the small power plants, with the aim of defining small types of hydraulic machinery of simple design and usable for many small power plants, so that mass production of them can be programmed, and even the alternators are being planned in a very few standardized sizes. The adoption of these criteria, together with intensification of automation, will make it possible to put back into operation some of the small power plants closed down because they were not physically workable, and also to modernize others still in operation, according to a plan appropriately scaled in time. It may also prove possible to build some entirely new small power plants using overflows or diversions--existing or to be made--from other priority uses of water. The recovery of new energy which it can be expected to achieve from small hydraulic uses at nonprohibitive costs is on the order of several hundred million kWh per year, while modernization of the small power plants in operation, the production from which today is nearly 1.6 billion kWh per year, will make it possible not only to keep them in service but also to increase their production potential by about 2 billion kWh per year.

It should be noted in this regard that the small power plants abandoned by ENEL--many of them also as a result of demand for water for municipal uses--had a total production potential of only 240 million kWh per year, out of the total of 175 billion kWh of Italian electric-power production in 1978.

It should also be noted that ENEL, precisely for the purpose of keeping in service the largest number of hydroelectric power plants that it would otherwise be antieconomic to operate, has developed automation and remote control to the maximum: the percentage of automated and remote-controlled small power plants was 12 percent in 1962, was increased to 68 percent by 1978, and will reach 70 percent by the end of the current year.

2.6. On the whole, the results of the study so far carried out can be summarized as follows, in terms of new natural hydroelectric production potential--therefore not including production by old plants replaced, in some cases, by new ones, and also not including the production potentials obtained from pumping:

Table 2. Hydroelectric Plants with Annual Production Potential Greater than 100 GWh

	(1) Sezioni idrografiche utilizzate e denominazione degli impianti	(2) Piemonte	(3) Piemonte meridionale (GWh)	(4) Produzione naturale media annua (GWh)	(5) Energia annua sottratta in bacello impareggiabile (GWh)	(6) Costo medio di 31/12/70 (L./kWh)	(7) Note	
(11) 1° gruppo	ALTA DORA BALTEA							
	1 Champorant - La Balme	Aosta						
	2 La Balme - La Balme	Aosta						
	(8) Totale		214	688	-	104.288		
	GRAN PARADISO							
	3 Novate-Toré	Aosta						
	4 Toré - Fontil	Aosta						
	5 Fontil - Vignin	Aosta						
	(8) Totale		618	754	285,3	385.488		
	6 ROSSATE (Alto subacqueo)	Cuneo-Milano		57	285,2	228,9	93.888	UP
	7 COGOLMALE R. Noce	Torino		68	388	-	101.488	
	8 ACQUAVIVA DI LANA (Alto)	Biella		178	584	388	121.288	
	PASSIRIO							
	9 Salaparuta	Biella						
10 Ruffa	Biella							
(8) Totale		354	848	-	344.888			
11 RIVA DI TURES R. Assunta	Biella		288	427	-	311.888		
12 ISOLA-PONTI (Alto Tanaro)	Imperia-Cuneo		188	128,7	-	87.488	UP (2)	
13 CASANALE (Alto Tanaro)	Cuneo		154	258	38	128.788	UP (2)	
(9) Totale parziale			1.884	4.148,9	685,3	1.288.188		
(12) 2° gruppo	DORA BALTEA INFERIORE							
	14 Mazon - Vignin	Torino						
	15 Vignin - Dapone	Torino-Milano						
	(8) Totale		18,8	188,4	-	37.888	UP	
	STURA DI ALA E DI VALGRANDE							
	16 Anzas - Pian della Mussa	Torino						
	17 Pian della Mussa - Mandrone	Torino						
	18 Mandrone - Cora	Torino						
	(8) Totale		218,2	334,8	41	238.888		
	19 CANNOBIO (V. Cannobina)	Novara		58,1	141,3	-	88.888	
	20 S. GIACOMO IN AUDA (Alto)	Biella		38	158	-	74.388	
	21 ROSENDO R. Ronco	Biella		38	148	-	72.388	
	22 BUSCHÉ R. Cordero	Biella		37	148	-	58.888	
	23 LESS-ARCOLA (Alto Corno)	Piedmonte		32,3	188	-	78.188	
TORRENTE LIMA E VERSANTE MERIDIONALE DELL'ABETONE								
24 Ponzonico - Ponto Dogno	Piemonte - Lucca							
25 Ponto Dogno - Borgo a Mazzano	Piemonte - Lucca							
(8) Totale		218	311	121,8	317.888	UP		
26 ROSETO R. Vignola	Torino		54	128,3	-	112.388		
(9) Totale parziale			678,7	1.827,3	188,8	1.188.888		
(13) 3° gruppo	27 VARALLO (Vignola)	Vercelli		48	128	-	83.388	
	28 RIVOLI R. Magno	Lucca		38,3	118	-	137.888	
	29 MONTESIGNATO R. Fina (Alto)	Piemonte - Ancona		88	188,3	18,4	188.788	
	CARONE ORIENTALI							
	30 Alcantara - Gash	Modena						
	31 Gash - Torinese	Modena						
	(8) Totale		138,3	188,3	-	381.488	UP	
	(9) Totale parziale		388,8	618,7	18,4	838.388		
(10) TOTALI COMPLESSIVI		2.883,3	6.581,8	1.028,8	2.274.888			

UP = Mixed Use

(1) = Restoration of 3 obsolescent plants.

(2) and (3) = Net cost of reservoirs for irrigation uses, on the Piemonte and Emilia slopes, respectively.

Cost Classes: 1st group: plants with production costs comparable to those of other sources;

2nd group: plants with production costs up to about double those of other sources;

3rd group: plants with production costs more than double those of other sources.

[Key on following page]

[Key for Table 2]

1. Hydrographic basins used and names of plants	6. Cost at 12 December 1978 (billions of lire)
2. Province	7. Notes
3. Installed power (MW)	8. Total
4. Mean annual natural production potential (GWh)	9. Subtotals
5. Annual energy based on old plants (GWh)	10. Grand Totals
	11. 1st Group
	12. 2nd Group
	13. 3rd Group

		<u>new availability (billions of kWh)</u>
1 - plants technically realizable, with production potential greater than 100 million kWh per year:		
--hydroelectric use only	4.4	
--mixed use	<u>1.1</u>	
total		5.5
2 - plants technically realizable, with production potential less than 100 million kWh per year:		
--plants for which preliminary studies have been completed	1.5	
--plants considered in a general way	<u>1.3</u>	
total		2.8
3 - possible recovery of inactive small power plants, contributions from new small power plants, and modernization of old small power plants in operation:		<u>0.7</u>
Total of new contributions technically possible:		9.0

Taking into account the expected utilizations along the watercourses of the plain of the Po and of the Adige--which, however, pose difficult problems of environmental alteration--and of other plants that may result from continuance of ENEL's studies and from proposals by third parties, the national hydroelectric potential still technically usable today can be estimated at about 11 billion kWh per year.

This figure takes account of what it may be presumed can emerge from the investigations already started and in various phases of development with

Table 3. Hydroelectric Plants with Annual Production Potential Less than 100 GWh

	1) Denominazione degli impianti	2) Provincia	3) Bacino idrografico	4) Volume installato (kW)	5) Produzione annua media annua (GWh)	6) Energia annua ceduta su licenza (GWh)	7) Costo medio al kWh (L.)	8) Note
1° gruppo	1 Andena	Udine	Tappanone	14,4	48	—	20,388	
	2 Cernobbio	Piacenza	Trebbia	21,5	85	—	37,000	U.P. (1)
	3 Cossato	Bologna	Reno	8,3	29,6	—	11,800	U.P. (1)
	9) Totale parziale			44,2	162,6	—	80,000	
2° gruppo	4 Ossi	Torino	Dora di Bardonecchia	34	67	—	50,800	
	5 Salbertrand	Torino	Dora Riparia	20,6	86	—	45,700	
	6 Candoglia	Novara	Vale Grande	31	63,8	—	26,100	
	7 S. Nazario	Vercelli	Brona (Cromagno)	14,8	90	20	48,700	
	8 Venas	Belluno	Piave (Baita)	15	12,8	16	37,500	
	9 Cimolera	Reggio Emilia	Saccha	11	38,7	—	18,100	
	10 Caramo	Santa Giustina	Orsina	15	35,5	—	15,100	U.P. (2)
	11 Scimone	L'Aquila	Alto Sangro	10,2	34,2	—	18,700	
	12 Palazzo I	Como	Lario	26,3	112,5	—	80,700	
	13 Palazzo II	Como	Lario	24,8	79,8	—	43,800	
	14 Argenta	Calabria	Arceola	21,2	81	—	81,000	
	15 Serrano	Calabria	Arceola	25,3	98,3	—	84,500	
	16 Cantone	Cagliari	Tirso	19,6	40 (3)	—	12,800	U.P. (1)
	9) Totale parziale			201,8	871,6	36	520,700	
3° gruppo	17 S. Martino	Sondrio	Adde (Alzuma)	33,5	70,7	0,8	49,500	
	18 Oliva	Trento	Brenta (Vale di Comano)	16	51,4	—	43,400	
	19 Gerosa	Ascoli Piceno	Asio	1,4	4	—	7,300	
	20 Accumoli	Ascoli Piceno	Trebia	10	17,2	3,4	21,300	
	21 Arquata	Ascoli Piceno	Trebia	5,1	18,6	—	22,800	
	22 Fossano	Frosinone	Alto Aniene	1,4	7,2	—	5,400	
	23 Ponte Renzo	Frosinone	Alto Aniene	0,7	2,7	—	3,600	
	24 Subiaco II	Roma	Aniene	3,7	21,3	1,2	11,900	
	25 Sora	L'Aquila	Frosinone	5,9	32	—	30,200	
	26 Isola Liri	Frosinone	Liri	17,3	85	56	34,400	
	27 Alatri	L'Aquila	Alto Sangro	9	47,3	—	34,000	
	28 Ponte sul Carile	Benevento	Volturno	30	66	—	78,800	
	29 Casinodduco II	Perugia	Nera	24	80	—	80,700	
	30 Savuto I	Genova	Savuto	14,8	45,3	—	38,700	
	31 Savuto II	Genova	Savuto	11	35,5	—	43,800	
	9) Totale parziale			188,8	571,2	61,4	478,400	
10) TOTALI COMPLESSIVI			525,8	1.605,4	100,4	1.088.100		

U.P. = Utilizzazione promiscua

(1) = Costo al netto degli oneri per la costruzione dei serbatoi e carico di altre utilizzazioni

(2) = Costo relativo a tutte le opere idroelettriche dal pozzo piezometrico allo scarico della centrale

(3) = Valore attualizzato che tiene conto della progressiva sottrazione di acqua per altri usi

Classi di costo: 1° gruppo impianti aventi costi di produzione comparabili con quelli di altra fonte

2° gruppo impianti aventi costi di produzione fino a circa il doppio di quelli di altra fonte

3° gruppo impianti aventi costi di produzione superiori al doppio di quelli di altra fonte

UP = Mixed Use

(1) = Net cost of expenses for construction of reservoir (charged to other uses).

(2) = Cost relating to hydroelectric installations only, from pressure well to discharge from power plant.

(3) = Updated figure taking account of the gradual removal of water for irrigation uses.

Cost Classes: 1st group: plants with production costs comparable to those of other sources;

2nd group: plants with production costs up to about double those of other sources;

3rd group: plants with production costs more than double those of other sources

[Key on following page]



[Key for Table 3]

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Names of plants                                   | 7. Cost at 31 December 1978<br>(billions of lire) |
| 2. Province  | 8. Notes  |
| 3. Hydrographic basin                                | 9. Subtotals                                      |
| 4. Installed power (MW)                              | 10. Grand Totals                                  |
| 5. Mean annual natural production<br>potential (GWh) | 11. 1st Group                                     |
| 6. Annual energy based on old<br>plants (GWh)        | 12. 2nd Group                                     |
|  | 13. 3rd Group                                     |

---

various Italian regions and with the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, in relation to general planning studies on water resources for irrigation, drinking water, industrial and energy uses, so as to reach the technical-economic-management optimum, through mixed-use plants, in use of the nation's water resources.

2.7. It may be advisable to specify the meaning which ENEL has given in these studies to the term "technically realizable"--a concept which to some extent is connected with the costs that result from the technical approaches taken, it being obvious that complete freedom from cost considerations could make it possible to build a quantity of expensive facilities that expand the possibilities.

The ENEL studies have been undertaken with the imposition of a reasonable limit to technical feasibility consisting in a production cost on the order of three times the present cost of the thermal and nuclear sources.

However, six of the plants projected in Tables 2 and 3, to have a mean annual production potential of about 220 GWh, have proven, upon conclusion of the study and estimation, to be over that limit, as could also prove to be the case with some of the minor plants individuated but not yet studied in detail.

2.8. As emerges from the tables, 16 of the plants individuated, with total production potential of 3.5 billion kWh, already prove to be economically competitive today, and construction of them could begin before long. Most of these plants had already been proposed on several occasions--though on different scales--but have always run into obstacles of different kinds from the local administrations and various opinion movements. Therefore it is necessary, in the light of the nation's energy requirements, that every action be taken which, within the framework of full environmental protection, can lead to the construction of these plants.

2.9. To complete the picture of the utilization of the national residual hydroelectric resources, it is pointed out that ENEL presently has eight hydroelectric plants under construction, using natural flows and pumping, for a total effective power of more than 2.5 million kW and production potential of about 3.1 billion kWh (including about 2.0 billion kWh from

Table 4. ENEL Hydroelectric Plants under Construction or Programmed as of 31 December 1978

	(1) Impianto	(2) Provincia	(3) Potenza (MW)	(4) Produzione media annua		(7) Totale (GWh)	(8) Energia accumulabile nei serbatoi (GWh)
				(5) Naturale (GWh)	(6) Da pompaggio (GWh)		
(11) In costruzione	Bentivoglio (Monte)	(14) Torino	5	15	—	15	—
	Pesce d'orco (Chiese)	(14) Cuneo	1,000	40	1,000	1,040	70
	Pesce d'orco (Riviera)	(15) Cuneo	100	100 (1)	100	200	2
	Edoia	(15) Brescia	1,000	220	800	1,020	—
	Orchestra (Lampugnara)	(16) Catanzaro	120	220	40	270	340
	Temporada (Lampugnara)	(16) Catanzaro	101	400	—	400	—
	Alto	(16) Catanzaro	31	40	—	40	50
	Totale		2,250	1,115	2,900	3,120	400
(12) In servizio nel 1978	Prosecco (2)	Novara	1,000	—	1,000	1,000	—
	Prosecco	Caserta - Napoli	1,000	—	1,000	1,000	—
	Susino	Siracusa	500	—	500	500	—
	(9) Totale		2,500	—	2,500	2,500	—
(13) In programma di costruzione	Quadrone II	Torino - Asti	20	120	—	120	—
	Accoglio (Intero)	(17) Cuneo	10	60	—	60	—
	Arco (Riviera all'Orto)	(18) Ivrea	—	10	—	10	—
	Mare II (Lampugnara) (16)	Novara	8	30	—	30	—
	S. Stefano (Alto Sarcis)	(16) Torino	200	340	60	400	120
	Sarri II (16)	Belluno	24	70	—	70	30
	Cattinella	Perugia	47	200	—	200	—
	Amore	Udine	62	200	—	200	—
	Monte S. Angelo 2 <sup>a</sup> fase (1)		—	—	—	—	—
	Lago Pesce	Rieti	40	—	—	—	2
	Ponte di Ruscio II (20)	Rieti - Terni	500	—	500	500	—
	S. Giacomo sul Vomano (1)	Teramo	200	10	120	140	—
	(17) Totale (9)		1,220	1,250	680	1,940	170
	(10) Totale complessivo di		6,375	2,365	4,717	7,060	600

- (1) Gutter diversions not yet authorized.
- (2) Awaiting provisional authorization. Local difficulties also remain to be overcome.
- (3) Work not started, because of local difficulties.
- (4) Work suspended in 1965 because of administrative difficulties.
- (5) Local opposition to the construction permit has arisen.
- (6) The totals include the input from old plants, totalling 297 MW of effective power, 1,066 GWh of mean annual production potential, and 297 GWh reservoir-intake capacity.

[Key]:

- |  |                           |
|--|---------------------------|
| 1. Plant                                   | 10. Grand Total           |
| 2. Province                                | 11. Under construction    |
| 3. Effective power (MW)                    | 12. To be started soon    |
| 4. Mean annual production potential        | 13. In the active program |
| 5. Natural (GWh)                           | 14. Chiotas diversion     |
| 6. From pumping (GWh)                      | 15. Rovina diversion      |
| 7. Total (GWh)                             | 16. Enlargement           |
| 8. Energy storable in the reservoirs (GWh) | 17. Restoration           |
| 9. Total                                   | 18. New canalizations     |
|  | 19. 2nd phase             |
|  | 20. 1st phase             |

pumping), and is starting construction of another three plants based on pumping only, with a total effective power of 2.5 million kW. In addition, ENEL's active program includes another 12 plants with a power of 1.3 million kW and production potential of about 1.9 billion kWh (including 0.7 billion kWh from pumping).

Not counting the contribution from old plants and the production potential from pumping, this complex of plants--whose names and principal characteristic data are given in Table 4--will produce a new-energy input of 1.3 billion kWh per year.

Rome, June 1979

11267

CSO: 3104

## PRESENT, FUTURE AVAILABILITY OF GEOTHERMAL ENERGY

Rome FONTI DI ENERGIA ALTERNATIVE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 16-27

[Article by E. Pacchiarotti, General Director for Different Energy Resources of AGIP (National Italian Oil Company), and L. Paris, Director of Studies and Research Center of ENEL (National Electric Power Agency): "Geothermal Energy for Production of Electrical Energy: Present State and Outlook"]

[Text] 1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to furnish specific indications about the availability in Italy of geothermal sources for production of electrical energy as it can be foreseen for the beginning of the 1990's, which, in practical terms, corresponds to the time horizon of ENEL's present operational programs.

This forecast is based mainly on analysis of the actions that have already been substantially undertaken by ENEL and by the AGIP-ENEL Joint Venture and that can make it possible in the next 15 years to keep the present sources of geothermal energy active and to find new ones--and all this within the framework of an estimation of the geothermal-energy reserves on Italian territory and their geographical distribution which, even within the limits of the value conventionally assigned it, can serve as an indication of the orders of magnitude of the achievable objectives.

2. The Guideline Estimates of the Geothermal Potential for Production of Electrical Energy

2.1. Criteria for and Limits to Overall Estimates of Geothermal Reserves

Those who must forecast and organize a country's energy future are constantly concerned to estimate the availability of the economically usable energy sources--that is, to estimate the so-called "reserves."

It is therefore logical that those responsible for development of geothermal sources be asked for an overall estimate of this type; on the other

hand, it is logical for those responsible to pose this problem to themselves, so as to proportion and distribute correctly the resources necessary for their task.

Moreover, the answer that can be given to this question in the geothermal energy sector is extremely uncertain. Indeed, while estimation of the heat contained in the hydrothermal systems of the earth's crust down to a depth of 3,000 m can be done definitely enough when sufficient geological information is available, estimation of the heat "economically extractable" remains largely in the realm of opinion; it can be defined with certainty only after deep exploration has been done and the extractability and usability of the geothermal fluids have been effectively tested.

An approximate estimate should therefore be made of the extractable reserves of geothermal energy, even if the estimate is limited to the hydrothermal systems to a depth of 3,000 m; the formulation of precise quantitative values should be understood as purely conventional and should be stated with clear reference to the method adopted.

The importance and validity of such figures as terms of reference are therefore in direct proportion to the precision of the conventions on which they are based and the extent to which the conventions are accepted by those who work in the field.

Estimation of the geothermal reserves in hydrothermal systems of depths greater than 3,000 m is quite a bit more difficult because of the considerable scarcity of data and the difficulty of hypothesizing the geological and physical situations of the subsoil at those depths. In addition, there has been little experience in estimating the costs and therefore the economic limits of exploitation of these fields.

If the experiments (presently under way) in exploration of the levels below 3,000 m (see section 3.2) are successful, it may be possible in the next decade to try to tackle the problem of overall estimation of the reserves.

In the present state of knowledge, the contribution from the levels deeper than 3,000 m must be considered a matter of pure speculation and therefore not programmable.

Another objective in the geothermal sector that is often talked about is exploitation of the nonfractured and therefore impermeable rock systems (hot dry rocks). In this sector also, it is not possible to make any quantitative prediction with certainty. On the world level, this system of exploitation is in the study phase, and even where experimentation is at an advanced stage (Los Alamos, DOE, United States), predictions about industrialization are not being hazarded yet. By virtue of the ENEL-DOE agreement, the Los Alamos experiment is being carried out in Italy, while the experimentation will be tackled directly and in the short term only if the Larderello substrate, presently being explored, proves unproductive because of the absence of shearing.






Figure 1. Estimation of the geothermal potential from hydrothermal systems of the Toscana-Lazio-Campania pre-Appennine range (depth to 3,000 m): areas considered and levels of thermality.

[Key]:

1. Florence
2. Low
3. Medium
4. High
5. Thermality

Moreover, it is to be expected that in Italy, given the geological structure of the country, dry-rock technology will be developed by way of the technology of stimulation by shearing of barren shafts, which is done so as to get to closed hydrothermal systems which today are not exploited or are unexploitable by the traditional systems.

In this sector too, therefore, one must refrain from quantitative predictions of any kind.

## 2.2. Estimation of Italian Geothermal Reserves in the Levels Down to 3,000 Meters

For some time ENEL, in collaboration with the CNR [National Research Council], has been working in this sector for the purpose of establishing credible standard methods; the orientation has been toward perfecting the so-called volume method, which is based on evaluation of the heat contained in the hydrothermal systems. The estimates--already made public by L. Paris at the Chianciano conference on "Geothermy and Regions" (1), and presented here in Figures 12, 2 and 3--made since 1975 for the reserves of the hydrothermal systems located in the first 3,000 m of the earth's crust in the pre-Appenine Tyrrhenian range (Toscana, Lazio, Campania) are based on this method.

Such estimations were based on the explorations of this zone carried out by ENEL and by the CNR in the period from 1967 to 1973 (it should be noted that the Toscana-Lazio-Campania pre-Appenine range contains most of the Italian reserves of high-temperature geothermal sources suitable for production of electrical energy).

ENEL has subsequently gone farther into the problem of estimations, dealing with it as a priority subject in the studies conducted in collaboration with the U.S. DOE (ERDA [Energy Research and Development Agency] at the time); this was done because the value of these methods, given their standardized nature, increases when the bases of experience on which the standards are formed are broadened. The method with its refinements was presented and discussed during the ENEL-ERDA symposium held at Larderello on 12-17 September 1977 (2).

At the same time, as a result of more detailed analysis of the available data and in the light of the new standards, the area of central and southern Toscana was reexamined (3), and the results indicated in Figure 4 were obtained.

The standardized value of the Toscana reserves proves higher than the previous estimation, and corresponds to a production possibility of 43 GWe per year (that is, to continuous production of 430 MW for 100 years or 860 MW for 50 years). This figure includes the energy already produced to date at Larderello, Tavale and Monte Amiata (about 10 GW per year), and presumes conversion of heat into electrical energy at the best economically achiev-




Figure 2. Estimation of the geothermal potential from hydrothermal systems of the Toscana-Lazio-CampANIA pre-Appennine range (depth to 3,000 m)

[Key]:

1. Florence
2. 100 GW<sub>t</sub> per year
3. GW<sub>t</sub> per year per km<sup>2</sup>




Figure 3. Estimation of the geothermal potential from hydrothermal systems of the Toscana-Lazio-Campania pre-Appennine range (depth to 3,000 m): electrical energy producible

[Key]:

1. Florence
2. 10  $\text{GW}_e$  per year
3.  $\text{GW}_e$  per year per  $\text{km}^2$




Figure 4. Estimation of the geothermal potential from hydrothermal systems of central and southern Toscana (depth to 3,000 m): electrical energy producible (updating of the estimates in accordance with the ENEL-DOE standards)



able efficiency. A similar review is in progress, with the participation of AGIP, for all the areas of Lazio and of Campania.

From the data already in our possession, it may be conjectured that about 100 GW per year can be obtained from the entire pre-Appenine region--therefor, taking into account the energy withdrawn to date, still about 90 GW per year.

The indications obtained in the other parts of Italy--resulting from AGIP's oil explorations (4) and from the preliminary research in progress, under the aegis of the CNR--lead to the belief that 90 percent of the reserves for production of electricity are located in the area of the Tyrrhenian pre-Appenine range. In total, and in a round number, the Italian reserves appear to amount to about 100 GW per year. If it were desired to exhaust all the reserves in 50 years, the maximum power installable would therefore be about 2,000 MW.

The reasons for not presuming exhaustion of all Italian geothermal resources in less than 50 years are of various kinds. In particular, one should consider the fact that exploitation of geothermal sources can come about only by degrees within the framework of a given area and with a certain staggering in time among the different areas, so as to achieve better utilization of the equipment employed and the experience acquired. The result, therefore, is an average lifetime for the entire reserve longer than the 25-30 years that constitutes the average economic lifetime of a geothermal electric power plant.

In addition, there are technical and environmental reasons that argue against or prevent outright the exploitation of the reserves in the relatively short times that would be optimal on the basis of the technical-economic analyses referred to above.

In addition to these, there could also be socioeconomic and strategic reasons for not considering it advisable to exhaust the geothermal energy reserves in times shorter than 50 years.

### 2.3. Estimation of the Maximum Electrical Power Obtainable from the Geothermal Reservoirs Located at Depths below 3,000 Meters

On the basis of the standardized estimations of the geothermal reserves as discussed in the preceding section, it is possible to make a judgment about what could be the target of geothermal activity in Italy in terms of electric power obtained from the hydrothermal geothermal systems with maximum exploitation.

This judgment can be based only on a qualitative comparison between the standardized assumptions on which the estimates are founded and the totality of the actual working conditions, the particularly disadvantageous factors are the uncertainty about the nature of the fluids brought to the sur-

face, the environmental restrictions relating to the subsoil and to the surface (it should be kept in mind that a large part of the reserves is near Napoli, in a region of intense land use), as well as the uncertainties owing to the present lack of legislation adequate to the requirements. Furthermore, such a judgment cannot be made subject to fixed ideas or rules; it must be left to the good sense of the entrepreneurs. Without reference to the times needed, our judgment of such a target places the maximum withdrawal capacity of the entire Italian geothermal-electric system at around 1,000 MW (equal to about 2.5 to 3 times the present rate).

However, this presumes that the economic limit for actual construction of the plants is competitiveness with the traditional thermoelectric plants within the framework of the probable cost of conventional fuels.

It further presumes that brisk legislation especially well-suited to geothermal energy will be passed quickly (and that the environmental control organisms involved will be made efficient and sufficiently flexible).

The 1,000 MW should be compared with the 370 MW that corresponds to the electric power realizable with the fluids available, as of the end of 1978, for conversion into electricity. In everything that follows, we prefer to refer to this figure rather than to the figure for the installed power in geothermal electric power plants, inasmuch as the latter figure does not provide a correct indication of the source's availability. In fact, many power plants are being or may be used at less than capacity because of decline of the production potential of the fields that supply them, while part of the fluids discovered may be waiting for the power plant destined to use them.

The availability of the geothermal source in 1993 will obviously fall between the present 370 MW and the 1,000 MW of our estimated limit target. A prediction of this availability value can be made only in the light of the activities under way and a forecast of the development of such activities. This will be done in the next section.

### 3. Geothermal Activity in Italy in the 5-Year Period 1979-1983 and the Outlooks for Increasing the Availability of the Energy Source for Electric-Power Uses

#### 3.1. Activity for Exploitation of the Hydrothermal Systems at Levels Down to a Depth of 3,000 Meters

At present, all these activities are being conducted in the Toscana-Lazio-Campania pre-Appenine range; Figure 5 shows the areas in which work of this kind is being done today or in which it is planned to do work in the 5-year period 1979-1983.

The figure shows the three areas of Larderello, Travale and Monte Amiata, presently in production, and the areas are indicated in which exploration work, experimentation and development are currently being done, as well as the areas where such work will be done per the plans for 1979-1983.



In Figure 6, the areas are classified according to the predominant nature of the hydrothermal systems ascertained or predicted. As can be noted, only the systems of Toscana have mainly the characteristics of steam-dominant systems.

Figure 7 distinguishes the areas held by ENEL exclusively from those held by the recently created AGIP-ENEL Joint Venture.

The same figure shows the drilling planned for the various areas in the 5-year period 1979-1983 and the type of work for which it is done (exploration, development, maintenance).

It is expected that in Italy in the 5-year period 1979-1983, an average of 10 drillings will be done for maintenance and finding of geothermal-energy sources for electric-power uses down to a depth of 3,000 m.

In the majority of cases, the work is directed at finding sources for electric-power uses; Figure 6 also indicates the zones where operations are being carried out with the aim of finding sources for thermal uses. Let us keep it in mind that in this report, our attention is devoted exclusively to the utilization of geothermal sources for production of electrical energy, while we propose to report on another occasion on the activity directed toward utilization of geothermal sources for nonelectrical uses.

A brief review of the activities in progress in the individual areas will enable us to evaluate what the concrete outlooks might be for availability of this energy source at the end of the 5-year period.

#### (a) Larderello

In this area, the activities under way are aimed at the following main objectives:

- the return into the subsoil (reinjection) of the discharge waters, now being dispersed on the surface, from the geothermal electric power plants;

- maintenance and, if possible, increase of the availability of geothermal sources. This second objective will be pursued mainly through drilling of the intermediate and marginal areas of the producing field. Moreover, the same reinjection could help to partially resupply the existing field (recharging).

Studies are in progress in this sector, and the first experimentations done, on which we expect to make a fuller report soon, seem to confirm this possibility;

- stimulation of the numerous barren shafts existing in this area.








Figure 7. Geothermal activities program in the 5-year period 1979-1983 (hydrothermal systems of the Tyrrhenian pre-Appenine range, to a depth of 3,000 m): use of drilling equipment in the 5-year period

**[Key]:**

1. Drillings per year planned for the 5-year period
2. Exploration
3. Development
4. Possible development
5. Maintenance

The general objective that can be set for the Larderello field in the 5-year period is to keep the field's power constant and possibly to increase it by some 10 MW.

(b) Central Travale

It is considered that the field's present production (corresponding to the existing Radicondoli power plant) is adequate for rational exploitation of the field itself. Action is planned for the final years of the 5-year period to ensure maintenance of the supply source for the existing power plant.

(c) Periphery of Travale

Exploration activity is under way with drilling down to 3,000 m of the broad graben that extends north of the producing field.

Subsequently, exploration will be extended into the northwest zone of the productive field, where the shafts (barren) already drilled have brought a considerable thermal anomaly to light. It is difficult to predict the availability of geothermal fluids that it will be possible to find at the end of the 5-year period.

(d) Monte Amiata (Fields in Production)

In this case also, the field's present production is adequate for rational exploitation of the field itself.

The activities planned for the 5-year period are aimed at maintaining the availability of the geothermal source.

(e) Monte Amiata (Fields under Exploration)

Exploration will be done in an area situated in the Radicofani graben, where recent studies have brought to light a large thermal anomaly with reservoir-head temperatures that should exceed 250° C. In this zone, the drilling of exploratory shafts has been programmed, positioned in correspondence with the zone of highest thermal anomaly. It is not possible to predict whether geothermal fluids will be available at the end of the 5-year period.

(f) Alfina

The Alfina reservoir has now been completely characterized by the exploratory drillings done to date. From this field (which is water-dominated, at about 150° C), fluids could be extracted to supply about 10-15 MW electric. However, it is necessary to solve the problem of extraction of the fluid, whose level of equilibrium in the shaft is 200 m below the level of the surface land. Extraction of the fluid by vaporization in the shaft is made difficult by the rapid incrustation of the shafts in the vaporization zone.

The further drillings necessary will be done in the final years of the 5-year period, after the technological problems related to extraction have been overcome.

(g) Latera

The geothermal field could have temperatures and potentials of the same order of magnitude as that of Alfina, and should therefore be capable of producing some 10 MW.

The first exploratory shaft has not yet reached the levels assumed to be productive, and it is therefore difficult to predict the potential fluid available at the end of the 5-year period.

(h) Monti Cimini

In this area, it is planned to begin the phase of detailed surface surveying by the Summer of 1979.

The characteristics of the more superficial hydrothermal system are those of a confined reservoir, with maximum temperature on the order of 100° C. This results in a nonelectrical use objective.

Below this depth and down to 3,000 m, the geological conditions could occur for the existence of a different reservoir with fluids at higher temperatures usable for production of electrical energy.

Drilling of the first exploratory shaft is planned for the beginning of 1981.

(i) Central Monti Sabatini (Cesano)

This is an extremely interesting geothermal area, but characterized by fluids of high salinity.

Although the zone is still in the exploration phase and is very complex from the geological point of view, hypotheses about the model of the geothermal system can already be advanced. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the very low permeability of the reservoir rocks and the uniform temperature increase down to 3,000 m (where 300° C is measured) lead one to presume that a hydrothermal field with abundant convective movement is absent; on the contrary, the two active shafts seem to be supplied through concentrated and highly permeable discontinuities, whose connection with a deeper hydrothermal system remains to be confirmed.

The type of model hypothesized for this field makes its development rather difficult; yet development should be pursued in view of its excellent thermality.

The particular nature of the high-salinity fluid (up to 30 percent in the Cesano 1 shaft and about 10 percent in the Cesano 5 shaft) has to date prevented sufficiently long output; broad experimentation with the active shafts and the installation of small pilot power plants of a few MW are planned for the short term. These experimentations should also make it possible to clarify the physical nature of the hydrothermal systems that supply the shafts and therefore permit estimations of the energy extractable. Simultaneously, the drillings will be continued in order to create new access to the fracture systems that supply these shafts.

The hypothesis that fluid can be provided to produce some 20 MW by the end of the 5-year period should be considered realistic.

#### (l) Monti Sabatini

Extension of the deep exploration of the Cesano area is planned, especially toward the west and northwest, where the results of various prospecting activities lead one to presume the existence of particularly favorable conditions at low depth.

This area is of considerable interest for thermal uses also, inasmuch as it extends to the vicinity of the Rome population area.

As regards electrical uses, the quantity of fluid that may be brought to light in the coming 5-year period cannot be estimated in specific terms.

#### (m) Colli Albani

It is planned to begin detailed surface surveying in 1979.

In one part of this area, geothermal-fluid temperatures on the order of 150° C are predictable, and there is therefore an electrical-use objective.

In the remaining part, the temperatures anticipated are lower, and thermal utilization is therefore foreseeable.

As regards electrical uses, the quantity of fluids that may be found in the 5-year period cannot be estimated.

#### (n) Lago Patria

The first exploratory shaft (Mofete 1) was sunk in the area of the Flegrei fields and was terminated, last March, at the depth of 1,600 m. It brought to light the existence of several levels containing fluids at a temperature between 250° and 300° C.

At the present time, a second shaft (Mofete 2) in the same area, programmed to arrive at a depth of about 2,000 m, is being sunk.

Even though the first probe has produced results of very great interest, it would be premature to estimate the potential of the geothermal field of the Mofetes. This will be possible only when the results from a sufficient number of shafts are available and the sufficiently long flow tests, presently programmed, have been carried out.

In any case, because of the severe limitations imposed by the unfavorable environmental conditions (dense urbanization, which limits the number of shafts), it should be considered improbable that the existing reserves can be exploited in their entirety. Nevertheless, a very general estimate, on the basis of the first data obtained, suggests that the available fluid could supply a unit of at least 20 MW electric.

A second area considered likely, located north of Pozzuoli, will be explored with a first shaft (San Vito 1) that should reach a depth of 3,000 m and the start of which is programmed for 1979.

Even though the zone seems a likely one, according to the surface-survey results, there are still no valid elements on which to base a prediction of the area's geothermal potential.

#### (o) Ottaviano

The detailed surface surveying is in progress in this area; it is expected to be completed by the end of the current year.

Sinking of the first exploratory shafts is planned for the second half of 1980, and it is therefore impossible to formulate predictions about the availability of fluids in the 5-year period.

In the 5-year period, other joint activities by AGIP and ENEL will be started; studies and investigations to localize such areas are in progress in southern Italy and on the islands.

Despite the fact that the framework of the activities to be carried out in the 5-year period is quite clear and detailed, the component of uncertainty is still the strongly dominant one in the outcome, and it thus remains difficult to make sure predictions about the increase in availability, at the end of the 5-year period, of geothermal fluids for production of electrical energy. However, it can be reasonably hypothesized that the total quantity of geothermal fluid available will be increased in the 5-year period by a quantity corresponding to about 80 MW electric, which potentially corresponds to electric-power production of 600 million kWh per year--this taking into account both the new finds and the reduction of the current availabilities.

It should be kept in mind that in order to reach this target, about 50 productive shafts will have to be sunk; indeed, the average production that can be expected from the active geothermal shafts planned for in the pres-



ent exploration is on the order of only 2 MW (such "power" is quite modest by comparison with that of oil wells).

If a drilling success ratio of about 0.5 is presumed and if the necessity of drilling reinjection shafts is taken into account, it can be estimated that a total of more than 100 shafts must be sunk--that is, about 25 per year; each of the average of 10 probes for exploration and development of new fields will therefore have to sink an average of 2.5 shafts per year. This figure seems reasonable, keeping in mind that the average depths of the shafts is on the order of 1,500-2,000 m and that the exploration shafts require relatively long times because of the numerous stops necessary for measurements and sample-taking.

It is also advisable to recall that the times required for achieving results--already very long in themselves, even in the optimal case of steam-dominant fields (and without considering the delays owing to the above-mentioned legislative deficiencies in this area)--can prove considerably longer because of the considerable differences in the characteristics of the water-dominant fields, on which the major part of the development of the geothermal source in Italy for the future is based. This strong differentiation in the geological nature and the physical state of the reservoirs and in the composition of the fluids poses for each field, and often for few MW, particular problems of exploitation that require long experimentation (Figures 8 and 9 [not reproduced]) and considerable commitments in study and design.

This "custom engineering," together with the "modest power" of a geothermal shaft, represent the substantial limitations to rapid increase of the availability of geothermal fluids.

### 3.2. Activity for Exploitation of the Levels below 3,000 Meters

In 1978, the first exploration of the levels below 3,000 m was started in the Larderello zone; it involves the "Sasso 22" shaft, which is to reach a depth of 5,000 m (Figure 10 [not reproduced]).

In addition to expanding knowledge of geothermal phenomena considerably, this experiment could make it possible, if geothermal fluid is found at depths greater than 3,000 m (which is the maximum depth reached by geothermal shafts in Italy or anywhere else in the world), to increase production of electrical energy in the Larderello area, perhaps substantially.

If geothermal fluids are not found, the "Sasso 22" probe will make possible, in future years, studies and experimentation for the eventual extraction of heat from dry rocks.

As is known, the cost of shafts increases with depth far more than in proportion to depth; in particular, when work is done at temperatures over 300° C, it may be presumed that the cost of a 4,500-meter shaft will be about 8 times that of a 1,500-meter shaft.

Exploitation of the deep geothermal fields will therefore prove economically feasible only if the enthalpic level of the fluids found is high enough to ensure that every shaft has an average productivity much higher than that of the present more superficial shafts. In addition, the nature of the shearings of the rock system that houses the hydrothermal system will have to be such as to ensure a good success ratio in the mining of the field.

In any case, the project in the Larderello area is favored by the fact that the thermal energy found could be partly converted into electrical energy in the present power plants, the utilization of which has been reduced because of the natural reduction of the production potential of the present thermal springs.

It is planned for exploration to continue with further shafts, but the entire program is conditioned by the results in acquisition of data from the first shaft that will make it possible to confirm or correct the assumptions on which the present objective is based.

Other deep explorations are planned in the area of Travale and Amiata, and there is therefore a commitment to make a new 5,000-meter probe.

One understands why, in the present state of exploration, it is not possible to make a serious prediction of the fluids to be found in the deep strata for the 5-year period 1979-1983.

On the supposition that two of the five shafts that could be drilled in the 5-year period prove productive of a quantity of fluid corresponding to 10 MW electric, one could conclude that a total of 20 MW would be obtained; but this would not substantially modify the forecast made in the preceding section.

### 3.3. Activities Directed toward Preliminary Exploration and Technological Innovation in the Geothermal Sector

To get a picture of the development of discovery of geothermal sources beyond the present 5-year period, it is useful to review the activities being carried out in parallel with those aimed strictly at finding fluids for production and capable of contributing to the development of geothermy.

In particular, the Purpose-Directed Energy Project is completing a geochemical analysis of the national territory, in addition to other exploratory activities of considerable interest.

The geothermal bill, introduced in the Senate at the tail end of the last legislative session, provides for further sizable state support for carrying out such a program of general exploration. A large-scale research program, concentrating on the interests of the three institutions, is scheduled for the purpose of perfecting the means for geothermal prospecting. Progress in this sector should, in the last analysis, make it possible to improve the success ratio of the drillings and thus to follow up on the results faster.

Considerable advantages in utilization of the resources should result from the studies in progress, which include collaboration with the U.S. technicians within the framework of the ENEL-DOE and AGIP-Chevron agreements, on the physics and engineering of the reservoirs. These studies should in fact make possible both better estimations of the reserves--and, therefore, more suitable utilization projects--and better use of the reserves themselves once the plants are built. In particular, they should make it possible to tackle confidently the problem of recharging the geothermal fields, with definite improvement of the possibilities for recovery of the thermal energy contained in the hydrothermal systems.

The studies and experimentations scheduled for stimulation of barren shafts by means of shearing are also aimed at improving these recovery possibilities; it has been suggested that with this system, considerable reserves of thermal energy that cannot be utilized today could be recovered in the Larderello area itself. The Purpose-Directed Energy Project also plans to work actively in this sector.

We have already had occasion to mention the fact that the development of geothermy is linked mainly to development of the water-dominant fields, and the utilization of these fields presumes the acquisition of new technologies for extraction and treatment of the fluids from the water-dominant fields.

A series of research and demonstration activities in this sector is programmed for the 5-year period, as has already been mentioned in connection with the Alfina and Cesano fields.

But exploitation of the water-dominant fields also presumes extraction and reinjection of large quantities of fluid into the subsoil, involving a large quantitative effect on the ambient subsoil. It is therefore indispensable for every doubt about the feasibility of these operations without damage to the environment to be removed as quickly as possible and for the necessary control systems to be validly established and put into effect surely and rapidly. In our opinion, this subject, on which all the technical organs involved in geothermy are working intensely today, should constitute one of the principal objectives of the CNR, which can count on coordinated action by the IRSA, the IIRG [expansions unknown], and the Purpose-Directed Energy Project.

Another important field of studies in progress--studies that can make it possible to reach the objectives faster--is the perfecting of the methods for conversion of the lower-temperature fluids, especially those between 130° and 150° C, into electrical energy.

All the above has to do mainly with the sector of the more easily accessible hydrothermal systems. We have already mentioned (see section 3.2) the activity in progress in drilling deeper than 3,000 m, which should make it possible, at the end of the 5-year period, to improve the technologies and knowledge in the deep-drilling sector; and we have also referred (see sec-




Figure 11. Outlooks for availability of geothermal sources for electric-power uses to 1993

[Key]:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Outlooks for Availability of Geothermal Sources for Electric-Power Uses to 1993 | 4. Reserves estimated by ENEL-DOE standard on assumption of utilization in 50 years |
| 2. Availability of fluid (MW)  | 5. Industrial estimate of maximum power extractable                                 |
| 3. Present availability  |   |

tion 2.1) to the activities connected with exploitation of dry hot rocks. Finally, we wish to mention that the magmatic-chambers sector is also being studied, in connection with exploration of the Vesuvius area (Ottaviano area).

#### 4. The Outlooks for Availability of Geothermal Sources for Electric-Power Uses in 1993

A prediction of the discovery of geothermal sources for electric-power uses in the decade following 1983 can only be inferred from the prediction for the 5-year period preceding, with examination of the factors that might work in favor of an improvement in the findings achievable annually. In our opinion, such factors are the following:

(1) the considerable effort in exploration of new areas in the 5-year period 1979-1983 should permit a larger quantity of development operations in the succeeding decade; even with the same number of probes, the success ratio should grow in many areas;

(2) for the same reasons as above, it will probably be possible to expand probe activity aimed at geothermy for electric-power uses;

(3) the research and experimentation in progress for development of new techniques, carried out on a considerably larger scale than for the average in this 5-year period, by the CNR as well as by AGIP and ENEL, should make it possible to solve the many problems that still impede development of the water-dominant systems and in any case to furnish new approaches for accelerating geothermal exploration and development of the fields;

(4) the new geothermal legislation should make it easier to obtain authorizations for the mining operations, and in particular for reinjection of fluids, which today is impeded by the inadequacy of the legislation;

(5) the new organizational arrangement which ENEL intends to make for itself in the geothermal sector by gathering all the available competencies together into a single geothermal center for research, exploration, development and the building of systems for utilization of geothermal energy should permit a marked increase in productivity;

(6) the constantly expanding presence of AGIP in the geothermal sector in this 5-year period will make it possible to take advantage, in this sector, of the very vast competence acquired in hydrocarbons research, with an increasingly large contribution to development of the geothermal source.

On the basis of these considerations, we expect that the average annual findings of geothermal sources for electric-power uses (from hydrothermal systems down to 3,000 m) will increase in the years following the coming 5-year period, reaching in 1993 an average availability of 700 MW of electric power potential, corresponding to about 5 billion kWh per year (Figure 11). This evolution is indicated in the figure with an uncertainty range that reaches  $\pm 100$  MW in 1993.

This availability may prove larger, in a way that cannot be estimated yet today, because of tapping from hydrothermal systems at depths lower than 3,000 m, for which the exploration and research effort planned for the 5-year period 1979-1983 is important.

For the time being, though, a contribution from dry hot rock systems is not foreseeable.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Paris, L. "Geothermal Energy and Other Integrative Sources: the ENEL effort," Proceedings of the National Conference organized by the Toscana-Lazio-Campania Regions, Chianciano, 14-15-16 April 1977.
2. Muffler, P., and Cataldi, R. "Methods for Regional Assessment of Geothermal Resources," Proceedings of the ENEL-ERDA Workshop, Larderello, 12-16 September 1977.



3. Cataldi, R., Lazzarotto, A., Muffler, P., Squarci, P., and Stefani, G.  
"Assessment of Geothermal Potential of Central and Southern Tuscany,"  
Proceedings of the ENEL-ERDA Workshop, Larderello, 12-16 September 1977.
4. AGIP "Temperature Sotterranee" [Subterranean Temperatures], Milan,  
1977.

11267

CSO: 3104

## CDA CALLS FOR RENEWED UNITY ON NUCLEAR ISSUE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 16 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] The Hague, 16 Jan--The party leaders of the CDS [Christian Democratic Appeal], KVP [Catholic People's Party], ARP [Anti-Revolutionary Party] and the CHU [Christian Historical Union] have called on Professor Goudzwaard, Mr Aantjes and Mrs Laning-Boersma to resume their duties in the program committee of the CDA.

In a declaration published yesterday, Messrs Steenkamp (CDA), Van Zeil (KVP), De Boer (ARP) and Van Leeuwen (CHU), urged the trio to "stay with us in the first ranks and work for a recognizable CDA." Van Zeil and De Boer are members of the CDA faction in the Second Chamber.

Besides the three AR members of the program committee, the call is also directed to "all who are unhappy" with the outcome of the atomic weapons debate in the CDA. Only yesterday a letter came from worried CDA members, blaming the CDA for paying too little attention to principles and too much to the power and leadership of Van Agt.

The party heads make their appeal to Goudzwaard, etc, a few days before the AR leadership will determine on Friday, how the party is to continue further. The three ARP members of the program committee have suspended their activities out of discontent about the behavior of the CDA faction in the Second Chamber and the CDA leaders at the recent NATO decision to modernize atomic weapons. In this connection, Professor Goudzwaard has already threatened to turn his back on the CDA.

The party heads write that they regret "the unclear conclusion of the chamber debate by both government factions, because of interpretations that exclude each other." They criticize the cabinet because of "the already signaled narrowing down of the debate to a cabinet question (last 19 December). Faction leader Lubbers expressed similar criticism recently. The leaders stress the fact that a judgment about the stationing of middle-range atomic weapons on Dutch soil by the end of 1981, should by all means be freely made in the parliament. There should be all means be freely made in the parliament. There should be no doubt that the CDA considers the forcing back of the role of atomic weapons a central program issue.

#### Work Paper

Further discussion is needed within the CDA about the way this forcing back can best be accomplished, also on the basis of a work paper that the scientific institutes of the CDA will have prepared at request of the leadership.

9314

CSO: 3105

## DUTCH OFFERING MEXICO FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, KNOW-HOW

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 16 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Mexico City, 16 Jan (ANP)--The visit to Mexico by Minister Van de Klaauw and State Secretary Beyen of Economic Affairs has been a good step toward later negotiations about Dutch participation in the development process of Mexico, in the opinion of both statesmen.

After discussions with President Jose Lopez Portillo, his colleague Jorge Castenada, Industrial Development Minister Jose Andres De Oteyza, Programming and Budget Minister, Miguel de la Madrid, and also at the Ministry of Communications and Transport and the Trade Ministry, Minister Van der Klaauw spoke of "an excellent visit." State Secretary Beyen mentioned "good prospects" for Dutch trade and industry.

The Mexicans exhibited great interest in harbor works and dredging, the chemical industry and modernization of agriculture, areas in which the Netherlands enjoys international renown.

A mission representing 50 Dutch businesses will arrive in Mexico tonight. This mission also contains representatives of Shell, who will have discussions with Jorge Diaz Serrano, director of the Mexican state oil company, PEMEX. According to the state secretary, "it is absolutely not the intention that members of the mission talk about contracts for the sale of Mexican oil to the Netherlands." But they will discuss the sale of installations and expertise for oil drilling at the ocean floor. "The Mexicans still have very many large orders to place, it is to be hoped with us," Beyen said.

Last year, PEMEX received almost 20 percent of the total budget, to be exact 216.2 billion pesos (about 16 billion guilders) for the purchase of capital goods. CFE, the Federal Electricity Commission received nearly 8 percent of the budget or 88.6 billion pesos. Many of the installations PEMEX and CFE need to purchase in the coming years will have to come from abroad.

Contacts have already been made for Dutch participation in the construction and expansion of ports on the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean in the areas of Dos Bocas, Tampico, Coatzacoalcas, Lazaro Cardenas and Salina Cruz

according to Minister Van der Klaauw. It will probably be decided in April whether Philips will receive a contract for the modernization of the Mexico City telephone system, a project running into millions.

On the one hand, Mexico is striving to loosen its very close ties with the United States, on the other hand, the Netherlands, 80 percent of whose export is directed toward Europe (70 percent goes to other EC countries), is trying to spread out the remainder of its exports. The minister said he has not heard "a single complaint" about Dutch businesses active in Mexico.

State Secretary Geyen, who is to stay in Mexico a few weeks longer, said he has the impression that Mexico is gradually beginning to break loose from its long isolation. Minister Oteyza, a kind of "super minister" of economic and financial affairs, did like the idea of sending a mission to the Netherlands to explore the possibilities of involving Dutch businesses, transfer of expertise and the sale of materials. In any case, a team of Dutch experts in the field of agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural products, will leave for Mexico shortly.

9314

CSO: 3105



## DUTCH OFFERING TURKEY ECONOMIC HELP

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 16 Jan 80 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] The Hague, 16 Jan (ANP)--Turkey has received a loan of 40 million guilders from the Netherlands within the framework of the economic aid action to Turkey by the countries of the (Western) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The total aid action amounts to about 2 billion guilders. The loan is given via the Dutch Investment Bank for Developing Countries (NIO).

The loan is to be used for the purchase of goods and services of Dutch origin that are urgently needed to restore the Turkish economy which is in very bad shape. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this loan has a quite different character from 13 earlier loans made to Turkey in the cadre of development cooperation. This time it is economic emergency aid. From 1963 through 1976 the Netherlands has given 13 loans totaling 85.5 million guilders.

The new loan has an interest rate of 6.5 percent and a duration of 12 years. No payments are due within the first 5 years. The previous loans have interest rates of 2.5 to 6.75 percent and durations of 25 to 30 years.

9314

CSO: 3105

## CABINET CONSIDERS RAISING NATURAL GAS PRICE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 26 Jan 80 p 1

[Report: "Possible Increase of Natural Gas Price"]

[Text] The Hague, 26 January--The cabinet is considering increasing the price of natural gas on the domestic market so as to render a unilateral intervention in the export contracts acceptable to foreign consumers.

At the conclusion of the weekly cabinet meeting Prime Minister Van Agt announced that the cabinet had deliberated extensively about an increase in the export prices of natural gas. On the basis of the Natural Gas Price Law the Netherlands has the power to fix a minimum price for this export unilaterally. "There are, however, many juridicial and political complications involved," said Van Agt.

One of the complications is that an increase in the export price would be difficult for foreign customers to digest unless the Netherlands should increase its domestic prices. "A decision in regard to this last-mentioned matter has not yet been taken; additional factors are involved here, factors such as the effect on purchasing power" said Van Agt.

The cabinet is still investigating whether the Natural Gas Price Law is compatible with European law. An increase in the domestic rate might refute the EEC reproach that the Netherlands is showing special favor to its own industry.

Another problem is that some contracts contain a renegotiation clause in case the Netherlands wants to increase the price. A unilateral fixing of a new (higher) minimum price might entail political difficulties with the involved countries, Van Agt indicated.

He called attention to the contract with Italy, in which then Minister of Economic Affairs Lubbers managed to include a renegotiation clause. Until 1975 there was in effect a very low export price for Italy, promoted by Minister Luns in particular; he was afraid that Italy would turn too much to the Soviet Union for its energy requirements.

Van Agt said that talks about an increase in the export price were recently begun with Italy, West Germany, France and Belgium. Minister Van Aardenne has visited the capitals of these four countries "to make clear how reasonable a price increase is."

In the course of this week's Chamber debate about the wage pause, various political parties insisted on an increase in the export price of natural gas so as to somewhat counteract the 7 billion guilder blow to the economy of the Netherlands as a result of the increased import prices of crude oil.

5742

CSO: 3105

## LABOR UNIONS TURN DOWN GOVERNMENT WAGE OFFER

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 8 Jan 80 p 1, 2

[Text] The Hague, 8 Jan--The wage pause, proposed by Minister Albeda (Social Affairs) does not at all appeal to the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] and the CNV [National Federation of Christian Workers in the Netherlands]. The FNV views a breathing pause in the CAO [Collective Labor Agreement] negotiations as a 'fatal road.' Tomorrow, on the eve of the discussion with the social partners, the government will deliberate about the situation that has arisen. So far, the government is quite divided about possible wage intervention. Minister Albeda is especially opposed to it.

S.J. Van Eijkelenburg, president of the Dutch Christian Employers Union also renounced a possible wage measure this morning. "That is the responsibility of the authorities and not ours." Apart from that, Van Eijkelenburg finds it quite irresponsible to call the new information from the Central Planning Bureau about the economic situation "computer language," as FNV President Kok has done. He thinks it quite possible to have sensible discussions about the figures, now that it is certain that the starting point has completely changed. "If a voluntary wage pause would help to make negotiations with the branches of industry go more smoothly, then I would feel positive about it," said van Eijkelenburg. "But first and foremost we want to contract freely with the labor movement."

Last night, FNV President Wim Kok also said that the government should take responsibility for a wage measure if they deemed such a measure necessary.

In his opinion, the government has been overly hasty in bringing a wage measure on the scene, since negotiations between employers and employees have yet to start. According to Kok, the government has killed negotiations between the social partners by putting a knife at their throat with the threat of an imposed wage pause.

Van der Meulen, president of the CNV, yesterday expressed the fear that after half a year of wage pause you will get wage catch-up maneuvers while

nothing has been done about the frictions in the labor market. Because in the CAO negotiations there are also other important issues at stake besides wages, such as labor market policy and the fight against unemployment. The CAO negotiations should not be stopped by a wage pause, says Van der Meulen.

At the request of the Labor Party, tomorrow the chamber committees of finance, social and economic affairs will meet to discuss the latest predictions of the Central Planning Bureau. The DCA and the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] have made it known, however, that they will not discuss this before the Labor Foundation deliberations on next Thursday.

During the discussion of 10 January, the FNV wants to find out more about the policy that the government is going to set. According to Kok, Minister Albada is very vague about this in his letter. It is of the greatest importance for the FNV to get an insight on the policy vision of the cabinet. The Federation Council has no plans to revise the starting points for the labor terms policy for 1980. Kok said that he could see no reason to change a policy that had been set up together with the unions and the members. This cannot be the stake in the discussion with employers and cabinet.

He said that an extra wage demand of 2 percent above the price compensation is needed to preserve the buying power to at least the modal income level. From the new figures of the Central Planning Bureau it appears that the buying power diminishes in case of a .5 percent wage increase above the price compensation, if incidental improvements are not considered. Therefore, preserving buying power remains a most important point of departure for the FNV policy.

The CNV also sticks to its original demands, complete price compensation and a wage increase of one percent, especially since this labor union has always taken a moderate position. According to President Van der Meulen, the CNV is willing to accept the fact that hereby buying power, in view of the new prognosis, will not be preserved for the modal worker but will probably diminish by one percent.

Wim Kok feels that further limitation of consumer spending brings with it the danger of yet a deeper economic decline. He points out that the increase in private consumption as a result of the oil price increase threatens to fall back to zero. Besides a cost problem there is also a sales problem in his opinion. He also fears that further cuts in collective expenditures will be at the cost of housing and the energy savings policy.

The effect of the higher oil prices cannot be denied, Kok said. If the price compensation would be cleared of that effect, it would have very uneven results, because especially the lowest incomes would be affected.



Kok wonders what the authorities are doing about the distribution of the burden over the different income groups. He feels that the tax policy should be reconsidered because now there are extra reasons to ask more sacrifices from the higher incomes.

The FNV president admits that the labor movement will have to reassess its aim if it turns out that the growth of national income falls back to a level not much above zero. The government would be wise, he said, to leave employers and employees the freedom to negotiate. He is willing to make arrangements with employers that make it possible to adjust the current CAO's to the changed circumstances. The CNV states that a breathing pause will offer no solution. The labor unions would be tied hand and foot while other (action) groups and individual entrepreneurs would enjoy free play. Without a doubt things will go wrong in those industries where it now rumbles, the union expects.

They see more profit in continuation of CAO negotiations by the business branches, thereby taking the new economic situation into consideration and the poor expectations based thereon. The CNV is more than willing to consult with the minister but this should not interfere with the negotiations of the industry branches. A wage pause means, in fact, that the government no longer has faith in the social partners, claims the CNV.

Union leader Terpstra says: "A wage pause actually is an educational leave of absence for organized labor."

9314

CSO: 3105

## DEN UYL COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT, LABOR UNIONS WAGE IMPASSE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 17 Jan 80 p 15

[Interview with Opposition Leader Joop Den Uyl by Jose Toirkens and A.F. Van Zweeden, date and place not given]

[Text] The Hague, 17 Jan--"National impoverishment, as the cabinet has called it, is out of the question. Such impoverishment will only happen if we have a weak and wrong policy. The cabinet is actually saying that it goes scot-free by only referring to the misfortune of the oil price increase and the decrease in world trade. But I must point out their passive attitude and their responsibility in failing to do something about it," said opposition leader Joop Den Uyl during a discussion about the wage pause and further policy changes that the cabinet has announced.

According to Den Uyl, the first answer must be the conservation of oil, not by 5 but by 10 percent. That is a saving of 4 million barrels and comes to 1.5 to 2 billion guilders. That is the way to face the oil price rise and its inflationary consequences.

There is not a trace of that kind of policy in the cabinet. The Second Chamber received a letter from Albeda on 4 January with only one theme, namely, wages. I do not deny the importance of wages but how can you expect to get industry support for that?

"On 10 December the cabinet spoke mournfully about the accord almost reached and on 4 January it made an about-face with a totally different outlook. Next it confronted the organizations with outside reasons and missed the opportunity to adapt to those reasons."

[Question] But didn't you take wage measures yourself in 1973 and 1976 under similar circumstances?

[Answer] The situation in 1973--whereby, for that matter, before 1 January the Enabling Act was used--was quite different. Then we had to do with an import price increase of 36 percent. Through the quadrupling of oil prices a disrupted situation developed. That cannot be compared to the 13-percent

price rise predicted by the Central Planning Bureau. The Enabling Act was meant to be used for 1 year in order to arrive at separate statutory measures. The strongest criticism then came from Andriessen.

In December of 1976 there was a large measure of agreement about the size of the wage increase but not about its form: cents or percents. At that time the cabinet consciously chose a measure that had a leveling effect.

The wage action of 1976 also contained a number of rules that belonged to it, like the rent increase delay. That is also prescribed by law.

[Question] Did the Van Agt Cabinet not announce accompanying measures?

[Answer] No, the cabinet blundered with that wage pause. It acted in defiance of Article 10 of the Wage Law which says that wage intervention can only be allowed in relationship with other actions. I think that if the labor movement were to appeal against it, the issue would not be settled easily.

[Question] Do you find the government decisions justified by the new figures about the economic development?

[Answer] I think that you have to go far back into the history of this country to find a similar haphazard policy. At the general review, the cabinet still saw results of the "Specifications '81," it showed a low inflation rate and expansion of the labor market. In October, we knew already that the oil price increases were to continue. Since that time the situation has not actually changed. It still remains to be seen whether oil prices will indeed rise 25 to 30 percent. Because of recession in the United States and slowed growth, oil prices may turn out to be lower. That is what happened in 1978. I am for income limitation. But in that case an eye should be kept on expenditures in connection with work opportunity. At the same time, programs should be developed to conserve energy and to redistribute labor and jobs.

But what do we hear from the cabinet? On 10 December, we got a letter full of lament because the central accord did not succeed. On 19 December, Andriessen sent a letter full of worry about the figures of the Central Planning Bureau. On 4 January, we got a letter from Albeda, painting in harsh colors, maybe not the end of the world, but indeed the end of the Dutch economy. Next we got a wage measure. In 3 weeks time, a new estimate by the Central Planning Bureau was thrown in and the cabinet made an about-face.

Figures

[Question] How much value do you attach to the new figures?

[Answer] I ask myself that question too. Van Agt translates the figures of the planning bureau into a national impoverishment of 7 billion. I find that hardly decent and also demagogical. It is impossible because how did that difference in the estimate develop between September and now?

The CPB noticed turnover problems in export, a decline in consumptive growth and a lower level of investment in housing. Together that leads to a reduction of economic growth. But whether these estimated developments will become reality depends on the administration.

Besides economizing on the use of oil you could make more room by speeding the increase in the price of natural gas for abroad. I find it wrong that the CPB has not considered that. We will have to negotiate again soon with the oil companies participating in Dutch gas extraction about limiting their share of the profit.

[Question] Minister Albada wrote to the Second Chamber that there is "actually" no room for a price compensation in 1980.

[Answer] Look, the minister is saying, actually there is no room for it but it will probably happen anyway. I find that simple and absurd. I am not going to say exactly what is to be done about wages and incomes. But I do point out that when you let the buying power guarantee go to a modal level, consumption will collapse further with all the consequences thereof. When Van Agt spoke of a wage decrease all along the line, he had not given the matter due consideration. Why did not the cabinet ask for emergency advice from the SER [Social Economic Council] at the end of December?

[Question] The cabinet gives as the reason for extra retrenchments the need not to let the financial deficit increase too much.

[Answer] You should not take that deficit lightly because of the danger of inflation but you should also pay attention to a possible undercapacity of the production apparatus. In that connection something will have to be done about the high interest level. That is extremely crippling to small-, and medium-size business. The PvdA [Labor Party] will propose special credit measures for this group, such as they have in France, or the Nederlandse Bank will have to bring the interest rate down.

#### Escape Routes

[Question] What do you think of the extra retrenchments of at least 3 billion that the cabinet has announced?

[Answer] I venture the prediction that this cabinet will not make those changes come true. It will again find all kinds of escape routes. I do not see this cabinet stopping all kinds of big projects. And, of course, that would be totally irresponsible. Also in retrenchments by the government, the first priority should be to keep expenditures up in order to avoid undercapacity and capital destruction

The experience of 1958 taught us that spending limitation only makes the ailment worse. We really can accomplish a production growth of 1 or 2 percent. I take a dim view of economic development under the policy of this cabinet.

[Question] Albeda announced further wage measures if no central accord is accomplished. Aren't you afraid that that will leave the labor movement out?

[Answer] I do find that the government should be able to legally regulate certain elements of wage formation, but I am not prepared to support such a policy in a situation where the government makes the labor movement, employers and people on social welfare carry the burden of their poor policy. I cannot imagine that the CDA and VVD will support measures that silence the voice of labor. I do not want to exclude a central accord beforehand, but I think that chances have not been improved by the wage pause because the worst possible conditions have been created for that.

9314

CSO: 3105



## CUNHAL ATTACKS GOVERNMENT, CALLS PROGRAM 'MASKED COUP'

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 24 Jan 80 p 5

[Speech given in the Assembly of the Republic by the secretary general of the Portuguese Communist Party, Alvaro Cunhal; date not specified]

[Text] When the Portuguese Communist Party [PCP] ended the debate on the government's program held in the Assembly of the Republic, the PCP secretary general, Comrade Alvaro Cunhal, delivered an address which we are publishing in its entirety, wherein he disclosed the intentions of the weak right wing majority that is governing the country at present: to destroy the democratic regime and its conquests, to restore the economic and political power of the big capitalists and landholders, and to establish a new political system progressing more or less rapidly toward a dictatorship:

The debate on the government's program has concluded.

Many Portuguese who heard on the radio or who followed in newspaper reports the plethora of statements in this lengthy debate may not have obtained a sufficiently clearcut notion of the scope of the policy that this government proposes to carry out.

The anticommunist hysteria among the legislative factions backing the government, and the insults with which we communists have been quite familiar since fascist times, and which we heard from the accusers in the special courts and from the Salazarist bureaucrats, but which we did not expect to hear again in the Parliament of democratic Portugal, are not a response to the nation's problems, nor a justification for the policy of a government.

At best, they are a revelation of the essential ideas and intentions which the narrow, weak and circumstantial majority in this Assembly is still temporarily trying to conceal by calling itself a Democratic Alliance [AD].

## A Masked Coup

From the government's program and the statements that have been made, the plan of the government and of the incidental majority in this Assembly has

become abundantly clear: to destroy the democratic regime and its great transformations and conquests, to restore the economic and political power of the big capitalists (allied with the imperialists) and of the large landholders, and to establish a new political system progressing more or less rapidly toward a dictatorship.

What AD is attempting to set in motion is a masked coup against democracy which, in a more or less rapid process, will lead to the destruction of the Portugal of April.

Regardless of how displeasing it may be to the forces of the past, the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land. It is in force. Compliance with it is compulsory, not only for the citizens, but also for the organs of sovereignty, which naturally include the Assembly of the Republic and the government.

And it does not suffice to uphold the Constitution with words; it must necessarily be upheld with deeds.

It has been stressed here on occasion that the government would confine itself to the framework of the Constitution, and that it would abide by constitutional law. But, from start to finish, the entire policy established in general, the measures indicated, the legislation announced and the system for constitutional revision sought are in direct violation of the constitutional principles.

#### The Unconstitutionality of the 'New Economic Model' Opposing the Workers

The government's intended attempt to "run," not the Portuguese economy with its current structure established in the Constitution, but rather (as the prime minister has said) "a new economic model," is unconstitutional.

For example, the government has announced its intention of making the constitutional revision in advance, through its action; something which obviously violates democratic legality and the so oft invoked "state of law."

The guideline for the government's program is the policy for actual restoration of the power of the big capitalists and landholders.

The government is seeking to restore the dynamics of capitalist accumulation, centralization and concentration, at the cost of worsening the exploitation and living conditions of the workers.

Despite its demagogic tirades, the government's program heralds a rapid worsening of the living conditions of the workers, of women and youth, of the most underprivileged classes, of those who are retired or disabled, and of the population as a whole.

This will result from the greater decontrol of prices; the rise in the constant prices of the market basket necessarily stemming from the reduction in the revenue of the Supply Fund; the camouflaged but real curbing of wages, specifically those for public enterprises; the intensified exploitation of the workers by means of appeals for greater productivity; the lack of real measures for combating unemployment; and the inability to really battle inflation; since the factors which have contributed most to it in our country (high interest rates, devaluation of the escudo, price hikes on the foreign markets and increased profits) still remain.

It will not be the workers alone who will pay a high price for such a policy.

The revision of the law on rural leasing is aimed at putting the tenants at the mercy of extortion by the rich landlords again. The new law on uncultivated land, just as in the time of the dictatorship, is aimed at taking the uncultivated land from the people and turning it over to the rich local reactionary bosses.

The policy of capitalist accumulation, centralization and concentration, which membership in the Common Market will intensify further, will lead thousands of small and medium-sized business firms into bankruptcy and failure.

The government's announced intention of running "a new economic model" has placed it overtly in confrontation with the socioeconomic realities that are expressly stated in the Constitution, and exposes the unconstitutional nature not only of the overall policy, but of the sectorial policies as well.

#### The Unconstitutionality of the Policy Against Nationalization

The policy regarding nationalization is unconstitutional.

The Constitution is specific: by virtue of Article 83, "all the nationalizations made after 25 April are irreversible."

The government's program and the comments made by its ministers and deputies attest to the fact that the government intends to blatantly violate this ruling, though it is compulsory.

The government overtly proposes to strangle the public enterprises financially through a reduction or elimination of subsidies, and restrictions on internal financing dictated by the needs of private financing.

The government intends to open up nationalized sectors, including the banks and insurance entities, to private capital.

The government's program reaches scandalous heights when it announces "the mobilization of indemnification rights through exchange with participation by the state or the public enterprise sector, specifically in the firms which were indirectly nationalized."

Thus, the government has dispassionately announced its intention of failing to abide by the Constitution in this respect as well; since, according to the fundamental law that is in force, insofar as the firms indirectly nationalized are concerned, only those which simultaneously meet three conditions may be integrated into the private sector, "by way of exception": They must be small or medium-sized firms; they must be outside of the basic sectors of the economy; and the workers must not have opted for the self-management or cooperative system.

We uphold nationalization, and we shall continue to uphold it, as an integral part of the democratic regime, and a requisite for its existence and development. It is we communists who, by upholding nationalization, assume a place in the institutional, constitutional and legal framework that the government intends to disregard.

#### The Unconstitutionality of the Policy Against Agrarian Reform

The policy relating to agrarian reform, something which constitutes an historic necessity and one of the most beautiful conquests made by the Portuguese revolution, is unconstitutional.

The government parties do not like to hear the Portuguese revolution mentioned, because they have always acted against it. But, whether they like it or not, it took place as a result of the struggle and endeavor of our people and the Armed Forces. Thanks to the April revolution, the fascist government was overthrown, the liberties were won and major democratic transformations were made in the socioeconomic structures. They include agrarian reform.

Over a vast area of the country, agrarian reform has put an end, albeit partially, to the large estates, and to the related situation whereby there are, on the one hand, huge expanses of abandoned land owned by a few hundred families consisting of absentee large estate-holders; and, on the other, masses of workers who are unemployed for much of the year, and doomed to miserable poverty.

Agrarian reform made a drastic change in the lives of the workers, their families and their children. And, despite the fact that they underwent enormous, brutal attacks, and despite the illegalities and violence of the governments, the agrarian reform workers have made a noteworthy contribution to the national economy, and to the development of agriculture and livestock raising.

The government has announced its intention of carrying out to any even greater extent the unconstitutional, illegal offensive against agrarian reform.

Since Law 77/77 did not go so far as to make a complete restoration of the large estates, it is intended to make a new law. It stipulates as a fundamental guideline for organizing the land "the formation of family farms;" something which, intended to be implemented in Alentejo and much of Ribatejo, reveals not only the intention of enacting measures of destabilization and violence, but also deepseated ignorance of the agrarian structures, and of the features of agriculture and livestock raising in the area, as well as a complete disregard for the desires and determination of the workers and the population concerned.

We give a reminder that the communist deputies who have been elected by the agrarian reform groups are here with the vote of the absolute majority, not only of the workers, but also of the population of the area.

Agrarian reform, an integral and inalienable part of the democratic regime, is the cause of the majority of the people, who will manage to struggle on its behalf.

We communist deputies here in the Assembly of the Republic and on this platform confirm the fact that we shall remain faithful to the commitment that we made to the voters, that we would, now and in the future, staunchly defend agrarian reform. We shall struggle on its behalf until it has been completely implemented.

With its intention of triggering a new offensive against agrarian reform, it is the government which is embarking on the path of illegality and subversion. And, by defending agrarian reform, it is we communists we are taking a place in the institutional, constitutional and legal framework.

#### The Unconstitutionality of the New Foreign Policy

With respect to foreign policy as well, the address by the minister of foreign affairs is not in keeping with the constitutional principles pertaining to the international relations of the Portuguese democratic state.

It is not by serving as a sparring partner for the most aggressive imperialist circles that Portugal will achieve dignity and be able to solve its problems. It is not by making the crudest sort of anti-Sovietism the focal point of Portugal's foreign policy that the interests of the nation and national independence will be insured.

Portugal is not interested in being a spokesman for the cold war, which would doom it to a progressive isolation, but rather in maintaining and developing relations of friendship and cooperation with all nations, regardless of their social system, on the basis of equality, respect for mutual interests and non-interference in internal affairs.



Instead of making crude, irate anti-Soviet tirades, it would have been better if the minister had sought accurate information regarding the imperialist interference and armed intervention against the democratic regime in Afghanistan; interference and armed intervention in which the imperialists, and the North American imperialists in particular, customarily engage.

Regardless of how much it may hurt the imperialists, the Afghan people will manage to defend their revolution, which put an end to a feudal monarchy and placed Afghanistan on the path to a new life marked by liberty, independence and social progress.

Also in the realm of foreign policy, the government claims that Portugal's entry into the Common Market as rapidly as possible is "the priority of priorities in Portuguese foreign policy."

The government and the forces which back it now admit what the PCP has always asserted and what they always contested: that integration into the Common Market was not so much a decision dictated by economic reasons as it was a major political operation aimed at destroying the April conquests.

What the government is seeking is not national economic development, but the "structural changes" which will restore monopolies and large estates, and which will lead Portugal back to monopolistic state capitalism.

It is also not only a policy which could entail extremely serious harm to the national economy, cause bankruptcy and failure to thousands of small and medium-sized businesses and actually subject the country to foreign imperialism, but a policy that is aimed at making a de facto, illegal revision of the Constitution before its official revision.

### Threats to Liberties

With what instruments does the government propose to carry out such a policy?

The government is well aware that the policy that it has announced is both a direct confrontation and an affront to the new democratic reality that was created on 25 April, and will also be opposed to the opinions, desires and determination of the workers and the Portuguese people who, using the liberties and rights that the Constitution has conferred upon them, will resist such a policy, in the context of the regime which the government wants to destroy, but which is the regime under which we are all living.

It is because it knows this, because it knows that the policy that it has announced cannot be fully implemented in the existing democratic context, that the government intends to restrict the liberties and rights of the citizens.

What is the significance and what is the purpose of special police and special courts? What is being sought with a law relating to the political parties? Could its main purpose be only to make the rendering of annual accounts compulsory? This would even be a good thing because, from all appearances, the PCP is the only one which has its accounts up to date, and the only one which pays social security, unlike the situation in the government parties.

But it is certainly not only this. And we cannot fail to recall that the present prime minister, when he was a member of the First Provisional Government, also submitted a bill on the political parties, a bill worthy of the processes used by the regrettable McCarthyism of the past.

And what is the purpose of the "normalization" of the justice system? And what is sought with the creation of an exclusive council in the Superior Council of Magistracy? What is the purpose of an intelligence service?

In the text of the program, in the language used in the government's statements and, even more clearly, in the speeches filled with intolerance made by the rival spokesmen for the government parties, there is a penetration of the government's intention of resorting systematically to authoritarian and repressive methods.

It is not a path of democracy and of the "state of law." It is a path leading to the destruction of the liberties and of democracy.

### Three Major Subversive Operations

The real danger is not only that of a right wing policy within the framework of the democratic regime. The real danger is that of a policy which is aimed at destroying the democratic regime.

Despite the fact that they have made repeated denials, the government and its majority are, in fact, seeking an institutional breakdown, in the immediate government action, in the legislative action and in the intention of making an unconstitutional revision of the Constitution.

As we have just observed, this is quite clear from many points in the program.

But it appears as an overall goal in three political operations announced by the government, which we cannot describe with a term other than subversion.

In fact, three major subversive operations against the democratic regime have been started by the government and by the parties which support it in the Assembly.

## The Plan For a New Electoral Law

The first one is the passage of a new electoral law which would violate the constitutional principles.

The prime minister claimed that the government "does not fear" elections.

However, it is because it does fear them, and because it does not trust in democracy, that the government wants to have a new electoral law passed which, in violation of the constitutional principles and the most fundamental democratic principles, could again guarantee a majority in the Assembly for the parties which currently comprise the "AD," even though it would make a considerable reduction in the number and percentage of votes among those parties.

The technical devices that can already be detected are essentially two.

First, a new division of the electoral circles.

The electoral circles would cease to be districts, and would become groups of municipalities contrived in such a way that, in violation of the constitutional principle of proportionality, the right wing parties would have their parliamentary representation reinforced.

It is true that the Assembly of the Republic has the authority to establish the electoral circles. But that establishment would be unconstitutional if the principle of proportionality were not guaranteed, owing to the smaller size of the circles.

It must be stressed that the principle of proportionality means, essentially, a proportionality in the number of deputies from each political group in relation to the number of votes received.

The principle of proportionality does not allow circles in which only one deputy is elected, as would be the case if the electoral circle of Macau, announced by the government, were to be created. The example of Macau shows the government's real intentions of subverting a fundamental principle of the electoral system that is inherent in the regime.

Another technical device would be the attribution of a larger number of deputies to the emigrants.

It comes as no surprise that the fascist lampoon O DIABO has carried a proposal by a deputy from this Assembly calling for the creation, in violation to the constitutional rulings, of seven circles abroad, for the election of a total of nine deputies, five of these circles being uninominal.

## The Plan for the Referendum

The second major subversive operation for the destruction of the democratic regime is the attempt for the unconstitutional establishment of the referendum.

The Constitution is absolutely explicit in this regard. Article 3 states: "The one, indivisible sovereignty lies in the people, who exercise it in the manner prescribed in the Constitution."

And Article 111 states: "The political power belongs to the people, and is exercised according to the terms of the Constitution."

The "referendum" is not accepted in the Constitution, and the attempt to introduce it through a common law is obviously unconstitutional, regardless of how jurists who interpret the laws to suit the convenience of their parties may try to argue, and regardless of the attempt to superimpose foreign practices on the fundamental law of the Portuguese republic.

In order to be able to change the Constitution, it is not enough to proclaim, as a standard of a democratic regime, that what is not prohibited is allowed. If such a principle were to be applied to the action of the organs of sovereignty, we would have illegality, arbitrary action and despotism.

We are quite certain that, if there were a PCP government and a communist majority in the Assembly of the Republic, the present prime minister would claim (and rightly) that such a government and assembly should confine its action to what has been allowed then by the Constitution.

From the standpoint of the organs of sovereignty, the democratic legitimacy of their actions stems from the fundamental law of the country, and not from the subjective lucubrations of this or that incidental prime minister.

## The Plan for the Unconstitutional Revision of the Constitution

The third major subversive operation for the destruction of the democratic regime is the unconstitutional revision of the Constitution.

The government intends to disregard the material limits set on the constitutional revision in Article 290, which requires any laws on constitutional revision to uphold, among other constitutional principles (I am quoting only a few), the rights, liberties and guarantees of citizens; the rights, of workers, of workers' commissions and of trade union associations; the elimination of the monopolies and large estates; the system of proportionate representation; and the autonomy of the local governments.

The government also intends to disregard the principle whereby changes in the Constitution must be approved by a two thirds majority.

All this proves that the government and its weak parliamentary majority are seeking to govern and legislate in opposition to the constitutional legality which is the supreme democratic legality in existence.

Within the strict context of the institutions and of the regime, and using the liberties and rights which the Constitution has conferred upon it, the PCP and with it, we are sure, a growing number of Portuguese men and women, will steadfastly oppose the government and its program.

#### Democracy Will Conquer

It is obvious that the government and those who support it are overestimating their own forces.

They want to make us forget that, although they have a slim majority of deputies at the moment, they do not have the majority of the Portuguese people who, as we know, voted for the democratic parties.

They want to make us forget that many of the votes which they received, especially in certain regions, were not gained as a result of the free decision of the citizens, but rather of the most variegated types of physical, economic, social, ideological and even religious coercion.

They want to make us forget that the votes which they received do not represent a stable social base of support; and hence, within a short period of time, when faced with the government's realpolitik, many of those who voted for the "AD" will realize the deception to which they succumbed.

They even want to make us forget that the claimed "stable and coherent" majority is less stable and coherent than its heralds claim; because we do the justice of believing that not all those in that majority want the policy of the present government to lead to the establishment of another dictatorship.

Reiterating the phraseology of fascist times about the "National Union" and the "ANP" [Popular National Action], the spokesmen for the government parties claim that "AD" is not comprised of the PPD [Popular Democratic Party] or CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], but the Portuguese people.

Convinced that their continuity and perpetuity in power have been insured through undemocratic elections and the unconstitutional revision of the Constitution, the government parties claim that the interim elections of 2 December for the Assembly of the Republic was a "milestone," the milestone of the "unstoppable" progress of the "AD."



This optimism is excessive.

We still trust that the workers and the democratic forces, whose unity and mutual action are becoming increasingly an urgent necessity, will manage to defend the Portugal of April and its conquests.

We still trust that the democratic institutions and forces are in a position to impede another unconstitutional electoral law or the establishment of the referendum.

We still trust that, when the next elections are held for the Assembly of the Republic within 8 months, under democratic conditions, the new "milestone" of the "AD" will not be a victory, but rather an electoral defeat, which will cause it to lose the weak majority in the Assembly that it has at present, consequently bringing about the fall of the present government, if it lasts that long.

The April revolution is alive, and quite alive in the hearts, the sentiments and the desires of the Portuguese people, who will manage to defend the Portugal of April, a Portugal free from fascism, a free, democratic and independent Portugal.

2909

CSO: 3101

## SOCIALIST PARTY LEADERSHIP MEETS, DEBATES STRATEGY

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Jan 80 p 8

[Article by Jose Rebello]

[Text] Porto--Open opposition without a split: so ended the Socialist Party's meeting of the National Committee which was held Saturday, 19 January and Sunday, 20 January in Porto.

The analysis of the past 2 December electoral defeat and the organization of the party's strategy in anticipation of the legislative and presidential elections this year gave rise to a lively enthusiasm among the Socialists. For some, the PS should do its utmost to recuperate its former rightist electorate lost to the benefit of Mr Sa Carneiro's Democratic Alliance. As for the others, they were intended mainly to make every effort to gather strength on the left and so prevent the gradual increase in the PCP's electoral weight. The former were termed "technocrats;" the latter, the "history minded" (so called because of their systematic adherence to the original official statements voted on during the first PS Congress in December 1974), wished to reopen the ideological discussion and emphasize its "Marxist inspiration."

Meetings with the secretariat and the board of directors followed one after the other throughout December without favorable results. Silhouetted behind this seemingly theoretical controversy were other issues. On the one hand, tactical problems. For the "history minded," it was necessary to give up any possibility of an agreement with the Social Democratic Party; to highlight the mutual sharing of interests between the PS and PCP worker-based groups; not to reject "a priori" the possibility of an entente with communists. The "technocrats," on the other hand, insisted on the need for the PS to take steps toward the establishment of a "central bloc" which, in the event of a split in the coalition now in power, would be set up on a Socialist and Social Democrat base.

To that is added the matter of manpower. Ever since the PS rose to power in 1976, it has prospered with the addition of young leaders from a whole new social stratum coming, for the most part from the Portuguese middle class. When, early in 1978, it confirmed its government agreement with the

CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], Mr Soares' party also opened up to a group of intellectuals, former militants in an extreme left organization, the MES [Movement of the Socialist Left] which had played an active part in 1975 at the height of the revolution. In short, the formation of the UGT [General Union of Workers] made possible the admission, under PS leadership, of a significant number of trade unionists, some of whom were fiercely anticommunist.

Relations between the "latest arrivals" and the party "old guard" (many of whom had been in the underground struggle against Salazar's regime, in Portugal or in exile). Personalities such as Messrs Manuel Alegre and Tito de Morais, for example, did not hide their displeasure on seeing the extremely rapid rise of an economist such as Mr Constancio, minister of economy and finance in Mr Soares' second government and the person mainly responsible for the agreement signed with the Internal Monetary Fund; of the jurist such as Mr Sampaio, who very quickly became one of the favorite advisers of Mr Soares, the party secretary general; of a trade unionist such as Mr Gonelha, president of the all-powerful Fontana Foundation, which is apparently channeling the funds coming from the International Socialist wealthy parties toward the Portuguese PC.

#### Mr Soares Uncontested

Thanks to the charismatic prestige of Mr Soares, the only one whom no one contested, a precarious balance was nevertheless achieved. The 1979 electoral defeat called everything again into question. The PS discovered that it was not the "eternal victor." Whose fault was it?

The "technocrats," who, according to their opponents would have cleared the PS of their class contents?

The "history minded," whose radicalism would have exhausted the voters, anxious above all else to find answers to their daily problems?

As usual, resignations followed one after the other. First of all, those of the nine board members (among whom a former minister of education, Mr Cardia), all considered moderates; then, the three secretariat 'history minded' members--Messrs Jaime Gama, Manuel Alegre and Tito de Morais, who want to be the party's left wing....

The national committee, PS upper organ between two congresses, was then to make a decision and it did so. The three secretariat members who had submitted their resignation were replaced by Messrs Lage, Madeira and Esteves--personalities who stir up little dispute within the party.

During the 2 days of meetings, discussions at times violent set the 'history minded' against other members of the national committee, particularly Messrs Soares and Zenha. Once the PS leader succeeded in having a strategic motion carried which does not disregard the majority of the amendments proposed by Mr Alegre's group, he undoubtedly scored a victory.

But for the first time in the hectic life of the young Portuguese Socialist Party, a movement representing about a third of the national committee's members, seems to be developing. It is to appear very soon when it presents lists pertaining to elections, for the new committee chairman, for the chairmanship of parliamentary group of the party's federation: a 'typical French' development which Soares has always condemned.

The majority who just withdrew, moreover, lack homogeneity. Between Mr Gonalves's trade unionists and those close to Mr Soares, there are deep-seated differences. They run the risk of becoming more marked when they choose a Socialist candidate for the presidential election.

In the strategic motion adopted, the PS avowed its "strong opposition" to the new parliamentary majority. It intends to denounce government activity aimed at "encouraging large private economic interests," at scrapping "widespread social reforms," at changing political and institutional systems. One of the "history minded" proposals which explains the rejection of the alliance with the social democratic party, the main political formation of the coalition of power, was defeated by 78 votes against 38 with 22 abstentions. All doors, therefore, remain open. The PS has committed itself to criticizing the PC both ideologically and politically, "but in such terms that this criticism could not be confused with that made by the right." For "we are a workers' party," it added.

Among the PS short term projects is the launching of a "democratic left movement," probably open to Social Democratic Party dissidents, for the establishment of a "phantom government" and the completion of a project for the revision of the constitutions.

8870  
CSO: 3100

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

11 March 80

*DD*



